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Dissertation

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF INVOLVED IN THE THOUGHT OF JAMES WARD, FREDERICK R. TENNANT, AND MARY W. CALKINS

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of the investigation

This investigation attempts to elaborate the metaphysics of the self involved in the writings of three Twentieth Century thinkers, James Ward, British psychologist and philosopher, Frederick Robertson Tennant, British theologian and philosopher, and Mary Whiton Calkins, American psychologist and philosopher. The three philosophers find a common denominator in their absorbing interest in problems of the self, various aspects and functions of which are emphasized by each thinker, and form the basis of his particular metaphysical views. Ward argues theism on the basis of the rational and teleological activities of 'dominant' and 'ministering' monads (finite selves) which together constitute a 'realm of ends' pointing to and revealing a creative God of love. The knowing function of the self is the epistemological axis on which Tennant's empirical argument for theism turns. The organic unity of the finite self is the analogy after which Professor Calkins conceives her "all-including" or absolute self.

Ward is renowned throughout the English-speaking world for his articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth and eleventh editions, especially for that so widely read and quoted, "Psychology", and for his later Psychological Principles, (1918) based on that article. Ward's psychology emphasizes the reality of the pure ego or subject (self in the transcendental function) and the non-atomic nature of presentations to the subject, who attends to and selects from a presentational whole, its objective continuum. Ward is also a metaphysical idealist, and his metaphysical works are likewise standard reference among contemporary philosophers, especially for their permanent value as a contribution to idealism. Naturalism and Agnosticism is a devastating refutation of the mechanistic speculation of naturalism. Ward regards the teleological interpretation of nature as more coherent than the mechanical. Nature when thus conceived is a teleological whole, the 'realm of nature'. Similarly in the Realm of Ends, the historical world is regarded as a pluralistic whole of monads striving after progressively higher good, which so teleologically interpreted, comprise a 'realm of ends' for whose highest unity and supreme End the practical reason postulates God as primus inter pares, the highest member of the realm, and immortality for the perfect realization of ends.

Because Tennant is convinced that the developed

belief in God must be mediated through knowledge of the self, mankind and the world, the "complete" theologian must not only have familiarity with metaphysical systems, but also a "selective" mastery of psychology and theory of knowledge (particularly of the self as knower, its capacities and faculties), and a sound mastery of scientific methods, results and limitations. Accordingly, the first volume of his Philosophical Theology is devoted to psychology and epistemology. A student of Ward at Cambridge, he acknowledges with gratitude a heavy indebtedness to his master's Psychological Principles. "Psychology", he tells us, "is the propaedeutic to theory of knowledge".[1] His epistemological method is to show by their genetic development that both knowledge and value are empirically derived, the result of interpretative activity of the pure ego (subject or soul) in understanding and appreciating its world, and of communication between selves.

Mary Whiton Calkins, Professor of Philosophy in Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., having come to this department after a previous tenure in psychology, is a widely known psychologist, and author of the textbooks, Introduction to Psychology, 1901, and First Book in Psychology, 1907. Professor Calkins's psychological writings,

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[1] Tennant, PT, I, 23n

and especially her more mature thought emphasize the central importance of the self in scientific psychology. Her self-psychology is a development from her earlier double standpoint of "ideas" and "selves," structural and self-psychology. She also holds the unique place of being the first woman in the history of philosophy to achieve distinction in that field. She has edited selections from Locke, Berkeley and Schopenhauer, and her chief works are Persistent Problems of Philosophy (1907) 1925, an expository-critical survey of modern and contemporary philosophy, whose concluding chapter is devoted to exposition of her own personal absolutism, and The Good Man and the Good, 1918, her ethical treatise. As a metaphysician she combines historical range with critical insight.

2. Definition of terms in the title

The term "metaphysics of the self" as employed in the title and throughout the investigation refers to its ultimate nature in relation to reality as a whole. It assumes therefore as did Plato, at the beginning of metaphysical inquiry, that reality can be known when experience is interpreted synoptically. By involved and derivatives it is intended to set forth what is reasonably suggested.

3. Previous studies germane to the present investigation

The titles of recent philosophical dissertations reveal no instance in which the three philosophers now

proposed for study have been joined together as the basis for special investigation. The many tributaries of James Ward's thought have made excellent fishing-ground for philosophical anglers. In 1926, John Sedberry Marshall wrote his Ph.D. dissertation in Boston University on The Continuum in James Ward's Philosophy. John Scott Pennepacker, in 1936, likewise wrote on The Body-Mind Problem in James Ward. In 1938, in a Boston University dissertation later published as The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought by the Harvard University Press, Peter Anthony Bertocci included Ward and Tennant as two of the four philosophers in his investigation of empirical theistic thought. Two years later, in 1940, Delton Lewis Scudder at Yale University investigated Philosophical Theology as argument for theism, in course of which such study of the self was made as was pertinent to the problem in hand. Scudder's work was later published by the Yale University Press under the title Tennant's Philosophical Theology. In 1942, for his doctoral dissertation in Boston University Ernest Reid Calvert chose the Panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong for systematic study.

The present inquiry will utilize from these valuable secondary sources any results which bear directly on the problem, and will indicate such use by appropriate footnotes.

4. Reasons for the present investigation

This study begins with the initial assumption that one's conception of the self is of profound significance for his views concerning the ultimate nature of the world and of God. Ward and Calkins would most assuredly agree on the thesis set forth by Tennant that "personality is our highest interpretative concept, for the theist it is the key to the universe."[2] Yet even a preliminary survey reveals the fact which investigation confirms that there is a fundamental difference in the complete organicism in conception of the self attained by Professor Calkins on the one hand and the only partial organicism involved in Ward and Tennant's conception on the other. Above all, since the most comprehensive truth is of paramount concern, to focus the intellectual spotlight on metaphysical differences is the first step toward the achievement of greater coherence in our thinking about the self.

As a by-product, it should also be possible to determine at least by inference, what is not directly within the province of the investigation, the relative merits of the conceptions presented for a theistic view of the universe.

5. Method of the investigation

The fact that in psychology we have to begin with a common denominator suggests comparison and a method of

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[2] Tennant, PT, I, 127.

procedure. After exploration of the theories of knowledge assumed in the thought of the philosophers, there will be an exposition of the psychology of the self which they hold, in order to determine its metaphysical inferences. This will be followed by a study of the respective interpretations of the universe, noting the metaphysics of the self implied in the area under investigation. Critical appraisals will represent the writer's own viewpoint in the formation of which he acknowledges profound gratitude to Professors Edgar Sheffield Brightman, his teacher in both undergraduate and graduate years, and Peter A. Bertocci of Boston University, under whose joint encouragement and guidance the investigation is attempted.

In the expository-critical method employed, the philosopher's thought will first receive sympathetic interpretation. Acceptance of the general philosophical position can be assumed in the absence of critical comment.

6. Biographical data regarding Ward, Tennant and Calkins

(1) Biographical data regarding Ward

James Ward was the son of a ne'er-do-well small-scale Liverpool merchant. His preparatory training had to be interrupted at the age of thirteen because of the failure of his well-intentioned father's business ventures. Ward, however, continued independent study in public libraries and with the aid of a Wesleyan Methodist tutor in Greek.[3]

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[3] Campbell in Ward, EIP, 7ff.

His undergraduate studies were pursued at Spring Hill College (later incorporated into Mansfield College, Oxford). His native ambition to be a scholarly person led him to try for and obtain the Williams Scholarship. Then by-passing Oxford, believing it to be too sceptical in spirit, he left Spring Hill College in the summer of 1869 for study in Germany.

Ward's intellectual development proceeded in conformity with his desire to be an enlightened and enlightening preacher in the ministry of the Congregational church. It should be recalled that he lived through the era of intellectual and religious ferment caused by the rise of evolutionary theory and the new historical standpoint in Biblical interpretation with their resultant demand for adjustment of theological thought. His daughter and biographer, Mrs. Olwen Ward Campbell refers to her father's intellectual development figuratively as "an adventurous pilgrimage from the dismal backwoods of a narrow Congregationalism, uncultured and Calvinistic" to "lands of unlimited speculation in science and philosophy" and to "broad vistas of liberal thought."[4] This was indeed a long trail presenting marked change of contrasting intellectual climates. To be sure, as his daughter states, on the pilgrimage he employed "the pointing compass of his own soul to chart his course,"

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[4] Campbell, in Ward, EIP, 1.

but it must also be added that the transition was successfully accomplished with the intellectual guidance of such world-famous teachers as Dorner of Berlin, the great New Testament scholar, and Lotze, the Göttingen personalistic philosopher, in whose lecture-rooms Ward may have touched elbows with fellow-pilgrims on a quest similar to his own from both sides of the Atlantic. In Germany Ward also came under the influence of Herbart and the Herbartians.[5]

His chief intellectual difficulty in Berlin had been the fate of immortality in the light of the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter. At a critical moment for him, when he left Berlin for Göttingen, it was Lotze, whose philosophical outlook saved him from the engulfing morass of pantheism and led him to find in personality the surer ground from which to advance.

If Göttingen marked a second milestone on the pilgrimage, a third and that of Ward's highest intellectual achievement came with his advent to Cambridge University in 1873. The previous year, discouraged with his inability to unite on the basis of a transition to liberal thought the varied elements of a Cambridge congregation to which he had been called on his return from Germany in 1870, Ward decided upon the more congenial atmosphere of university cloister. He entered as a non-collegiate student,

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[5] Campbell, in Ward, EIP, 23ff.

then in 1873, tried for and won a scholarship in Moral Science offered by Trinity College. This enabled him, while at work on the London B.Sc. examination, to attend Sidgwick's lectures.

Sidgwick was his spiritual benefactor in these days of disappointment and thwarting of his earlier high hopes of serving humanity in the Christian ministry. Sidgwick's ethics, of a strongly social emphasis, brought intellectual satisfaction, and occasional personal conversations brought the moral inspiration to serve humanity by teaching. Exultantly, with this decision fixed, he writes his sister Lucy, "Can we not still sit at the feet of the world's noblest and best spirits and learn of them?" When in 1874, Ward was elected Fellow in Moral Science in Trinity College, for "distinction in the moral sciences," it was to begin at this seat of his highest intellectual triumph, an official connection that lasted till his death. His dissertation on "The Relation of Physiology to Psychology" adumbrates the topic of his dominant philosophical concern. It had presented his chief intellectual difficulty while in Germany, and in Psychological Principles he will say of it,

> These two problems--the relation of body to mind and the reality of external perception have continued to vex philosophical thinkers from Descartes' day to our own, nor will they cease to trouble us till dualism is laid to rest.[6]

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[6] Ward, PP, 12.

The topic of his dissertation as Fellow in Moral Science indicates a good start in preparing for its metaphysical demise.[7]

Psycho-physical investigations were still an untilled corner in the new field of psychological science, and the year 1876 saw Ward again bound for Germany, this time to spend a year in the physiological laboratory of Ludwig at Leipzig. Like Lotze, Bergson and others he came to metaphysical study of the self after exploration of its physiological concomitants.

In 1885, his first major publication appeared, the article "Psychology" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, ninth edition, as an earlier commentator has aptly expressed it, "to turn over anew the psychological soil of England for the sake of a new sowing."[8] The article on "Herbart" had appeared in 1879, and a series of papers prepared for the Moral Sciences Club had offered opportunity for the development of his new standpoint in Psychology. The Britannica article established Ward's position as psychologist, and well-merited honors began to pour in on him. Edinburgh conferred on him the honorary degree of Sc.D. He became one of the original members of the British Academy and was elected to membership in the Institut de France. An invitation to the Gifford Lectureship in Natural Theology,

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[7] Campbell, in Ward, EIP, 53.
[8] Bertocci, EAG, 93.

in 1894, was the occasion for synthesizing results of his scientific and psychological speculation, and his lectures published under the title Naturalism and Agnosticism,(1899) 1906 are an exposition of the false assumptions of mechanistic philosophy. They were followed by a second Gifford series, The Realm of Ends, (1911) 1912 setting forth his spiritual interpretation of reality.

In 1897 he was elected to the new chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic in Cambridge University, and so came into close contact with a world-wide audience of scholars. In the summer of 1904, he extended his travel by a visit to America. A lecture at the University of California at Berkeley, "Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints" is published in a posthumous volume, Essays in Philosophy.

(2) Biographical data regarding Tennant

In Tennant's undergraduate days in Caius College, Cambridge, orthodoxy was under fire from a speculative attack by followers of Thomas Huxley, whose evolutionary philosophy found common ground with the historical standpoint of literary criticism of the Bible by adherents of the Tübingen school. Awakened by what might easily be viewed as a serious set-back of the faith, and confident that increasing knowledge of more adequate truth would leave the Christian faith unimpaired and perhaps strength-

ened for the encounter with scientific knowledge, Tennant entered upon what proved to be a life-long quest for the completest truth obtainable when to the thesis of Christian revelation had been brought the antithesis of modern scientific knowledge.

In 1887, he took part one of the tripos in Natural Science, and two years later, part two in chemistry. The teachers at Cambridge under whose influence Tennant especially came were Henry Sidgwick, J. M. E. McTaggart, and James Ward. It is clear that Ward's thought, and in particular, his psychology was a guiding influence in the development of Tennant's own philosophical standpoint, a debt which he handsomely acknowledges, and recommends to immature theological students the Psychological Principles as being an objective science of psychology, which could be read "from cover to cover without the reader being able to guess from it what are the author's metaphysical convictions."[9]

Following college days, Tennant was for three years 1894-1897, Senior Science Master at his own preparatory high school at Newcastle-under-Lyme, then after requisite private study, was ordained in the Church of England, and began three year's ministry as Curate of St. Matthews, Wallsall. Then he was called to be chaplain of Caius, his undergraduate College at Cambridge, a period which saw the development of his own philosophical standpoint.[10]

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[9] Tennant, PT, I, viii.

[10] Who's Who, 1946; Bertocci, in Ferm, EOR. art. "Tennant"; Bertocci, EAG, 192ff.

His earliest theological writings were on the problem of moral evil, and he is a recognized authority in this field. In 1901, he was invited to deliver the Hulsean Lectures in the University of Cambridge. The four lectures resulted in the publication of his first important work, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, 1902. In the preface, he indicates that the lectures presuppose a larger work, then in preparation, a historical treatment of the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. This larger work actually appeared a year later, dated at the Hockwold Rectory, 1903, entitled, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. To this period also belongs "The Child and Sin" in a work edited by Stephens, called The Child and Religion, 1904.

On the strength of these writings Tennant was appointed Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion at Cambridge in 1907, and later in 1913 Lecturer in Theology, a post which he held until 1938.

Another area of special theological interest is Christian theism as confronted by modern science, indicated by the topic of his graduate thesis, "The Being of God in the Light of Physical Science," Miracle and its Philosophical Presuppositions, 1925, and numerous articles in religious and philosophical journals. The culmination of his intellectual quest for a complete rationale of theistic belief

in the light of physical science was reached with the publication of his magnum opus, Philosophical Theology, in two volumes, I, The Soul and its Faculties, 1928, II, The World, the Soul and God,1930. A later work considering "relations or want of relations between the different departments of knowledge" resulted in the Tarner Lectures, The Philosophy of the Sciences, 1932. Tennant retired from active teaching in 1938.

(3) Biographical data regarding Calkins

Professor Calkins prefaced her distinguished career of psychological and philosophical writing with a high school graduation essay in the Newton, Massachusetts, High School on "The Apology Plato should have written." The title joins her early philosophical interest to a plea for Xantippe whom she aimed to vindicate.[11] Professor Calkins's higher education went forward at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, where, in 1885 she received the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Travel to the Continent followed with study at the University of Leipzig in 1886. In 1888 she received from Smith the degree of Master of Arts, and the same year joined the teaching staff of Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, as tutor in Greek and instructor in Psychology, 1890. She remained as Professor of Philosophy in this institution till 1929,

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[11] Bussey, in DAB, art, "Mary Whiton Calkins."

when she was appointed Research Professor, and returned to Newton, Massachusetts, to write a book on Religion, a plan which was never consummated.

Her graduate study at Harvard University was carried forward during the early days of Wellesley teaching. Among her greatest intellectual benefactors was William James, with whom she began the serious study of Psychology as a graduate student. His Principles of Psychology was fresh from the press in 1890, and in a seminar with James when she was the only remaining student of the registrants, she reports having received from the "brilliant, erudite and provocative volumes" and from the Mark Hopkins-to-a-student discussion of that seminar "a vivid sense of the reality of finite individual minds."[12] Edmund C. Sanford, the experimental psychologist at the Clark University (Worcester) psychological laboratory directed her research into dream phenomena, a study later published as "Statistics of Dreams" in The American Journal of Psychology, 5(1893). Her first contribution to the literature of Psychology was the revision of a paper first prepared for James on association. It was published in The Philosophical Review, 1892, and reprinted as a monograph supplement of Psychological Review, 1896, Association.

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[12] Calkins, in Murchison (ed.), HPA, 31.

Another outstanding teacher of Miss Calkins was Hugo Münsterburg. In 1892, when Miss Calkins was planning to seek admission to his Freiburg laboratory, Münsterburg came to Harvard, and she worked under his direction in the psychological laboratory. She completed brilliantly the full work for the doctor of philosophy degree, but Harvard University refused to confer it on a woman, and offered her instead a Radcliffe degree which she promptly refused. But even her natural disappointment could not dim her enthusiastic gratitude to her intellectual benefactors. Of the experience she writes

> My natural regret at the action of the Harvard Corporation has never clouded my gratitude for the incomparably greater boon which they granted, that of working in the seminaries and the laboratory of the great Harvard teachers. My debt, both academic and personal to these men, to James, Royce, Palmer and Munsterburg may be acknowledged, but can never be repaid.[13]

No doubt her extensive research and laboratory studies under the expert guidance of these great teachers account for her comprehensive viewpoint in psychology. Whether in her presentation of the "idea" standpoint (and she confesses to having employed Titchener's Outlines and Primer for teaching general psychology) or that of the "selves," of which she is the doughty protagonist, Miss Calkins is an authority in the field. "Every experience,"

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[13] Calkins, in Murchison (ed.), HPA, I, 35.

she writes, "may be treated alike from the atomistic (structural) and from the self-psychology standpoint."[14] This thesis was maintained in an article written in German, "Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," 1895, and in her platform articles, "Elements of Conscious Complexes" in The Psychological Review, 7 (1900), 300-389 and "Psychology as Science of Selves" in The Philosophical Review, 9 (1900). These articles mark the beginning of a program of systematic study of the relative merits of the two standpoints.

The standpoint of "self-psychology" in scientific psychology was developed by way of reaction to the exclusive use of the structural method, which ignored the self. She writes, "Both conceptions are useful," and the policy of psychologists vacillating irresolutely between one and the other is to be deprecated.[15] She cites her earliest advocacy of "self-psychology" in published articles of 1892 and 1893. Then followed a period of systematic study of the relative merits of the two standpoints on the basis of her "platform" articles. She acknowledges the influence of James's chapter on the stream of consciousness and J. M. Baldwin and Josiah Royce on the social nature of the self. She also profited from Ward's article "Psychology" in

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[14] Calkins, in Murchison (ed.), HPA, I, 39.
[15] Calkins, in Murchison (ed.), HPA, I, 36.

Encyclopaedia Britannica.[16]

In Philosophy Miss Calkins's first teacher had been Charles E. Garman, of Smith College, whom she credits with guiding her into the line of thought which culminates in idealistic philosophy.[17] That Royce's Absolute Idealism had much to do with the development of her own Absolutistic Personalism will be obvious as investigation proceeds.

To this distinguished American scholar came deserved honors from learned societies on both sides of the Atlantic. She was elected President of the American Psychological Association and of the American Philosophical Association, and held Honorary membership in The British Psychological Association.

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[16] Calkins, in Murchison (ed.), HPA, I, 39.

[17] Calkins, in footnote to an unpublished article, "The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic Personalist." n.d. For Professor Calkins's place in philosophy cf. Brightman, Art. (1930) Wellesley Alumnae Mag., 14, 307-310.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF WARD, TENNANT AND CALKINS

1. Ward's analytic-synoptic method

(1) Thought backgrounds in relation to method

James Ward's philosophical method illustrates the thesis that a philosopher's native interest and general thought backgrounds largely determine his method. Ward's method may quite fittingly be termed analytic-synoptic. He not only explicitly advocates it in his University of California address, "Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints," but also had come to recognize the importance of the view of the whole by way of a previous long-standing interest in science and analytic method, that had warranted high commendation for his "scientific mode of thought."[1] He could therefore both defend the exact methods of science and yet be sure that mechanism failed to account for man's moral and religious experience. To the refutation of naturalism in his first series of Gifford Lectures, he could bring the insight that the scientific method which culminated in mechanistic philosophy had to be supplemented with the more inclusive view of the whole of experience. Science is bent on the

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[1] Campbell, in Ward, EIP, 19.

discovery of elements and fundamental processes, but we have to face life and the world as a whole if we would truly discover its meaning. Accordingly, to the analytic method by which only parts and their relations can be discovered, must be added the synoptic, in order to obtain the view of the whole with its spiritual bond. Then we find that while we have to do indeed with a 'Realm of Nature,' we have also to face it as a 'Realm of Ends.'

(2) The two sides of method, analysis and synopsis, must receive equal emphasis

Analysis, as Hegel put it, is like "peeling off the coats of an onion." But continues Ward, "The error lies in forgetting that analysis is only half the process, and that the main point is the reunion and interpretation of what has been divided." Although we may have the parts in our hand, we may have lost the spiritual bond that makes them a living whole.[2] Nevertheless, Ward insists, and his insistence accounts for his failure to lean more heavily on synopsis, that we cannot have the articulate whole without the several members of which it consists.

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[2] Ward, EIP, 185. The reference to Goethe's often-quoted lines is obvious.

2. Ward's rational empiricism

(1) Reasons for characterization

Ward's theory of knowledge, here denoted rational empiricism, is a further illustration of his philosophic method. He will neither, on the one hand, be an adherent of Locke's _tabula rasa_ view of experience, nor on the other of Leibniz's theory of 'windowless' monads, trying to explore reality _a priori_ from the inside. His empiricism transcends sense experience and includes in the context of experience its teleological and moral factors.

(2) Duality of subject and object in the unity of experience is epistemologically ultimate

i. Duality is to be taken concretely

The ultimate upon which knowledge rests and from which its development begins is the basic primordial duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. The concreteness of this relation is to be emphasized. It is in the interaction between subject and object that knowledge has its genesis. The subjective elements in experience are presupposed and implied in the experience of objects. These elements, besides the _a priori_ factors of space and time are feeling, the subject's "one primordial capacity," experienced in the affective states of pleasure and displeasure consequent on the

apprehension of objects; conation, the subject's experience of want, either of continuance or change of objects; and attention, the subject's "one faculty," involving both awareness and conative action.

The existence of these subjective elements revealed in experience when it has begun warrants the assertion that the subjective elements are not wholly *a priori*, but are 'given' only in connection with the experience of objects. On the other hand, the objective elements of experience are not independent of the conscious, attending, selective knower, whose motives and interests are shaped by the paramount end of self-conservation and self realization.

> We start then with this duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. What a subject would be without objects or what objects without a subject would be...unknowable; for in truth the knowledge of either apart is a contradiction...It is true that what we take and what we find we must take and find as it is given. But on the other hand, it is also true that we do not take--at least do not take up--what is uninteresting; nor do we find unless we seek, or seek unless we desire...Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-conservation, self-realization, we must conclude that it is not that content of objects which the self cannot alter that gives them their place in experience, but their worth, positive or negative, their goodness or badness as ends or means to life.[3]

The concreteness of this duality is an emphatic denial of any dualism of disparate metaphysical

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[3] Ward, NA, 404, 425f.

substances. It is also a denial of any theory construing sensations as subjective modifications. They are in the mind, but are presentations of an object to a subject. All knowledge therefore has an objective or transcendent reference. In this, Ward is an epistemological dualist. Nor is individual experience to be regarded either as naive realism would have it, as originated by an external object, or as Kant held, by an unknown Ding an sich. The latter view is as objectionable as the former because it rests upon the false assumption of a dualism of matter and mind of which the external world is phenomenon.[4]

ii. The subject-object relation itself is not causal

Concerning the subject-object relation a caveat is entered against assuming that since there is interaction between subject and object, the relation itself is causal. Causality logically presupposes reality, and it is subject and object in the unity of experience which Ward holds to constitute reality. The category of causality is employed to account for distinctions of antecedent and consequent within experience. The duality of experience would cease to be a unity if the whole were bifurcated in order that either one or the other fork may be taken as causally efficient. If we are not to entertain the notion of an Absolute in order to have the unity out-

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[4] For exposition of Ward's theory of presentations, cf.98. Also for factors involved in regarding presentations as mental, cf.137ff.

last the duality, duality in unity must be taken as the epistemological ultimate, the fundamental and inexplicable fact of experience.[5]

> I do not mean to deny that there are causal relations between subject and object, object and subject, quite the contrary--I only mean to demur to the assumption that the subject-object relation itself is causal..
>
> If we disabuse ourselves of the psychological fiction of isolated sensations pattering like spots of rain on a tabula rasa from an outer nowhere; if we think instead of an objective factor (or presentational continuum) as an unbroken whole--as much a whole as a mere continuum can be--then we see, I think, that this--for experience--absolutely fundamental relation cannot be causal.[6]

(3) Knowledge in individual experience arises on the sense level

i. Knowledge arises in sense experience

Knowledge is throughout a conative-cognitive development, experienced on the levels of sense and thought, individual and common knowledge. It arises in sense presentation, and "throughout all experience there is something there of which the subject is aware, by which it is affected, and with which it interacts."[7] However, bare presentation, apart from retentiveness of the objective continuum to which the new sense datum is assimilated, could furnish no knowledge. Sense data are only the ground or fundamenta on which the fabric

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5. Ward, NA, 416-423.
6. Ward, NA, 409f.
7. Ward, art., Mind, (1919) 28, 257-274.

of sense-knowledge is raised.[8]

ii. The sensory origin of impersonal propositions

Failure to apprehend the epistemological significance of impersonal and existential propositions based on sense data and expressed by use of the neuter pronoun "it" and a verb in the singular, as "it rains," etc., is due to the bias that logic deals only with conceptual thought. Nevertheless, they are existential propositions, and emphasize only the thesis which they express, and are impersonal only in lacking definite synthesis, implying only the continuum to which they refer. Such knowledge testifies to a particular occurrence in some individual experience. It is characterized by the distinguishing categories of sense, intensity, quality, extensity and protensity.

(4) Continuity and difference are traceable from sense-knowledge to thought-knowledge

i. Thought-knowledge is implicit in sense perception

From the level of sense-knowledge, experience of the concrete individual, to that of thought-knowledge (common knowledge), psychology shows continuity and development. Thought knowledge is implicit at the perceptual level. Besides the *a priori* perceptual factors of space and time, at the level of sense-knowledge there is rudimentary apprehension, by the subject, of relations which at the

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[8] Ward, in Muirhead (ed.), CBP, II, 30.

thought level yield the categories of identity and difference, unity and quality.

ii. Ideas are derived from sense data by intellectual construction

Not only is there continuity but also difference to be noted in the transition to ideas. These pertain to the relata rather than their relations. Most important, ideas unlike percepts present no actual. They may postulate but cannot posit existents. Again, ideas are only formal. They are abstract intellectual constructs, which due to limitation of prehension span on the part of the subject, lack detail, especially time and place marks. They are archetypal, relevant only to the perceptual in which they were implicit. Finally, they involve symbolization.[9]

(5) The development of thought-knowledge is a function of inter-subjective intercourse

The advance from sense-knowledge to thought-knowledge could not have been made apart from inter-subjective intercourse, and this involves knowledge of other selves, and, prior to that, knowledge of one's own self and things.

i. Self-knowledge, knowledge of other selves and reification develop pari passu

We come then to Ward's account of these three epistemological stages. The self first knownis the bodily self,

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[9] Ward, in Muirhead (ed.), CBP, II, 32f.

perceived as a definite group of qualities in constant union with each other in contrast with other objects in our environment that are only intermittently presented. As qualities of the latter 'hang together,' reification follows in their case. In the case of the bodily self, we find in addition that action upon it is accompanied by feeling and that the body can be made to move to satisfy conation. The body thenceforth becomes 'me' as distinct from 'it.' The 'me' in comparison with the 'it' is found not only to be identical but also constant. By analogy with ourselves the objects in our environment when reified are treated as possessing individuality and persisting reality. Similarly by ejective analogy the active bodies of others are regarded as ourselves, possessing individuality and substantiality. The twin categories of substance and cause as efficient agent are thus born. Self-knowledge or self-consciousness, knowledge of other selves and of the world of things develop pari passu.[10]

ii. Teleological and practical significance of thought-knowledge aids its development

At the level of intersubjective intercourse, continued teleological interest of the selfand the practical significance of knowledge are important factors in its

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[10] Ward, NA, 404, 462ff. Enc. Brit.(11th ed.), XXII, "Psychology," 550, 555, 598f; cf. his book, PP, 370.

accelerated development. When individuals live in a society in interaction with each other and in interaction with a common environment there is a sympathetic rapport which determines thought-knowledge as more real and valuable in comparison to sense-knowledge, which at best represents only systematic description of the perceptual, lacking the fuller meanings conceived by a plurality of subjects.[11]

The teleological significance of knowledge is clearly evident from its originally hypothetical character and from the biological axiom that self-preservation is the first law of life. 'Laws of nature,' originally hypotheses to be verified, are the presupposition of scientific knowledge. And the very striving of individuals in the social medium to gain a fuller and richer life for self and society becomes a strong incentive to come to a sympathetic understanding of the environment making it more comprehensible in terms of mind, and leads to an ever expanding and yet never fully complete development of knowledge.[12]

3. Critical evaluation of Ward's rational empiricism

(1) Ward's conception of experience as the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience makes for incomplete organic unity of the self

When experience is constituted into epistemological subject and object, the knowing function of the self,

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[11] For further discussion of sympathetic rapport cf. 221f.

[12] Ward, NA, 511. RE, 11, 23, 413ff.

distinguishable but not separable, is abstracted and hypostatized. The self is no longer a true whole. Its unity is "reduced to an als ob status."

> The finite self is a genuine whole, an experienced unity, in which reason and sense are inseparable aspects of one indivisible mind...If idealists were to speak of empirical aspects or problems or transcendental aspects or problems, constantly making clear that both types of aspect refer to one and the same identical finite self, then thought would be less ambiguous, idealism would be more consistent, and much confusing half-intended hypostatization would be avoided... It would become unambiguously clear that the "pure ego" and the "empirical ego" are experiences of the same finite self, namely each and every normal finite self in the world...In short he (the idealist) would recognize that experience exists only in experience; that real consciousness exists only as real selves.[13]

(2) Ward intends the organic unity of the self

There is ample evidence that Ward intends the organic unity of the self. He insists on the concreteness of the duality of subject and object. Experience is regarded as a unity of cognition, conation, feeling and interest. The subjective elements of experience, although only revealed in connection with the experience of objects, are conceived to be of prior existence. He holds that the category of causality is employed only to account for distinctions of antecedent and consequent within experience, but that experience en bloc constitutes reality. Neither subject nor object in the interaction

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[13] Brightman, in Barrett, CIA, 181ff.

from which knowledge arises is to be regarded as causally efficient. Finally, he rightly protests against the psychological atomism that would interpret the objective factor (or presentational continuum) as "isolated spots of rain pattering on a tabula rasa from an outer nowhere."

(3) Ward abstracts and hypostatizes distinguishable but non-separable functions of the self and fails to attain organic unity

But Ward's intended organic unity fails of attainment because his justifiable analytic distinction of functions of the self is hypostatized into subject and object. The self is more than duality. It is a complex of sense perception, thought, feeling, will, memory and purpose, etc., each of which gives its distinctive meaning and character to the whole. Apart from the whole, abstracted hypostatized aspects are found to engender confusion. So in the Tennant-Wardian psychology, the pure ego (a transcendental aspect of the self) is conceived to be of prior existence to the "empirical ego" (an empirical aspect of the self) and a status is implied for the former as superior to personality, which it is held to elaborate in the course of experience of organic sensations.[14]

(4) Ward's emphasis on the teleological development of knowledge is equalled by that of Bowne and Royce

Emphasis on the teleological interest of the self in

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[14] Cf. critical evaluation of this genetic process, 333.

the development of knowledge and its predominantly conative rather than cognitive significance find an important near parallel in the writings of two contemporary American idealists, Borden Parker Bowne and Josiah Royce. They testify in this respect to their common epistemological descent from the Kantian primacy of the practical reason and their common opposition to the mechanistic conception of the universe.

i. Bowne's argument is directed primarily against a purely intellectualistic view of knowledge

Bowne argues for the practical nature of belief as against the barrenness of the 'rigor and vigor' method of logical demonstration. Ward's view of the teleological and practical significance of knowledge was directed as refutation to the naturalistic and mechanistic interpretations of the universe then current and notable espoused by Herbert Spencer, in refutation of which Bowne also wrote. Parallel quotations exhibit the marked similarity of emphasis. Bowne writes:

> Man has been considered solely as an intellect or understanding, whereas he is a great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical understanding. Man is also a practical being, in highly complex interaction with his fellows and with the system of things. Before he argues he must live; before he speculates he must come to some sort of practical understanding with himself, with his neighbors and the physical order. This practical life has been the source of human belief and

> the constant test of its validity; that is of its truth...When it is seen that belief is made for us as well as by us, that it is wrought out in action rather than speculation, that the great outlines of belief are the product of life itself, then the basal catholic beliefs of humanity and the unfolding tendencies to believe begin to acquire the significance of any other great natural product. They show the direction of the evolving movement, the trend of the universe of mind.[15]

ii. Royce regards knowledge as a teleological development

> We do not indeed say, our will causes our ideas. But we do say, our ideas now imperfectly embody our will. And the real world is just our whole will embodied... The thinking process itself is a process whereby at once meanings tend to become determinate, and external objects tend to become internal meanings...Increase of knowledge therefore would really involve increase of determination in your present meaning.[16]

iii. Ward equally emphasizes the teleological nature of knowledge

> But what of the conception itself of this systematic unity and invariable conformity to law? That too, I say, is teleological, is a means to the end, knowledge itself. It is of the nature of a hypothesis or postulate and differs from other hypotheses or postulates relating to objective reality only in the fact that it underlies them all.....Moreover that intellective or selective synthesis by which I make them mine (perceptions)--though I do not make them absolutely--is determined primarily by an affinity of interest, not by an affinity of 'content' is a function of life first, not of logic.[17]

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[15] Bowne, TTK, 576f.
[16] Royce, WI, I, 37ff.
[17] Ward, NA, 426, 522, 526.

4. Metaphysics of the self involved in Ward's rational empiricism

(1) The argument of Ward's rational empiricism involves the monadic unity and identity of the self

Experience is regarded as a unity of cognition, conation, feeling and interest. The concreteness of the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience is emphasized; the subject is experienced only in relation to the object, and is distinguishable, but not separable therefrom. Causality which presupposes ultimate reality must not be attributed to either subject or object in the interaction from which knowledge arises, because it is their duality in the unity of experience that constitutes reality.

(2) Ward's conception of experience as duality in unity involves an incomplete organic unity of the self

The epistemological duality of subject and object depends on abstraction and hypostatization. But the knowing aspect of the self can only be understood in the light of its membership in the whole self, which is more than duality; it is a complex of sense perception, thought, feeling, will memory, and purpose,, etc., each of which gives meaning to the whole. Incomplete organicism is therefore involved.

(3) Ward's rational empiricism involves a mentalistic metaphysics

All knowledge, whether apprehended in sense perception

or developed in intersubjective intercourse is the experience of selves. Presentations, though not to be conceived as modifications of the subject, are mental, because they are 'given' in experience.

(4) Ward's argument involves an activistic metaphysics and metaphysical freedom

Attention is an act of the subject motivated by interest in its self-conservation and self-realization. In the activity that follows conation, the self is a "fighter for ends." This implies its ability to choose, and metaphysical freedom.

(5) Time and space and the transcendence of time and space are involved in Ward's argument

Knowledge is conceived as a conative and cognitive development in a world of process and this implies space and time. The unity of the self implies its transcendence of space, and the retentiveness of the objective continuum to which new sense data are assimilated implies the transcendence of time.

(6) The self involved in Ward's argument experiences meaning, and response to its environment

In the sense-knowledge of the self are found the precursors of later-developed categories, so that in sense perception the self is aware of meaning. With inter-subjective intercourse comes wider content of meaning and consequent indefinite expansion of knowledge.

(7) Ward's argument involves the privacy of the self

Ward's monads have "windows" through which interaction with other selves is attained. This implies their privacy which is transcended in inter-subjective intercourse.

5. Tennant's empirical method

Philosophical method for Tennant first and foremost must be concerned with adherence to observable fact. This is the external control that must guide a philosophy of the actual. Philosophy must begin at the beginning of observable fact. That even this pristine datum, due to its humble origin may involve animistic speculation or other prehistoric metaphysics need not dismay us, if it is our earliest fact-datum and our earliest point of departure.

This body of presumptive or common sense knowledge, when taken without suppression, mutilation or previous bias and "reading-in" of preconceived theory, must be the analysandum from which metaphysical analytica and logical presuppositions are to be derived.[18] It affords the only extant version of the original of which metaphysics should be a translation.

Empiricism contrasts with the a priori method, which instead of 'discovering' data, like mathematics, postulates its axioms. The 'discovery' rather than 'creating' of data

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[18] "Reading-in" and its opposite, "reading-off" are frequently used by Tennant. The former means suppositious interpretation, the latter, apprehension with immediacy.

represents our only external control, whereby to distinguish between speculative gnosticism and a philosophy of experience.

> If to set out from fact and to keep in touch with fact be called empiricism, then, whatever else is found necessary, the empirical method is a sine qua non for knowledge of actuality of any sort.[19]

6. Tennant's genetico-analytical theory of knowledge[20]

(1) Epistemology involves historical connections and theistic argument.

The most inclusive approach to Tennant's theory of knowledge is by viewing his treatment of epistemological problems.[21] One could, of course, try to comprehend it from the standpoint of articulation with his demonstration of theism, or in the light of its historical ante-

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[19] Tennant, PT, 1, 5. Note on actual, Real and derivatives. For clearness the terms 'actual', 'Real' and their derivatives are defined as used by Tennant. The 'actual' is the perceptual existent. When capitalized, to be consistent, Actual should mean the conceptual, related interpretatively for sense experience. Since, however, there may be 'existents' which cannot be known by sense the Actual need not imply the 'existent'. For example, the astronomer's Sun and the God of theism, cannot be known by sense, but may nevertheless exist. The conceptual Actual is thus indefinite and there may be 'existents' unknowable by sense. The Real is the Actual in the correct conceptual sense above defined, and may refer to the phenomenal in Kantian usage or physical Objects of common sense realism and the molar physicist, thought to be permanent and independent of perception. Reality refers to ultimate reality, things in themselves or electrons of the microscopic physicist. Instead of Reality, Tennant more frequently uses the term the 'ontal'.

[20] This term is employed because it is used by Tennant prior to reaching his developed theory of knowledge, phenomenalism. It describes the method whereby phenomenalism is reached. Cf. 61.

[21] Cf. 39.

cedents. As to the former, he tells us that it is through knowledge of the self, the world and God that theism is mediated, and the crux of the epistemological problem might be expected to be found at these points. We do find that the self provides the key to knowledge of the world and God. Psychology acquires special importance for epistemology, and the result is a psychological theory of knowledge.

Again, viewing his theory of knowledge in relation to logical predecessors, chiefly James Ward, his master, himself primarily a psychologist, Tennant may be said, as a faithful disciple carrying on in the spirit of the master, to make explicit what has been found only implicit in Ward. Another clearly evident historical influence, in disagreement as well as agreement, is that of Immanuel Kant. Indeed, after rigorous examination of theories of knowledge with respect to their adequacy to meet the requirements of his genetico-analytical theory, he finds that with necessary modification "this theory of knowledge (the Kantian) is by far the most satisfactory of those yet considered."[22] He modifies Kant's logical "deduction" of the categories demonstrating their psychological derivation, and amplifies Kant's doctrine of the Ding an sich, assigning to it a function beyond that of a

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[22] Tennant, PT, I, 243.

necessary limiting concept. As to the relation to Ward, one would hesitate to apply the term genetic to Ward's theory of knowledge, but the broad outlines of a genetic theory are present. Development from the level of sense-knowledge to that of thought-knowledge is bridged by the lex continui, which applies throughout. Although Tennant derives his psychology of valuation from Ward, Ward himself does not apply the genetic principle in the field of axiology. "Truth," he holds, "is eternal." We do not make the realm of truth, we only "enter" it.[23]

Because it will also involve consideration of these two possible approaches we shall follow a more direct approach of regarding it as a theory of knowledge in itself, coming to grips with such epistemological problems as the origin and nature of knowledge, the nature of the object known, whether dependent on or independent of the knower, to what extent knowing makes a difference to the known object, etc.

(2) The convergence of empirical method and genetico-analytical psychology in a theory of knowledge

Empirical method and genetico-analytical psychology converge in theory of knowledge. Epistemologically regarded, the empirical method means proceeding by way of the ordo cognoscendi. While conceding a ratio essendi,

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[23] Tennant, PT, I, 180. Ward, PAE, 153.

known if even in part, Tennant's approach is genetico-analytical, analytical procedure being joined to the genetic to avoid the dangers of the latter. Finally, empirical method requires a psychological theory of knowledge. Locke, who pioneered psychological theory of knowledge, looked in the right direction but could only defectively pursue it for lack of a scientific psychology, now made available by the progress of knowledge. The more recent science of psychology dictates a radical difference in epistemological standpoint, a recognition of the distinction between individual and common experience. F. C. S. Schiller, the Oxford humanist is additional authority for psychological epistemology. Philosophical method and genetico-analytical psychology converge in epistemology, and we turn now to the latter.

(3) Knowledge is a development of subject-object duality

Knowledge is conceived as a development in individual and common experience of the subject-object duality revealed in consciousness.

i. Self-consciousness the primary datum for epistemology

Self-consciousness or knowledge of self, the primary datum for psychology, is also primary for epistemology. Knowledge of the self and knowledge of other selves in the

Tennant-Wardian view advance pari passu. Self-knowledge begins at the ideational level of experience, when the pure ego or implicit self as subject apprehends the body perceptually as object, 'me' - its relative unity, permanence and active response to volition in contrast with other things in the environment. Other selves are known by ejective analogy with ourselves when their bodies are perceived to behave as our own.

Because of the basic importance of self-consciousness for Tennant's theistic argument, we present, even prior to the more detailed exposition of his psychology given in a subsequent chapter, such aspects of the theory as are pertinent to epistemology. For Tennant, as for Ward, the distinction between the pure ego (the knowing self) and empirical ego (the self known) is needed to account for and explain the presentation of the self in self-consciousness, or the knowledge that I am knowing myself. Stated otherwise, any act of knowledge involves a subject and object. But when the object known is the self, the conception of the pure ego is needed as the subject of that actof knowledge. It is conceived as a substratum bond for the unity of the states and acts of consciousness, and is not immediately experienced but noumenally known. It is that to which phenomena appear. The 'I' or pure ego is known in the 'me' or empirical ego, its acts, states, and objects, which are

a presentation to it. The empirical ego is "the pure ego plus its states, relations, and objects," that is, the mental life and its owner. "Every single drop in the stream of consciousness (empirical ego) must have its subject" or owner (pure ego).[24]

ii. Consciousness the starting point

Because consciousness is logically prior to self-consciousness, Tennant, invoking his first use of analysis, begins with consciousness. It is unique, ultimate and reveals throughout the duality of subject and object in the unity of consciousness.

(4) Refutation of rationalism

Private non-conceptual knowledge and public conceptual knowledge are not constituted, as rationalism holds, *a priori*, independent of sense.

i. Necessary preliminary distinction in epistemological standpoint

In order to comprehend the difference between private, unshared knowledge and later developed public conceptual knowledge, a preliminary fundamental distinction in epistemological standpoint **must** be recognized between the subject of individual experience, prior to enrichment by the effect of social intercourse, symbolized by S, and the subject of conceptual or shared knowledge, which results from communication with other subjects, symbolized by Σ.

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[24] Tennant, PT, 75ff. Cf. Bertocci, EAG, 202ff.

ii. Tennant's definition of object

Further, in order to avoid ambiguity that often attaches to the use of the term 'object,' Tennant explicitly defines his own usage at the two stages of knowledge correlative with those stages distinguished above in the treatment of the subject. The psychological object of individual non-conceptual knowledge, also termed idion, (pl. idia) perceived in individual sense experience is hereafter symbolized by the lower case letter 'o.' When 'o' is identified with a subjective state as by subjective idealism, it is denoted by small sigma 'σ.' The conceptual object of social intercourse is symbolized by capitalization, 'O.' The thing in itself, the noumenal object which en rapport with the subject causes sensa is denoted by small omega, 'ω.'

iii. Knowledge originates with sense experience

The thesis that knowledge originates with sense experience recalls Ward's theory of knowledge and also a familiar passage beginning the "Introduction" to Kant's Critique, "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with (sense) experience."[25] Tennant asserts that the minimum individual cognition must set out from the sense datum as the external control necessary to give us knowledge.

iv. Ideas have their psychological genesis in sensation

The origin of ideas from sensation can be genetically

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[25] Smith (tr.), CPR, B1.

traced, beginning with a theory of sensation adumbrated in the Leibnizian contention in refutation of Locke's view of experience as a tabula rasa, that "the mind itself" exists prior to sense experience, and by Kant's hint that the understanding and sense have a common root. The activities of "the mind itself" in sense experience are denoted as differentiation, retention and complication. A sensatio, (active perceiving of sensa) the earliest sense experience, is a hypothetically simple artifact of advanced thought, in reality germinal perception, only analytically distinguishable from the sensum in which it occurs. It is therefore never pure.[26]

Here in sense perception is the origin of conceptual thinking. The steps are the recognition and comparison of sensa, synthesis into things by projecting their combined qualities into time and space, reification. These are the activities of a subject and presuppose its interest and attention, selectiveness and memory. In these perceptual activities we find the precursors of the later developed categories of identity, resemblance and difference. The process of perceiving a thing, reification, is primarily

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[26] The English language being uninflected, the term sensation does duty for both the object sensed and the act of sensing. With the ending "io" as in sensatio and perceptio, Tennant anglicises "dog-Latin" to mean 'the act of sensing' or 'perceiving.'

a matter of external control by subjectively unalterable brute fact, sensa, rather than sole subjective interest and synthesis. Yet it involves the activity of the subject, who chooses, according to interest, the qualities to be combined into the 'thing,' the subject being limited by particular span of attention and natural tempo. The body is psychologically the most important 'thing' one perceives. The earliest notions of permanence, resemblance and difference, unity and individuality, precursors of the later-developed categories are derived from experiencing the body.

> It is to the contingency that human beings are embodied in solid flesh that ultimately is due the particular form of the primary concepts through which the world is 'known,' and from which human thought and reasoning are spun. Had we not been embodied, maybe we should not have possessed the categories we use: our thought-synthesized experience, even if its sensory core had been the same would possibly not have been what it is. Thus the logical a priori forms of our understanding and knowledge are not necessarily those of other intelligent beings, nor of Universal Understanding or Reason, in the abstract--what-ever that may be. They are derived from life not from logic; they are regulative while they are constitutive; they are both anthropic and mundane. Creations of the synthesizing and interest subject, suggested by his body and prompted, or at any rate suffered, by the sensory data into which he reads them, they are tools for fashioning a phenomenal world in some respects after his own likeness.[27]

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[27] Tennant, PT, I, 49f.

The further advance to ideation can be traced through the impressional and memory images to the genetically earlier vague and indefinite,(Leibniz, obscure), to the clear and pure idea. Its concrete filling abstracted, empty form remains. An idea, then, cannot be regarded as solely an act of the subject or as subjective modification. It is not created ex nihilo by the subject, but is the product of subjective activity with impressional data, and is valid only of the perceptual or actual from which it has been abstracted.[28]

v. 'Forms of Intuition' and categories are derived from sense experience

The 'forms of intuition' and categories, varying from Kant, are psychologically derived from sense experience. Although Tennant's classification of the categories is made on the basis of intersubjective intercourse, his classification closely resembles that of Kant, as formal (Kant, mathematical) and real (Kant, dynamic). But his psychological 'derivation' of them is in striking contrast to Kant's logical 'deduction' from Judgments. Tennant's view is that the categories are 'functionings' of the understanding in interpreting experience.[29]

Time and space, the 'forms of intuition' are not the

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[28] Tennant, PT, I, 62ff. So also Ward, Cf.27 .
[29] Tennant, PT, I, 171.

twin which popular thought has taken them to be. Not only is time more fundamental for all experience, but the two concepts--for concepts they are--have a quite different genesis and history. The concept of space is elaborated from the extensity of sensa, and is visually and tactually mediated. Time is derived from the following perceptual elements: (i) The quale of protensity (ii) Change, in which duration and succession alternate and simultaneity, in which earlier and later elements are present and discriminated (iii) Present linkages of a percept series of past, present, and future, and most essential (iv) All perceptual time has reference to a subject, and (v) is irreversible.

Taking up now the psychological 'derivation' of the categories, it has already been noted that they are 'incipient' in sense experience. It remains to observe that further 'explicit' development is rendered possible by intersubjective intercourse, when by gesture and language, communication and 'comparing of notes' of what is individually perceived takes place. In this way the socialized individual, Σ, constitutes (conceptualizes) the public Object in space-time environment.

Without executing a detailed analysis of all the categories, we select for illustrative treatment because of their fundamental importance for the Tennant-Wardian thought

the two 'real' categories, substance and cause. They are said to "have a foot in both worlds," the subjective and the objective, in being derived by subjects in commerce with an objective environment. They are not purely "read off" with immediacy and necessitation as are the 'formal' categories of resemblance and difference, or purely "read-in" by suppositious interpretation.[30] They are subjectively derived and objectively evoked postulated principles of inter-pretation. They originate in self-consciousness, but are not original severally to each individual mind. They are developed in intersubjective intercourse. This origin is Tennant's principle of classification of the categories.[31]

The categories of substance and cause are interdependent and assimilated to each other. Because the temporal manifestations of a continuant are due to the immanent

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[30] For genetic origin of the 'formal' categories derived by reflective comparison of sense data cf. 45 .Note on the formal categories: in order to render unambiguous the two pairs of 'formal' categories, qualitative likeness and difference and numerical identity and diversity certain distinctions are made. Numerical identity is to be distinguished from qualitative identity. Qualitative identity is exact likeness, "an ideal perhaps never realized." Numerical identity or singularity, a mathematical category, must be distinguished from the indiscernability of difference, or similarity. The emigrant who returns home after many years' absence may be changed beyond recognition, but is nevertheless the same person. But twin brothers are always two individuals, however much alike in resemblance.

[31] Tennant, PT, I, 171ff.

one bond between its states and their manifestation, the categories of substance and cause are found to be fused. As Ward expresses it, "No substantiality without causality."[32]

The category of substance in the sense of abiding unity is empirically derived from analogy with self-knowledge and knowledge of other selves. It involves the interpretation of scattered discretes as being connected or unified, and believed to continue when not perceived. Emphasis is to be placed on the connectedness rather than the collection of discretes. The category also contains a subsidiary notion of a permanent acting individual, person or thing. It is reminiscent of the primitive animism which, distinguishing between things and the material substratum of which they were made, as the wood of a bow, read the substratum notion into the self, when breath was conceived as substratum of spirit.[33]

The category of cause as efficient action of the subject originates when in our doing and suffering we conceive the notion of productive agency, which we then project into things and interpret them as active. A further notion involved in cause, also arising from analogical interpretation is that of necessitation of effect. It is derived from our experience of effort which is able to impose constraint upon things, as when a man shapes his hat, and from the

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[32] Ward, NA, 487. Cf. Bowne, TTK, 90, who has a similar view.

[33] Tennant, PT, I, 177ff.

experience of being ourselves coerced. From this latter notion of necessitation there arises the further concept of necessary connection. The constancy of consequent when preceded by antecedent and the lack of it without the prior occurrence of antecedent suggest a sufficient ground, which is taken to express determination of consequent by antecedent.

vi. The meaning of thought and reason

We are now ready to understand Tennant's view of thought and reason. Reverting to the genesis of thought we recall that there is a pari passu development of self-knowledge and knowledge of other selves and a similar mutually dependent development between the 'real' categories and intersubjective intercourse, both developments taking rise from self-consciousness. The combined process makes thought and reason possible.

In considering how the categories function in this development of thought and reason, it is maintained that Kant's view of reason as regulative and the understanding as constitutive was an unwarranted and arbitrary distinction. We have now seen that the understanding, in its function of interpretation is as venturesome as the reason. They (thought and reason) express belief rather than knowledge in the sense of logical concatenation. Between the understanding and reason there is no breach, but continuity. The understanding is reason in its interpretative function

introducing unity into impressional data and meaning through the anthropic categories derived by analogy with self.[34] The categories of the understanding are both regulative and constitutive; regulative, not as Kant thought, in the sense of establishment by reason of unity among 'the rules of the understanding,' but as interpretative; constitutive, not in the sense of imposing subjective rules of the understanding on Nature, "legislating for Nature" and so prescribing the universal laws of physics, but in 'conditioning' the mode of existence of Objects. Although the mind does not 'legislate for Nature,' it interprets Nature in terms of itself.[35]

A summary statement of Tennant's view of the nature of thought and reason can now be presented. There are no grounds for any sharp distinction to be made at any point in the knowledge process, neither between perception and conception, nor yet between understanding and reason; hence no sharp distinction between belief and knowledge. Reason is of plebian origin, of humble descent. It is not an innate lumen naturale, a divine substance in man. It is reasonableness rather than rationality, and is related to the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason. Its essence is teleological and conative, interpretative and analogical. Thinking is experimental. It is problem-solving under the

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[34] Anthropic, rather than anthropomorphic, now superseded because of inherent connotative incongruities, is used by Tennant to mean 'human.'

[35] Tennant, PT, I, 189.

incentive of practical needs.

> It is a psychologically conditioned excursus along lines of association of ideas...In so far as by thought or reason we mean discovery of valid premises as to matter of fact, reason is an alogical, not a logical process.[36]

vii. The empirical genesis of thought is conclusive refuation of rationalism

From his derivation of non-conceptual thought from sense experience and conceptual knowledge from intersubjective intercourse, Tennant concludes that knowledge is not constituted as Continental rationalism maintains, *a priori* by subjective activity, independent of sense. Rationalism assumes wrongly that reason is a unique and original faculty, divinely given, capable of constituting knowledge from ideas innate to the mind, independent of sense, and valid of the external world. Its claim is alleged because of the believed superior Reality of its archetypal ideas in a super-sensuous Realm of self-subsistent truth, independent of human knowers. In the dualism of worlds created by rationalism, the mind and nature each a closed system, the logical order of ideas is said to be the same as the Actual order of things. The knowledge thus 'spun' out of the mind itself is thought to be of the nature of self-evident axioms, and mathematics and logic are taken as its paradigm.

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[36] Tennant, PT, I, 184f.

But rationalism is refuted by forthcoming knowledge. The empirical genesis of thought is conclusive refutation of the rationalist theory of knowledge. The content of knowledge must come from sense experience. Further, that the world is amenable to thought merely reflects the dependence of man's mental equipment on his physical and social environment. The forms of his thinking have been found to originate in sense experience, and reason is an outcome of interaction between the subject and the objective.

> That our world does submit to mathematical and logical treatment, in large degree, and consequently admits of exploration and prediction within limits, is observable fact, but not a priori necessity.[37]

Once more, the nature of knowledge obtained by rationalism is found to be either conventional definition, as the axioms of empirical science, or disguised empirical generalizations. Even the logical principles of identity and contradiction are only primarily conditions of thought, but become secondarily "laws of things, in so far as things admit of being thought about." As they are applied to variable concepts they express conventional agreement that for the purpose of thinking, words which refer to certain qualities of a conceived 'thing' shall be used with the same meaning.

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[37] Tennant, PT, I, 206.

> They prescribe the convention that we will use words in the same sense, ideas with invariable connotation; that we will fix as static for the particular purpose of thinking, the properties of a conceived 'thing'.. (They) reflect the dependence of man's mental furniture on his physical and social surroundings, not their own independence of either one or the other...This conclusion means...that there is no foundation for the belief that any world, in order to be, must conform to a prius of subsistent law, separable from things and knowable without empirical observation of their behavior.[38]

(5) Refutation of subjective idealism

Private, non-conceptual knowledge is not constituted, as subjective idealism wrongly maintains, from subjective modifications. This view is variously expressed as 'states of the subject' (Locke) ideas 'inhering in the subject' (Berkeley) or ideas as 'activities of the subject' (Leibniz). The sensum is not a subjective modification, but an objective presentation. The former view shows a defective psychology. Again, the early British empiricists failed to distinguish between the individual and common standpoints, and apart from this distinction the logic of subjective idealism is solipsism. Hume ended in scepticism. Locke avoided solipsism by assuming an external 'O', thereby becoming a representational realist. Moreover, objects are not in the mind as states of mind, but before the mind as sensa. The correct prepositional

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[38] Tennant, PT, I, 205, 214.

distinction must be observed.

i. Logical and epistemological significance of _idia_

We turn to the logical and epistemological significance of the private object of individual non-conceptual knowledge. Logically and epistemologically an object is what is immediately over-against the subject _in the act of apprehension._[39]

> Of the psychological object in individual and non-conceptual experience, correlative with the subject as right is with left it can only be said that its _esse_ (its objective _esse_) is _percipi._[40]

ii. Metaphysical status of sensa

As to the metaphysical status of the sensum Tennant is agnostic. When we come to its metaphysical meaning we are baffled. (i) To begin with the sensum is non-isolable. There are no 'pure' sensa. Ultimate experience is not a sensum or a collection of discrete sensa, but a stretch of change, within which sensa arise as discriminations. It is at this point that the objective "announces its objectivity, or otherness from the subject."[41] The sensum is psychically immediate, and it is this fact of psychical immediateness which renders it impossible to have direct knowledge of respective objective and subjective factors.

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[39] Italics are the author's.
[40] Tennant, PT, I, 34.
[41] Tennant, PT, I, 38.

> The idion is the ne plus ultra of (ψ) immediate simple perceptio; and analysis of it into p (phenomena) and o (the private object), assigning specific characterization to each factor, is so far as psychological science goes, hypothesis not directly verifiable.[42]

iii. Sensa are not subjective functioning

Moreover, sensa do not come into existence as a consequence of subjective functioning. "They are thrust upon us willy-nilly."[43] The sensum is an "irrational surd." It announces its objectivity or otherness from the subject.[44] Of it the only connotational statement that can be made is that it is "that element in the objective which may be said first to break in upon the experient."[45] "As presented, as apprehended, sensa may as well be appearances of spirit or of non-spirit."[46] To assert ontological status of the psychological object of individual non-conceptual knowledge is from the psychologist's standpoint, unverifiable hypothesis.[47] At this point Tennant implies agnosticism.

iv. "Truth" in psychophysics of sensa is an unsolved problem

Tennant does not include a reconciliation of his phe-

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[42] Tennant, PT, I, 223. Note on symbols (ψ) and (ps): The Greek 'Psi' in parentheses in Tennant means psychical, while l.c. (ps) means psychological. They may also, as in this case, be used adverbially.

[43] Tennant, PT, I, 36.

[44] Tennant, PT, I, 38.

[45] Tennant, PT, I, 36.

[46] Tennant, PT, I, 224.

[47] Tennant, PT, I, 223.

nomenalism with the "truth" which he admits to be in the psycho-physical account of sensa. He does, in his repudiation of scientific realism discuss the psycho-physical account of the sensum, notes that "it involves truth of some sort," and concludes that how nervous impulses are constituted into psychical processes is as yet "unknown or unknowable."

> Psycho-physical teaching as to causation of sensatio and sensum by stimulus must indeed involve truth of some sort; but as it stands it assumes a particular theory of knowledge, which from the point of view of psychology and the *ordo cognoscendi* is a mere prepossession.[48]

(6) Refutation of realism

Common knowledge of public Objects is not constituted, as realism of various types wrongly maintains, independent of all subjects, and without the distinction between the ontal or Real world and its appearance to our minds; and without the knowing making a difference to the Object known.

i. Statement and refutation of common-sense realism

Common sense realism erroneously holds that the physical Object is the cause of percepts, that the *idion* is appearance of the Object. But the physical Object itself presupposes the sensa which it is supposed to cause, and so common sense explains the more certain and immediate by the less certain and derived.

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[48] Tennant, PT, I, 267.

ii. Exposition and refutation of 'instrumental' realism

'Instrumental' realism wrongly maintains that sensing is "plate-glass" apprehension of the Real, hence appearance and Reality are identical; that the body is merely 'instrumental,' but in no way conditions the percept, hence it makes no difference in the nature of the Object known. But 'instrumental' realism fails to account for illusion; for the useful concept of 'things,' that percepts group themselves with rhyme and reason; and for the similarity in the percepts of different persons looking at the same Object. It also fails to account for the difference in ability to constitute a synthesis of Objects from some objects and not from others, each prima facie purporting to be similarly Real.[49]

iii. Exposition and refutation of scientific realism

Causal or scientific realism holds that the percept of the Object is an unstained version of the Real, unconditioned by the nervous mechanism of the body; hence, knowing makes no difference to the Object known. The percept is regarded as phenomenon of the Real or ontal world of insensibles; electrons, ether, etc.

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[49] Tennant, PT, I, 231ff.

(i) If scientific realism were true, non-veridical phenomena of consciousness would be psychologically inexplicable. Scientific realism is repudiated because psychology could not then account for illusion, hallucination and 'subjective sensations.' If external imperceptible events could be the cause of sensa, the distinction between veridical consciousness and illusion breaks down; and the latter would be psychologically inexplicable. False interpretation by the subject might be involved in the former case as is admitted to be in the latter.

(ii) Distinction between primary and secondary qualities is untenable. In resorting to the invalid distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the former allegedly caused by imperceptible events within the Real, and the latter as subjective, scientific realism is unable to face the fact that primary causes, as Berkeley showed, are in no way different from secondary, that they can be as unreal as secondary.[50]

Psychologically there is no basis for assignable difference in ontological status of primary and secondary qualities. The scientific realist makes the distinction to account for the difference between actuality and illusion. But secondary qualities are recognized by scien-

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[50] Tennant, PT, I, 233ff. Cf. Tennant POS, 85ff.

tists not to be caused by external events, and it is also admitted that primary qualities, as in illusion, can be as unreal as secondary qualities. It is clear that in both cases alike, subjective interpretation is involved.

(iii) Scientific realism's view of the mind-body problem leads to its basic error. Tennant analyzes the stages in the perception of an object, like the sun, in accordance with the psycho-physical process which the realist himself maintains. First, there are certain changes in the external world that are entirely independent of the subject and are external to his body, the coming into view of the distant Object, millions of miles away. On the realist's theory, this is the remotest, but Real cause of perception. It is also assumed that the transmitting atmospheric environment is favorable to the reception of stimuli. Second, a group of changes are set up in the body, stimulation of the rods and cones of the sense organ, accompanied by changes involved in the corresponding cortical changes. Finally, as the last stage of the process, there is a psychical resultant, the sensum.

The causal realist wrongly maintains that the sensum is the end result of the chain of physical causes beginning with the distant Sun, and mediated by stimulation of the nervous system. These physical changes are entirely in-

commensurate with the resulting psychical sensum. The sensum could not be produced by these unaided physical causes. The inevitable conclusion is that perception of the Sun is not independent of the subject.

7. Phenomenalism is maintained

A "complete" phenomenalism alone fits the forthcoming facts in an adequate theory of knowledge. Tennant, with reference to Kant's theory of knowledge now shows that such a phenomenalism must distinguish between the ontal or Real world and the phenomenal, its appearance to our minds.[51] This phenomenalism must amplify Kant's doctrine of Ding an sich making the thing in itself in interaction with the subject to account for idia.

(1) Kant's view of ontological status of 'o' and 'O' is right

For their conception and ontological status the 'o' and the 'O' are referred to Kant. He correctly saw that 'o' without 'O' is blind content without thought form, and the 'O' without 'o' is empty conceptual form without impressional content. The 'O' Kant held to be phenomenon, henceforth also denoted by ϕ.

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51. Reference hereafter to Tennant's completed theory of knowledge, dispensing with the term genetico-analytical, the process by which it was reached, will be denoted as phenomenalism or derivatives thereof.

(2) Kant also saw difference between '*o*', as private and '*O*', as public

Kant also saw correctly that until communicating his idion with other subjects, a subject is a 'windowless' monad, but that having transcended their respective private worlds in intersubjective intercourse, the subjects can now have a consciousness in general (Bewusstsein überhaupt).[52]

(3) The ontological status of the universal is contingent on its particular

The Object of common knowledge, *O*, then, for knowledge of its ontological status depends on a plurality of subjects, each of whom reads his idion into the common concept. Its ultimate metaphysical status, therefore, must be undecided, until we know whether or not it is to be referred to sense experience; for we cannot as the ontological argument assumes, assert a Real Counterpart to every concept. There are concepts, like the round square or the ether, for those physicists who use the concept but deny its existence, that have no counterpart in Reality. "There is no psychological or scientific basis for the opinion that universals exist save in rebus, or for identifying the valid with the Real."[53]

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[52] Tennant, PT, I, 242. Cf. this concept in Ward, 234f.
[53] Tennant, PT, I, 64.

The existence of God is then on a parity with the existence of the Electron as Real counterpart to the electron-concept, or a Real Sun corresponding to the sun of astronomers. They are both

> What is thought to exist in order to account for, and to coordinate what is perceived or sensed by this person and that: and God, whom no man hath perceived, is thought to exist to account for and to coordinate facts of another order.[54]

(4) Kant's Ding an sich needs amplification

Tennant now amplifies his thought of the thing in itself to account for phenomena

i. Kant's Ding an sich a mere limiting concept

Turning to the ω, we note that Kant postulated behind O or O held to be phenomenal, the ω or noumenal Ding an sich to account for the existence of sensa which enter into its conceptualization. However, he inconsistently left it a mere suppositious limiting concept, a superfluity inviting later wielders of Occam's razor.

ii. Tennant's thing in itself is knowable and interacts with the subject

Tennant, on the contrary, makes ω jointly with the subject cause of the sensum, and the distinction between phenomena and noumena is also required for the differentiation between appearance and Reality. Unlike Kant for whom it was "unknowable save as to its existence," Tennant

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[54] Tennant, PT, I, 226.

holds that "we know the noumenal through the phenomenal;" and this knowledge of the noumenal, while incomplete, is more than of its mere existence. We do know, at least, that the noumenal object is active, and with the subject, jointly causal. Things in themselves are Tennant's unverified hypothesis to account for the facts of external perception as he finds them.[55]

iii. Summary statement of the knowledge situation according to Tennant

The pure ego or subject, S , is stimulated by an independent external thing in itself, ω . The active subject responds to this stimulation and sensa are produced. Sensa, then, are the joint product of S and ω , and are phenomenal, what appears to the subject. Phenomena are not to be identified with noumena. They are the joint product of the subject en rapport with noumena. Noumena are independent of the subject. Yet there must be "a one-to-one correspondence between them, in respect of detail;" for the subject does not "create phenomenal variety ex nihilo and without provocation." "There must be as much of structural detail" in the noumenal as in the phenomenal, for "the detail must be there in order to have the appearance."

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[55] According to Tennant-Wardian psychology, the pure ego or subject is the only active cause known, and in Cosmic Teleology things inthemselves are identified as substance-causes; and the subject is interpreted as soul substance. We have already found the category of substance and cause to be fused.

As to the metaphysical status of the thing in itself we do not know. Whether the source of stimulation, which en rapport with the subject produces sensa is a sub-human self as the panpsychist would hold, or a Cosmic self, as the personalist maintains, the philosopher can only ignorantly guess. He does not know. Neither does the scientist know. He holds that electrons are the ultimate Reality. But they are only his concepts, used as shorthand descriptions of Reality. Further, to the scientist as scientist, it would not matter if extension and figure were the phenomena of electrons or of self, finite or Cosmic. The metaphysical status of things in themselves is undecided. However, as argued in the preceding paragraph, our knowledge is relevant to Reality.

> While we thus have acquaintance with the sensible or phenomenal, we are having rapport with and phenomenal knowledge about the noumenal through the phenomenal. And we know only phenomenally, or by phenomenalizing when the Object is primarily sensible.[56]

iv. Diagram of the knowledge situation adapted from Tennant

(i) Private, unshared knowledge of the individual:

$$S - \omega - o \quad ^{57}$$

(ii) Development of S as a socialized individual:

$$\begin{tikzcd}
S^1 - o^1 \arrow[dr, dash] & \\
S^2 - o^2 \arrow[r, dash] & O \\
S^3 - o^3 \arrow[ur, dash] &
\end{tikzcd} \quad ^{58}$$

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[56] Tennant, PT, I, 247f.

[57] 'o' involves a pure ego or noumenal subject.

[58] 'O' is phenomenal, being appearance to S of noumenal Reality.

(iii) Public, conceptualized knowledge of the individual: based on (i) and (ii)

$\Sigma - \omega - O$[59]

(5) Nature and extent of phenomenalized knowledge

i. Phenomenalism involves relativism

Phenomenalism involves relativism and heuristic rather than complete knowledge, Tennant thus reaches a theoretical relativism. Knowledge is heuristic rather than final. It is not finished, logically demonstrable, truth.

ii. Phenomenalized knowledge, although partial and 'impure', attains convincedness

Knowledge is "belief that commands certitude."[60] It is not finished, logically demonstrable, truth. Phenomenalized knowledge involves relativity in the sense of being partial. Tennant quotes Paul. "We know in part," and see, not "face to face," but "through a glass darkly." It is also 'impure' as Ward pointed out in an unpublished document, being conditioned by the inadequacies of our sense organs.

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[59] 'O' is also phenomenal, because it involves interpretative relating of the sense experience of individuals.

[60] In distinguishing between 'certitude' and 'certainty' Tennant properly reserves certitude for psychological convincedness, while certainty refers to the Objective character of a proposition, independent of its being believed or not.

iii. Phenomenalized knowledge is anthropic and adequate

On the other hand, the knowledge possible of attainment is anthropic and biologically sufficient for finding our way around, and making ourselves at home in the environment. While it is relative in the sense of partial and impure, most important of all, it is relevant to Reality.

8. Critical evaluation of Tennant's method and epistemology

(1) Tennant avows a thorough-going empiricism

Tennant's method is empirical in the most rigorous sense of the term. Professor Calkins, too, we shall see, avows empiricism. She insists that the terra firma of fact-data must be beneath the philosopher's feet. But as she also points out, the data which she employs are second-hand transcripts of reality, worked over by earlier philosophers. Ward likewise is an empiricist. He begins with sense experience, and his knowledge advances experimentally "from more to more." But although Tennant expresses the judgment that no philosopher of high rank has been as empirical as Ward, he believes that Ward would hesitate to apply empirical method in seeking truth in all areas of thought, notably in axiology.[61] Tennant does not follow the master in this regard. He says:

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[61] Tennant, PT, I, 160, 217. Cf.39 .

> Perhaps no individual philosopher of first rank has used it (empirical method) in greater measure than (implicitly) did James Ward; but whether he would have endorsed, in whole, the programme set forth above, is very doubtful.[62]

Tennant's empirical method denies emphatically the view that there are a priori universal and necessary truths of reason, independent of sense and individual experients. That the world does submit to logical and mathematical treatment is observable fact, and not a priori necessity. Thought and knowledge are not to be conceived as products derived by "spinning concepts" out of the mind, but only by "attending to what is thrust upon us in the experience we happen to have." So thought is not primarily logical deduction nor induction, but has to do basically with thinkers and facts; and because knowledge contains teleological elements, "existents are not a priori bound to obey all our logical axioms: they are only so bound when they lend themselves to the designs of thinkers."[63]

(2) Tennant's view of self-consciousness destroys the organic unity of the self

Because he follows Ward's psychological distinction between pure and empirical ego, Tennant destroys the organic unity of consciousness, and for this reason the theory is rejected. Tennant is right in his view that the experience of the (whole) self involves experience of its states,

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[62] Tennant, PT, I, 160, 217.
[63] Tennant, PT, I, 206.

relations, and objects. The unity of this immediate consciousness is really the only self to be experienced, so that differing from Tennant, it is maintained that self-experience is not mediate and noumenal, but is immediate.

What this whole self is has been stated with clarity and force by Professor E. S. Brightman, from whose account pertinent comment is paraphrased. The whole self is the total consciousness in the specious present that can be connected by the datum self, the self apprehended in the immediate consciousness of the specious present. It includes memory linkages of the past and"that future which desire and purpose can anticipate and control". This whole is a complex of thought, feeling and volition, and is experienced as a systematic unity, every part being systematically related to every other part.[64]

The whole self not only is a unity, but has continuity, as by memory it recalls its past, receives influences in the present, and by anticipation looks toward the future. The significant differences between the theory of self-consciousness on the one hand and the view of self-experience on the other are, that on the latter view, the systematic ordered unity and continuity of consciousness is the basic fact of self-experience. No pure ego is needed to account for this unity and continuity. The

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[64] Brightman, POI, 20ff. Cf. Bertocci, EAG, 202ff.

only self known is the self of experience, and the confusing distinction between the 'I' and the 'me' disappears. The self is a systematic whole. As Tennant also would grant, it is constructed in part out of residua as well as present and anticipated future experience. In keeping with this criticism, it is held that Tennant's dichotomy of the self into pure and empirical ego constitutes an unwarranted breakdown of the unity of the mental life, and involves a defective view of the unity of the self.

(3) The qualitative metaphysics involved in the interaction of the subject-object duality is problematic

The qualitative metaphysics of the subject of the subject-object duality is established; it is mind. But the metaphysical status of the object does not appear. Alternate possibilities for construing interaction may be reviewed. The scientific realist would construe interaction in terms of the interaction between imperceptible electrons in external objects and the rods and cones or other end organs of the percipient, by means of light waves or other media. Tennant repudiates scientific realism. To begin with, electrons are only conceptual descriptions and have no causal efficiency. Further, in its view of the causation of sensa by imperceptible external events, scientific realism would abolish the necessary psychological distinction between appearance

and reality; and moreover, its distinction between primary and secondary qualities is psychologically indefensible.

A second possible method of construing interaction is that of Ward's panpsychism. Interaction is then conceived as between selves, 'dominant' and 'ministering,' and both are causally efficient. But Tennant does not believe that the qualitative metaphysics of Reality can be determined, and is not a panpsychist. His conception of the ultimately Real is substance-cause; and the panpsychist method must be eliminated.

(4) Alternate metaphysical interpretations are possible

Tennant's qualitative metaphysics is equivocal because of conflicting elements.

i. Denies Kantian constitutive activity of the mind

In denying Kant's principle of the category-constitutive activity of the individual mind, he refers it instead to intersubjective intercourse (Kant's _Bewusstsein überhaupt_).

He nevertheless maintains, this investigator thinks correctly, that the mind is active. The percept is freighted with subjective activity. The categories with which, in intersubjective intercourse, the plurality of percipients build up common public knowledge are also the

activities or functionings of subjects throughout the knowledge process. The implication of this mental activity is idealism.

ii. Tennant is an epistemological realist

Epistemologically Tennant's position seems to be clear. The Real noumenal object, ω , he tells us, is independent of the subject. The objective "announces" its objectivity as it "breaks in" upon the experient, "willy-nilly thrust upon us."[65] Tennant, having repudiated realism in several of its forms, seems to come now with still another variety, believed to be required by the facts.

iii. Tennant's qualitative metaphysics is equivocal

But as to qualitative metaphysics, his position is capable of two alternative interpretations. One alternative suggested by his scientific thought background is that sensa are impressional presentations of material Objects; another is as Ward would hold, that they are impressions of bodies indicating other selves. On the latter view to use the Humian term 'impression' in connection with knowledge of other selves, although consistent with Tennant's usage, smacks of psycho-physics which he repudiates on epistemological grounds. Tennant has also repudiated the view held by sciantific realism that electrons or ether cause sensa, on grounds stated in a

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[65] Tennant, PT, I, 36.

previous paragraph.[66]

Able interpreters, like G. Dawes Hicks and W. G. DeBurgh, interpret him as a dualist.[67] That Tennant's position is not unequivocal is confirmed by a previous investigator, who found a fluctuating emphasis as the distinction between phenomena and noumena is applied by Tennant to realism and idealism.

> Whenever realism attempts to construe noumena in terms of primary and secondary qualities; i.e., to make noumena identical with phenomena, then these supposed phenomena per se or noumena are shown to be mind-dependent or mind-relative, and agnosticism is pressed as to the phenomenal nature of the real. Mind is real and active; phenomena are known only as experiences which are mind-produced.

Paraphrasing Scudder's thought, we continue.

The external stimulation which causes sensa is not known by acquaintance to the scientist to be either primary qualities of matter or primary plus secondary qualities. But since spirit is the only active cause we do know, and it would not matter to science as science if causes of external stimulation are spiritual beings, it behooves the scientist, in the interest of consistency, to abandon his unwarranted metaphysical claims, and admit his ignorance of noumenal causes. Resuming quotation from Scudder

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[66] Cf 59 .

[67] Hicks, art. (1929-1930) in Hibbert Jou., 28, 174-179. DeBurgh, art. (1928) in Jou. of Phil. Studies 3, 537-542.

> On the other hand, whenever there is danger that the mind-dependent nature of the knowledge product may lead to subjective idealism, or to social solipsism, or to agnosticism, emphasis is placed upon the noumenal, independent aspect of the duality relation. Berkeley and Kant were correct in emphasizing the productivity and activity of mind in experience, we are told, but phenomena are not merely mind-dependent. Solipsism is wrong in thinking that objects are states of mind; Berkeley is wrong in believing that to be is to be perceived in mind; Kant is wrong in holding that there are no forms in sensa...Mind, we learn, neither "creates" nor "makes" the qualia and relations of sensa themselves; these are what they are by virtue of objective, external control irrespective of subjective activities.[68]

(5) Synoptic interpretation of the metaphysics involved in Tennant's phenomenalism must refer to his psychology and theistic argument

i. Things in themselves are substance-causes

On reaching Tennant's theistic argument we find that things in themselves postulated to account for the facts of the external perception of nature as he discovers them, are substance-causes, "ontal beings with existence for self." They are "posited" or "planted out" by a creative God. The conception of being "planted out" is intended to suggest their independence of God, to whose creative activity they owe their existence. Earlier in this chapter we found the categories of substance and cause to be assimilated to each other, and in Tennant's revision of Ward's psychology, that they are psychologically derived

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[68] Scudder, TPT, 40f.

from the pure ego which Tennant interprets as soul substance.

ii. The metaphysical status of substance-causes is problematic

According to the Tennant-Wardian psychology, "that which occupies space is psychologically the substantial." Substance-causes have a dual nature, being extended like physical Objects, and causally efficient like spirit. The scientific realist does not know that these ultimate constituents of Reality are not spiritual beings. Because the distinction between appearance and Reality is necessary, their extendedness may be appearance of spiritual beings. On the other hand, Kant's conception of the constitutive activity of the mind having been denied, sensa are not a subjective product. They are what they are by virtue of rapport between the subject and these beings that are entirely independent of the subject. The idealist therefore, who is also ignorant of the metaphysical status of substance-causes, cannot know that the process by which sensa come into existence is spiritual rapport.

iii. The conclusion is agnosticism.

Although substance-causes are spatial, the scientist does not know what they are. Spatiality may be appearance of spirit. Neither does the idealist know that they are mental, for they are entirely independent of mind. Our

knowledge of substance - causes is limited to their existence, spatiality, and activity. Their qualitative metaphysical status is not conclusively known.

(6) Statement and advantages of the personalistic view of external perception

This investigator ventures an hypothesis from the personalistic standpoint that he believes to account for the "truth of psychophysics," dispenses with the dualism involved in a material Object as cause, abolishes the untenable distinction which scientific realism makes between primary and secondary qualities, and makes unnecessary the postulate of an external thing in itself, which since Kant has been regarded as an inconsistent and otiose relic of dualistic thought.

This hypothesis is that the active and constitutive self, manifesting the expression of ultimate divine activity, operates on impressional data as grist brought to its mill, inverting the retinal image so that men are apprehended walking on feet and not on heads; correcting binocular vision, so that we perceive not two objects but one object where there is numerically one; and making color vision out of ethereal vibration, so that the sensum of the sun is constituted bright orange, etc. Tennant would probably endorse the following citation which well expresses the view presented by this investigator.

> The perceptual world contains something more and other than the real world. Yet there is apparently a marvellous adjustment of the two to each other. The physical stimuli are totally different from the resulting sensations and perceptions, yet there is an orderly relation between them, a kind of preestablished harmony. The stimuli in and of themselves leave us with the impression of incompleteness, and so also does the entire material world when robbed of its secondary qualities. It is a barren, poverty-striken world; and this forces on us the conviction that if it has any extramental existence at all, it is an embryonic or purely instrumental type of existence. It does not exist simply for and by itself. It exists in order to be known, and hence finds its completion and meaning in knowledge. Knowledge, in a word, is organic to nature. It is not "a barren rehearsal" of it. It adds something to it, it completes it.[69]

9. The metaphysics of the self involved in Tennant's phenomenalism

(1) A monadic view of the self is involved

Consciousness is conceived as a duality in unity, in which the pure ego (subject) and empirical ego (object) are numerically self-identical. The unity of the self implies a monadic view.

(2) A conception of the self as an incomplete organic unity is involved

In the breakdown of consciousness into pure and empirical ego, a defective organic unity of the self is involved.

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[69] Knudson, POP, 139. Cf. Tennant's argument for adaptability of thought and thing in Cosmic Teleology, 251.

(3) Tennant's phenomenalism involves an agnostic metaphysics of the self

The pure ego is conscious experience, but the qualitative metaphysics of ultimate Reality and of sensa, which are jointly caused by it and the pure ego or subject is held to be unknowable. The metaphysics of the self involved is therefore agnostic.

(4) An activistic metaphysics of the self is involved and metaphysical freedom

The pure and empirical ego are both conceived as active. Specifically, the pure ego or thinking self is active both in perceptual and conceptual functioning. Also in perceptual thinking the pure ego selects and chooses the qualities that are combined in the reification of an object.

(5) Time and space and the transcendence of both are involved in Tennant's phenomenalism

From the derivation of time and space as intuitions experienced by the pure ego, time and space are inferred. The transcendence of space is involved in the conception of the self (pure and empirical ego) as a unity; and the transcendence of time is involved in the experience of memory and anticipation, and in the conception of the pure ego which gives unity and continuity to the self.

(6) The possibility of immortality is involved in Tennant's phenomenalism

From the ability of the self (pure and empirical ego) to transcend time and experience in the continuity for which the pure ego is conceived, the possibility of immortality is implied.

10. Calkins's expository-critical method

(1) The advantages of expository-critical method

Professor Calkins employs the expository-critical method in philosophy. She defends it as having two distinct advantages. It is empirical and comprehensive.

i. Expository-critical method is empirical

First, it is empirical. It begins with a body of fact-data about reality. In her metaphysical writings they are second-hand transcripts of reality, to be sure, and not direct experience. But at least to begin here is to avoid floating in a sea of vague abstractions.

> Nobody who hammers out the meaning of Spinoza, of Kant, or of Aristotle, who compares passages to get at their significance or divergence, who estimates the different statements of a philosopher with reference to the date of their formulation can be accused of floating about vaguely in a sea of abstractions.[70]

ii. Expository-critical method is comprehensive and undogmatic

A still more important advantage of the expository-

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[70] Calkins, PPP, 7.

critical approach is its comprehensiveness and lack of dogmatism. It forces one to re-think the philosopher's argument, supply the links that are implied, but not verbally stated, to choose sides from the possible, and so to arrive at independent thought about problems of ultimate reality. This conviction is succintly expressed in a remark which she observes that Herder made of Kant in high commendation of his teacher, "He obliged me to think for myself; for tyranny was foreign to his soul."

iii. Calkins's method is also synoptic

The synoptic character of our philosopher's thought is indicated by her use of that method. In epistemology, it is evident in her organic view of the self, while in her metaphysics she insists that philosophical systems must be viewed critically with reference to two fundamental criteria, the ultimately real nature of the universe, and whether this reality is one or many beings. In a sentence, what is the qualitative and numerical nature of the ultimately real? Before these criteria as impersonal judge, she will marshal the evidence, and judgment will follow, mediated through her own critical estimates, in keeping with the evidence.

11. Calkins's idealistic epistemological monism

(1) Epistemology must be derived from critical estimates

Because of her expository-critical philosophical

method the epistemological presuppositions of Calkins must be derived from her critical estimates of theories of knowledge of modern philosophers. Her single chapter dealing directly with epistemology is such an expository-critical treatment. On April 22, 1925, at a two hundredth anniversary celebration of the birth of Kant, she delivered an address at Boston University, which was later edited by E. C. Wilm as a chapter entitled "Knowledge," in the book, Immanuel Kant 1724-1924. Professor Calkins, primarily a psychologist and metaphysician, nevertheless expressed important utterances on epistemology, and the attempt is here made to sketch in broad outline, the epistemological presuppositions of her writings.

Certain epistemological defects of modern philosophers, notably Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Schelling offer opportunity to vindicate the knowing self from various types of scepticism and agnosticism, while their sound insights, joined to those of Hegel and others, become signals to maintain the knowableness of universal reality and of the self.

(2) Validity of her Kantian and Hegelian criticism is established in Tennant's revision

The validity of her Kantian criticism is established in Tennant's treatment of Kant. Attention should be directed at this point to the fact that in Tennant's phenomenalism, the unknowableness of Kant's thing in itself

has been removed, and that the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal has also been partially revised in keeping with Hegel's criticism noted by Professor Calkins. Phenomena now yield knowledge of the ontal; that is, we know the ontal in the phenomenal.[71]

(3) Repudiation of agnosticism of Kant and Schelling

i. Calkins repudiates the agnosticism of Kant and Schelling

From his rationalistic predecessor, Wolff, Kant took over the hypothesis of a world of reality which existed independent of the human mind. In Kant this hypothesis occurs in barest outline, in which Dinge an sich are independent of consciousness, non-mental realities.[72] They are ultimately real and noumenal, and contrast with the objects of experience, which are only phenomenal. We know only of their existence, and the only argument presented for their existence is that they are required to account for phenomena and for the arbitrary occurrence of sensations, to which they are causally related.

ii. Professor Calkins advances three arguments against Kant's conception

(i) Kant's Dinge an sich involve contradiction

In being thought about, even as a limiting concept

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[71] Cf. 63f.

[72] It is here noted that the empiricists Locke and Hume also held the conception of the thing in itself.

Dinge an sich are not independent realities, they are drawn into the orbit of consciousness. (ii) Again, in being held as noumenal to account for phenomena, Kant illicitly applies the category of substance to Dinge an sich, which by hypothesis are transcendental and not subject to categorization. But even, when granted the noumenal function, the argument is insufficient, proving only the need of more ultimate reality than phenomena.[73] (iii) Finally, Hegel's refutation is repeated. This unknowable reality contains a glaring contradiction. The thing in itself as a ground for phenomena adds nothing to already known phenomena, and is nothing but a tautology. We should know of its existence only by means of the phenomena which it is conceived to explain. Instead of being independent reality it is closely linked with it.

iii. Approves Hegel's criticism of Schelling's agnosticism

In a second instance, our philosopher takes up the critical cudgels against agnosticism. Hegel had shown the inherent contradiction of Schelling's undetermined or pure being. Ultimate reality is not as Schelling held, pure in the sense of being undetermined and therefore unknowable. It has the minimum character of being thought about and is therefore a fact of consciousness, having at least that attribute. It is therefore determined being. Professor

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[73] Calkins, PPP, 238ff.

Calkins enthusiastically approves Hegel's teaching that reality is knowable and she joins him in the attempt to make it known.[74]

4 (4) Our knowledge of reality is denial of dualism

Our knowledge of reality is a denial of Cartesian dualism. Reality is not dualistic in nature.

i. Professor Calkins adds her repudiation to that of Berkeley and Hume

In this repudiation, she joins Berkeley and Hume in denying knowledge of the existence of external material reality. Berkeley had denied that matter,"passive and inert", could be the cause of active spirit, the non-conscious the cause of thought. Hume, however inconsistent with his frequent assumption of external objects, follows Berkeley in this regard, and argues with a greater validity that also includes in the denial recent scientific theories, the impossibility of its existence as known on the basis of inference, or on any principle whatever. Any object of inference must involve consciousness, or as Hume expressed it be 'present to the mind.' Further, as he also maintains, causation is a mental relation, a connection made in the mind, and the non-mental or material cannot be a cause. It would be a contradiction to maintain the Cartesian assumption of such material reality independent of mind. Nothing which is 'present to the mind' can have this

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[74] Calkins, PPP, 363.

asserted existence independent of mind.

> Hume asserts, first, that causality is a relation within consciousness, and consequently cannot assure us of the reality of anything outside consciousness; and second, that whatever the basis of inference, inferred objects must be known objects, and cannot therefore be 'possessed of independent existence,..This position is one of great strength; it is indeed, in the opinion of this writer, unassailable.[75]

ii. Reality is of the nature of self

With materialism refuted, Professor Calkins now maintains the metaphysical position of idealism that all reality is immediately known to be of the nature of the self.

(i) She first repudiates Berkeley's copy theory of knowledge which denies knowledge of selves except by 'notions.' Berkeley's adoption of Locke's copy theory of knowledge and his doctrine of ideas as 'passive and inert' had led him to deny that knowledge of spirit is possible, since spirit is active, while ideas are passive. But Berkeley's doctrine of 'notions' through which spirit is known is as untenable as that of ideas. For 'notions,' in being perceived, would be no less passive than ideas. The difficulty inheres in the copy theory of knowledge. And spirit or self is directly known without mediation of ideas, which are at best only abstractions from the concrete conscious self. Ideas recognized are either those

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[75] Calkins, PPP, 176.

of one's own self or of some other self. Berkeley had not attained the synoptic view of the mind as the concrete conscious self of experience, which is not adequately described as a series of psychic states, nor that it is the very nature of spirit to obtain direct knowledge of other spirit as well as one's own.[76]

(ii) Turning to a refutation of Hume's 'bundle' theory of the self, Professor Calkins calls to mind that Hume's denial reverts to his teaching that knowledge consists of impressions and ideas, and his view of idea as separate, independent and isolated from all other reality, having no need of a self as 'sub-stratum' in which to inhere. Hume's second argument is that we are not self-conscious. No one has an impression or ideas of himself. Ideas are fleeting and evanescent and any impression of self would have to be relatively permanent. Introspection fails to discover such a conscious self. But Hume fails to observe that there are no "floating" experiences, that all perceptions are "owned" and are those of a self. But the self is assumed in every denial that Hume makes. In his very denials he refers to the conscious activities and the permanence of the mind in terms impossible for a mere bundle of fleeting perceptions.[77]

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[76] Calkins, PPP, 118ff, 145ff.
[77] Calkins, PPP, 150ff, 179ff.

(iii) To the world of unknowable reality, as he conceives it, parallel to things in themselves Kant also assigns the real transcendental self. He has insisted that knowledge must contain sense data, and hence can be only of phenomenal reality, but the real categorizing, thinking self is unknowable. But Professor Calkins maintains that while it is true that all consciousness including knowledge contains sensation, it does not necessarily follow that knowledge is sensational to the exclusion of any object of ultimate reality. Knowledge of self is more than sensational, but the two experiences of self-consciousness and being at the same time sensationally conscious are not irreconcilable. The presence of sensation in consciousness does not prevent coincident awareness of self. In spite of sensation, in Tennyson's pregnant line,

..."Spirit with Spirit can meet".

Kant's second argument is that to hold the transcendental self knowable would cancel the distinction between subject and object, which is involved in knowledge, since the real self known would have to be object as well as subject. But Professor Calkins objects that while the distinction between the transcendental and empirical ego would satisfy the demand of self-knowledge as defined by Kant, the very admission of the transcendental self as knower is contradictory. In affirming the transcendental self to be knower, subject not object, there is the implicit

iii. Our knowledge of Reality involves at once experience of self and knowledge of the absolute

(i) The personalistic absolutist holds that immediate and direct knowledge of self is at once experience of Reality and knowledge of the Absolute. They hold with Fichte that this direct experience includes besides the immediate experience of an involuntarily limited and thwarted self, the direct awareness of other than self, which is to be conceived as an all-including self, "of which all that exists is genuinely part." The experience of self and of not-self is direct. Because the self is only a part of the greater self, all consciousness is at once self-consciousness and consciousness of being "genuinely though only partially identical with the greater (all-including) self, the Absolute."[81] In this identity of the self as known object with the knower self is our warrant for denoting Professor Calkins an idealistic epistemological monist. Self as knower does not transcend itself, and is not only qualitatively, but also numerically one and the same. However, in a later paragraph, discussing the contrast between our indirect knowledge of other selves and the direct awareness of self and the Absolute, Professor Calkins tells us what is independently inferred.

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[81] Calkins, PPP, 422.

> We are here discussing not the nature of social consciousness but the epistemological basis of it. And, according to the theory of knowledge on which the whole philosophy of personal Absolutism has been based, knowledge or certainty requires an identity between knower and known.[82]

(ii) In this lack of transcendence of the known object, Professor Calkins declares there is no warrant for the contention of the critical realist that idealism cancels the distinction between the subject and object in consciousness. For in self-experience this distinction is always drawn between self knowing and known. Likewise, that the distinction is drawn between knowing self and other self is readily seen in the fact that in development of a critical estimate, whether in agreement or disagreement, the argument of the one other person is clearly distinguished from one's own. In imitation of one self by another, the distinction is beyond question. Further, in knowledge of externalized objects that the personalistic absolutist does distinguish between qualitative and numerical differences is obvious. He knows, for example, that not only does an orange differ from a pineapple numerically, but also in empirical quality, and that two oranges, say an "Indian River" and a "Sunkist" are not only numerically but also qualitatively different.[83]

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[82] Calkins, PPP, 472.
[83] Calkins, PPP, 417.

iv. Knowledge of other selves is mediate

On first thought, although we seem to know other selves, like wife, child, or friend, as directly and certainly as we know ourselves, and even more direct than we know the Absolute, it is paradoxical to assert that our social consciousness is not immediate. But my fellow and I are different parts of the Absolute, and I am aware of him only indirectly. I am not identical with him and my indirect knowledge of him is inferred from my knowledge that it is "the nature of the Absolute self to include within it many finite selves."

12. Critical evaluation of the idealistic epistemological monism of Calkins

(1) Critical estimates are ample for constructing her epistemology

It should be noted that although Professor Calkins does not present a systematic epistemology, the incisive and fundamental nature of her critical estimates of modern philosophers afford ample basis for constructing her epistemological presuppositions.

(2) Holds the view of self as an organic unity

Above all, she is a doughty protagonist for a view of the self as an organic unity. Whether in refuting Berkeley's abstraction of ideas (or notions) from the concrete self of conscious experience, Hume's atomistic impressions and bundle theory of perceptions, or in equal

repudiation of Kant's breakdown of the self into empirical and transcendental or real self, Professor Calkins steadfastly maintains that these all are only abstractions from the concrete self of experience. The synoptic view of the self is the only tenable one.

(3) An all-including self and plurality of selves contradictory

Professor Calkins's monism of an all including self involves a series of contradictions. While it is true that in personality, identity and diversity are reconciled, the 'selves' are numerically individuals, no two of whom are exactly alike. One can conceive of different aspects of an individual's nature being manifested in temporal succession. A teacher self may thus succeed a student self, as it in turn succeeds a childhood self, but that all these can temporally co-exist in the same individual would involve hopeless contradiction. How love and hatred, mutually exclusive can exist in one individual at one and the same time has not been shown by Professor Calkins.

Again, to be "genuinely though only partially identical" is to involve logical contradiction or to use the word 'genuine' in an ambiguous sense. If the word is synonymous with true or real, one may either be identical with the other, or be partially like another, but to be partially identical with another is contradictory.

"Genuine" identity, or qualitative and numerical sameness, is numerical singularity. Partial, which implies only a fraction, cannot be consistently applied to identity. If so applied, it could only mean indiscernability of difference, or similarity. An adult self, though greatly changed in the intervening years is identical with the self of childhood. In the self, as Bowne showed, identity is compatible with change. On the other hand, "identical twin" brothers, however similar are not identical. Reverting to the "all-including" self with its "included" plurality of selves, each of whom is said to be "genuinely though only partially identical with the Absolute," the truth must either be genuinely identical or similar to, but cannot be both.[84]

(4) The concept of an all-inclusive self is contrary to conscious experience

While all that we experience is mind, it is also experienced as multiplicity of conscious data in the unity of self-experience. The datum self does not reveal an all-including self.[85] This experience of self is contemporaneously also immediate experience of some object, which may be a principle, which transcends the self. The datum self is therefore a refutation of the concept of an all-

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[84] Cf. Tennant on the formal categories, 48, note 30. For critical evaluation of the metaphysical status of the absolute, cf. 327ff.

[85] For meaning of datum self, cf. 312f.

inclusive self. The datum reveals its owner,but no other self. The existence of other self is an inference, not as Professor Calkins holds, from common knowledge of inclusion as parts of the absolute, which is rejected as unempirical, but from such empirical data as knowledge of the social instincts of the physical organism, the rational nature of the self and the social nature of knowledge, and in part by ejective analogy.

(5) Professor Calkins's view involves discrepancy between knowledge by the absolute self and the finite selves

There is an epistemological contradiction between the all-including self as it knows me and my own self-experience. The Absolute self knows me completely, but my experience of myself is only fragmentary. The so-called 'alter ego' is also an occasional experience. But the knowledge of the all-including absolute is not fragmentary, like mine. Is self-experience illusory, or is the knowledge by the Absolute like mine only fragmentary?

(6) Calkins's view involves ignorance and error in the absolute

Akin to the problem of incomplete knowledge is that of ignorance and error. If the knowledge of the absolute is perfect, is his consciousness of my ignorance and error the same as mine? Granted that he does 'transcend' it, it is difficult to harmonize in the absolute finite ignorance

with perfect knowledge, error with absolute truth.

13. Metaphysics of the self involved in Professor Calkins's idealistic epistemological monism

(1) Calkins holds a view of the self as an organic unity

In the refutation of abstraction of ideas from the self, the self implied by Professor Calkins is an organic unity.

(2) Mentalism is involved in Calkins's epistemology

Throughout discussion, in refutation and in original interpretation and especially in denial of Cartesian dualism, the self is mentalistic, being conscious experience.

(3) Professor Calkins's view of the self involves time

Acceptance of Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as of "crowning (epistemological) importance" implies time.

(4) Transcendence of time is involved in Calkins's acceptance of Kant's idea of the unity of apperception

Kant's unity of apperception which Professor Calkins accepts also involves the transcendence of time.

(5) Calkins's epistemology involves process and conation

The outreach of the self after knowledge of reality involves process and conation.

CHAPTER III

THE TENNANT-WARDIAN PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF

1. Reasons for joint exposition, adjectival characterization and logical order

The reasons for presenting the psychology of the self in the thought of Ward and Tennant as a common view, its adjectival characterization and the logical order of exposition must first be stated.

(1) Avoidance of duplicate presentation and euphony in adjectival use

Because Tennant's psychological view of the self is based on Ward's psychology and the two views are substantially identical, in order to avoid repetition of exposition and critical evaluation, their psychology of the self is treated as the Tennant-Wardian view. Where essential divergence occurs, it will be separately presented. For the sake of euphony the historical order of names is reversed in adjectival use, but in exposition the proper historical order will be observed.[1]

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[1] If and when there is reference in later chapters of this investigation, the Tennant-Wardian psychology will denote the view in which there is complete agreement and the particular writer will be self evident from the context. Tennant-Wardian (rev) will denote a view in which there has been revision by Tennant.

(2) Exposition of self-consciousness conforming to the genetical order of self-knowledge, reverses the normal order

As will appear, a primary characteristic of the common view is its dichotomy of the self into the pure ego or subject and the empirical ego, or object. In the interest of clearness, and conforming to the genetical order in which the pure ego is said to be known, exposition of self-consciousness will reverse the normal subject object order. After argument for knowledge of the pure ego, exposition of personality as development of the empirical ego will follow.

2. Self-consciousness is the primary datum of psychology, and standpoint of treatment is individual experience

(1) Consciousness is synonymous with experience

Both thinkers regard self-consciousness as the primary datum of psychology, and this leads to a consideration of consciousness as logically prior. Ward prefers the term experience because it is less ambiguous. He defines it as "the art of becoming expert by experiment." Tennant, observing that both consciousness and experience have acquired ambiguity uses consciousness, and without definition, is careful to indicate in its connotation what Ward preserves in 'experience,' the more-than-cognitive meaning of the term. The fact of importance urged by both thinkers

is that in consciousness change takes place, accompanied by feeling.[2] Moreover the terms are used interchangeably, and will be so used in our study.

(2) Psychological standpoint of treatment is analysis and synthesis of individual experience

The psychological standpoint of the Tennant-Wardian treatment is analysis of consciousness as it is experienced by an 'imaginary' individual who has "continuously advanced from the beginning of psychical life." Upon reaching exposition of the empirical ego and personality, the standpoint changes to that of the concrete individual of historical and social life, a post-analytic synthesis of individual experience.

3. Consciousness is a duality in unity

The chief implication of consciousness is that it is a duality in unity. Experience implies (Ward) or reveals (Tennant) a subject-object duality in unity.

(1) The object is a presentation

The psychological object is a presentation to a subject. From the side of the object the presentation is a differentiation of one identical sensori-motor continuum. The continuum, a stretch of change, is a continuous whole (totum objectivum) which is gradually discriminated by the

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[2] Ward, PP, 29, 41. Tennant, PT, I, 15.

subject, giving rise to presentations. A presentation is what Locke means by idea, or Kant and Herbart by Vorstellung.[3]

The presentation is more generally regarded as a psychical object. It may be a sensation, percept, idea, or movement; or it may be various combinations of these. It may be a primary presentation, pertaining to the present, or it may be secondary, the re-presentation in memory of an earlier presentation. A presentation is not a subjective mode. To regard it as such is to confuse the pure Ego with the empirical Ego which self-consciousness implies, and because the empirical Ego of self-consciousness is itself an object, to relate one object of experience, as an idea, to another object, the 'Me.' Experience is a unity of the duality of subject and object. The object is a presentation to a subject, and the relation between the two implies attention.[4]

i. The plasticity of the continuum

The modification of the continuum is a three-fold process termed the plasticity of the continuum.

(i) Differentiation is the partial modification of a pre-existing presentational whole which increases in complexity as the subject progressively differentiates from the unbroken whole. It is insisted that this does

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[3] Ward, PP, 46.
[4] Ward, PP, 46ff, 66ff. 178ff. 195ff.

not give rise to a plurality of discrete presentations, but that in presentation the continuum is one unbroken whole. Any atomistic view of sensation is thus precluded. (ii) The second stage of the process is retention. Previous differentiations persist to combine with new differentiations. There is increase in complexity. (iii) In the third stage there is assimilation of the new to the old elements of the continuum, so that the continuum increases indefinitely in complexity. The development from childhood to maturity is comparable to the "advance from the egg to the chicken."[5] The process is an interaction between subject and object, the subject being the formative agency, to which we now turn.

(2) Attention, feeling, conation and memory are subjective functioning

The primary functionings of the subject are attention, feeling and conation, a concrete unity. Memory is a subjective function of recall.

i. Attention is the activity of a subject

Attention is not a synonym for consciousness. Consciousness is ambiguously used to include a range of awareness from passive perception to active reflective consciousness, whereas, attention properly implies the activity of a self. Attention is used, not in the narrow sense of something being selected for special attention, but in the wider sense of attending to what is presented, whether it

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[5] Ward, PP, 410.

involves a special act of attention or not. Attention is the subject's "one" faculty, since the receptive and reactive factors of consciousness can be resolved into attention to some special class of objects, as sensory or motor objects. In the subject-object duality, attention constitutes the relation between the two. (i) A distinction is to be drawn between continuous attention and specific acts of attention. (a) There is always some degree of continuous attention to the presentation-continuum as a whole (the object). This is sensory and passive, non-voluntary and objectively diverted.[6] (b) Specific acts of attention represent changes in distribution of attention correlative with changes in the differentiation of the continuum. An act of attention is always concentrated within a certain restricted limit, hence Herbart's comment on the Enge des Bewusstseins. 'The effective' intensity of an act of attention depends on two factors, the degree of attention concentrated on it in relation to the rest of the continuum and the 'inherent' intensity, the psychical concomitant of neural stimulation which sets an upper limit for intensity.

ii. The relation of feeling to perception and action argues its exclusive subjectivity

The primary psychological significance of feeling,

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[6] This is exclusively Ward's view. It is revised by Tennant, in the spirit of Ward, however, making even this continuous attention to the continuum possess a degree of subjective activity. See our presentation of this divergence, 119.

the subject's one primordial capacity lies in its relation to action. It is an affective state of pleasure or displeasure, and in some degree accompanies perception of objects. It is a unique and ultimate factor in experience, and cannot be resolved into sensa. A few briefly stated facts will suffice to indicate the futility of attempting, as behaviorists do, to make it other than an exclusively subjective element.[7]

(i) Feeling is related to attention in that pleasure or displeasure is produced in the subject proportionate to the effective or ineffective exercise of attention. (ii) Feeling is evoked either from single sensations or movements, or from a harmonious arrangement of such presentations. (iii) Feeling cannot be differentiated into parts nor associated. Those of different 'sign' do not coexist and accompany perception, but blend into an affective state, neither wholly pleasant nor unpleasant. (iv) Feeling cannot, like the sensum be localized and projected into things.

iii. Conation is an irreducible subjective function

The third subjective element, conation or conative action, the experience of want or unrest is 'irreducible' and fundamental, a function of the self. (i) Conation may result in desire or aversion, and tends to its own fulfillment. Hence it is highly important as basic in

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[7] Ward, PP, 41ff; Tennant, PT, I, 24f.

the achievement of value. (ii) The three primary subjective elements attention, feeling and conation are logically distinguishable, but are not wholly separable. Neither is 'reducible' to the other. (iii) In relation to feeling and attention, pleasure leads to the concentration of attention on the pleasurable object, and to repress movement, except such movement as is executed for its own sake, as play. Painful presentation produces involuntary movement, withdrawal of attention and movement away from the disturbing presentation.

(iv) Behaviorists deny that desire is a subjective attitude, holding it to be but a convenient fiction for economy of description. But experience of a conative state is sufficient refutation of this claim.

> Granted conative states, first lived through or 'enjoyed,' and then contemplated, we can understand the poet's talk of the loves of plants; but, given only the clinging of ivy to oak, it is hard to account for the superfluous word 'love.' [8]

iv. Memory is a subjective function

Memory is a function of the subject, and although not primary as feeling and conation, in memory the subject functions in recalling past experience. Genetically, it is related to the plasticity of the continuum. "Retention, the precursor of memory, is practically brief memory in 'the specious present,'" so that introspectively we experi-

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[8] Tennant, PT, I, 28.

ence "the lapse from past to present" in process. The memory-image is a re-presentation of a past presentation and is not a continuing or re-instatement of an original percept. It is conditioned by the previous perception and the original Object of which it is an effect. Paradoxical as it seems, it is actually psychically immediate knowledge of the past.[9] "Memory includes recognition of the past in the experience of an identical individual." So it becomes the basis for belief in self-identity. The recall of individual experience involves a contrast of past with present and a "dated" event.[10]

Because memory is related to perceptual time, memory and expectation are intimately connected. It is necessary to distinguish between those expectations that are due to the memory-train and those that are the result of reasoning. A clear case of expectation does not depend upon the exact similarity of a past event to that expected, but only upon any previous similar experience from which reasoning may set out to expect. Psychologically the one-

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[9] The view of memory as psychologically past though psychically present is to be referred to the psychology of time. "The specious present or unit of actual experience is a saddleback, not a knife-edge." It can be psychologically resolved into the memory image or after-percept and the pre-percept. The psychologist is able to distinguish within 'the specious present' these elements, one of which is psychologically past although psychically present. In order that succession of the second note of a chord be heard following the first, both first and second must be presented within the psychic present. Cf. exposition of the psychological derivation of the 'intuition' of time in Tennant's epistemology, 47.

[10] Ward, PP, 206ff. Tennant, PT, I, 57ff.

ness of direction of time and the distinction of past and future depends on the continuous sinking of the primary memory-image on the one side, and the continuous rising of the first member of a percept-series, all of which depend on the formation of a memory-train by the recurrence of similar presentations.[11]

The old notion of memory as resulting from the association by contiguity was based on the mechanical view of the 'adhesion' of 'contiguous' and the attraction of similar experiences. This is abandoned as erroneous, and the cause of associated recall is assigned to interested acts of attention to objects, to 'continuity of attention' rather than 'contiguity' of presentations.[12]

(3) Agreement in militant polemic in vindication of the existence of self

There is substantial agreement in militant polemical spirit in vindication of the unity of the mental life against theories which attempt to reduce the psychical to the physiological, and by devious periphrases to suppress the subject of consciousness. Ward declares,

> However assailed or disowned, the concept of a self or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever - not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact than Hume who treats it as a fiction.[13]

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[11] Ward, PP, 289ff. Tennant, PT, I, 169.
[12] Ward, PP, 191ff.
[13] Ward, PP, 35.

Tennant says,

> For the present it suffices us to insist that whenever there is such an occurrence as an instance of consciousness, be it passing sensatio or a mental Bios, that experience involves an experient...But it has been hushed up by psychologists who analyze cognition into object and act of awareness, but shyly refrain from confessing that acts involve agents.[14]

Especially is this vindication of the subject insistent in its view of the unity of the mental life as against all atomic theories of the self, whether the atomism of Hume, the elastic-ball analogy suggested in a foot-note to *Critique*, A, by Kant, but discarded in the following sentence, or the "absorption" or series theory of James, whereby each term in the series is thought to absorb the preceding psychosis, so that the latest term is thought to "contain all its forbears."[15] But there are no subjectless experiences except those "owned" by an abiding self. Ward pronounces the series theory "the most impossible thing in the world," and Tennant "a monstrous offence against fact." "Every single drop in the 'stream of consciousness' must have its subject."[16]

4. Self-consciousness involves the distinction between pure Ego and empirical Ego and knowledge of the pure Ego

Self consciousness, the primary datum of psychology,

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[14] Tennant, PT, I, 17.
[15] Cf. James, ERE, 36.
[16] Ward, PP, 381. Tennant, PT, I, 81.

involves the distinction between the knowing self or pure Ego (I) and the known self or empirical Ego (me). A most important knowledge is that of our own consciousness. To be self conscious is to know that we know, feel and act. This self-knowledge is only gradually attained.

(1) The empirical Ego is a presentation

The empirical Ego is "a presentation among other presentations." Self, however, is distinctive in having a unique interest, a certain inwardness that persists, is active, and knows itself.

i. Self-knowledge begins with the bodily self

Genetically, self-knowledge begins with the bodily self, the self implicit in awareness of embodiment. It arises chiefly through somatic sensations. The body is distinguished perceptually from other bodies as an extended thing. It becomes a center to which is referred centripetal action toward it and centrifugal action from it to other bodies, hence it is also accompanied by feelings of 'appetite' and 'aversion.' Further, itself occupying space, the body becomes a point of spatial reference from which all positions are reckoned. This outer zone of selfhood is termed by Ward "the sensitive and appetitive self." It is "an unfailing 'double' of the actual feeling and active self to which all other things are external." The body thus gives a measure of individuality, permanence and

inwardness which is attributed to self.[17]

ii. The formation of a generic image of the self occurs at the ideational level of experience.

At the ideational level of individual experience, there is a further development of self-knowledge. A distinction is drawn within the body of an outer zone and an inner, relatively more unified, unchanging zone. In the latter, trains of ideas, memories and anticipations of doing and suffering together with organic sensations of the moment compete for attention with external percepts. In reverie and reminiscence, a generic image of the self is formed, synthesized with organic sensations and regarded as their seat. This inner zone is then contrasted with the rest of the body, which is regarded as external and alien to it. In ecstasy and similar abnormal instances the body appears to be wanting. This generic image of the self is termed by Ward, "the imagining and desiring self," and its location is fixed as the midriff, the chief seat of the emotional agitations. Tennant refers to it as "the germ of the idea of a soul."

iii. Self-knowledge and knowledge of other selves advance _pari passu_

With the earliest belief in other selves and consequent social intercourse, higher development of self-knowledge is

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[17] Ward, PP, 365; Tennant, PT, 70f.

attained.

(i) The belief in other selves in order of time follows awareness of the rudimentary idea of self of the preceding stage. The bodies of others perceived to be and to act like ourselves suggest interpretation by ejective analogy: knowledge of oneself and of other selves develop pari passu. (ii) In social life there is indefinite expansion of the empirical self. Value experiences of the individual in society suggest that the common weal and individual self-realization are closely related. Social approval itself becomes a value, and in the attainment of this and other values consequent to it, there is enrichment and continuing development of the self.

iv. Intellectual and value experiences of self in intersubjective intercourse make possible the attainment of the real self

The intellectual experiences made possible by intersubjective intercourse together with self-appraisal and self-criticism in society, as before a mirror in which we see ourselves as others see us lead to the attainment of the thinking and willing self or personality.

(i) In judgments, the distinction is made between the thinker and his thoughts, to which he is inner. They are his objects and so figuratively external. (ii) To this idea of thinking and willing self is added the concept of self as a person, the actor in various social roles.

(iii) In social intercourse we compare and contrast our own conduct with that of other selves. Becoming spectators of ourselves at the mirror of social life, we appraise our conduct in the light of the expectations of others, and implicit jural conscience arises, its explicit development is only a higher phase of this stage of self-consciousness.[18]

v. Thinking and willing self becomes inner agent, the pure ego, owner of empirical self. Definition of pure ego.

An inverse process now takes place. This thinking, willing, personal self of social intercourse culminates in an inner agent, figuratively interior to its presentations, and so distinct from itself. Assuming control of the concentric circles of empirical selfhood, it is now an inner agent, the pure ego. The empirical self is its creation and property, and it now sustains its persona in social intercourse. Based on the identical empirical views of Ward and Tennant, the pure ego may now be defined as the owner of empirical consciousness, and the transcendental agent of experience.

vi. Knowledge of the pure ego is mediate and reflective, knowledge by description rather than acquaintance.[19]

The nature of this knowledge of the pure ego thus discursively attained, is reflective and mediate. (i) It is not a presentation of the moment, but a construct from residua. It is knowledge by description rather than by acquaintance. The subject, present in all consciousness,

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[18] Ward, PP, 368ff. Tennant, PT, I, 146.

is apprehended in self-consciousness.

> At the level of self-consciousness (the common sense fact) consciousness, or perceptio, is presented, as directly as any sensum, to the subject thereof; this presentation involves the subject--for there are no perceivings or other instances of consciousness that are not acts or states of a subject--though it is not a presentation of the subject. The I is known in the me, agent from acts, cause from effects...We are thus empirically confined to the alternate view that the pure ego, if known at all and not merely thought or supposed, is but known about, mediately and reflectively or intellectively.[20]

(ii) Knowledge of the pure ego is noumenal and not phenomenal knowledge. Presented qualia being that of the object, the pure ego is transparent or qualityless. It is known by idea or known about by intellect. Ward says,

> We conclude then, that we know intellectually what we are as experients: into the empty form of consciousness, our being fits.[21]

And Tennant similarly declares,

> The I that is unknowable to sense is knowable to intellect operating on sense; and this intelligible knowledge of the I is not like perception of the non-ego, dependent on immediate presentation of the object (in this case the I) itself.[22]

(2) In addition to the pure ego other factors in personality are inheritance and environment

In the Tennant-Wardian view, three definite factors

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[20] Tennant, PT, I, 77.
[21] Ward, PP, 38.
[22] Tennant, PT, I, 78.

determine human personality.[23] One only has been treated, the pure ego, and two are now to be considered, the inheritance or psychoplasm (plastic psychologically objective continuum) and the physical and social environment. For this study we pass from the earlier standpoint of the "imaginary individual" to that of the "concrete individual," the individual as he is related historically and socially to nature, the human race and to his immediate ancestors.

i. Empirical Ego or Mind, as objective 'content' of experience is inherited

The empirical Ego, but not the pure Ego is inherited. It is continuous with the human race and with its immediate ancestors, and organic to Nature. (i) On this view mind is the psychologically objective 'content' of experience, originally 'given' to the individual as the psychoplasm or plastic psychologically objective continuum. (ii) The hypothesis of psychoplasm, original in Ward and followed by Tennant is supported by the following data. a. The single empirical fact that the mentality of the psychological subject, as it develops, shows partial likeness to that of his ancestors. b. The analogy of the bioplasm, in which general characteristics of parent organisms are inherited as tendencies by offspring.

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[23] Ward, PP, 424.

c. According to the mnemic theory of heredity, habit in individual life is the ground of heredity in racial life.[24]

(iii) The German Anlage best describes the nature of this inheritance. It is a disposition based on inheritance of factors which condition the determinate development of mentality. These factors are "proximately determined through the bioplasm."[25] The extent of this inheritance is the tendency to develop along certain lines and the inhibiting of development along certain other lines. The Anlage is not the body as Objective, "it is the body in its intentional aspect." It is not innate in the sense of being born in the subject.

Therefore the popularly used term instinct could only apply to it when instinct is defined to exclude properties of the pure ego. Further, while instincts are almost entirely stimulated externally, the Anlagen are inwardly initiated as blind craving, which if objectively directed would be desire. The term instinct, if applied to Anlage, would have to be used in a broad and indefinite sense to include not only such factors as fear-induced flight, appetite, aversion, parental love, curiosity, and probably gregariousness, but also the specialized tendencies that individuals display in definite situations, such as resourcefulness in emergency and its opposite. Viewed

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[24] Ward, 420ff. Tennant, PT, I, 106.
[25] Ward, PP, 426ff. Tennant, PT, I, 105ff.

ethically, the Anlage is unmoral, for as pertains to the individual, it is an endowment for which he has no responsibility until he either elaborates or neglects it.[26]

ii. Personality, except for the pure ego is 'organic to Nature,' and involves teleological determination by the pure ego

Except for the pure ego, personality is a product of the world process, and involves teleological determination by the pure ego. (i) It is a construction by one identical ego or subject en rapport with other subjects in a common environment, and may exist in all degrees between man and God. Personality is not attributed to sub-human selves, because we have no evidence of their being self-conscious, the minimum essential of personality. It is capable of an indefinite expansion to an ever increasing ideal.[27] (ii) Personality involves volition as teleological determination by the pure ego. a. Psychologically, volition is to be distinguished from the conative activity which follows perception as the result of feeling mediated by the inherited Anlage. For example, the involuntary random movement that is discovered to relieve pain or promote pleasure is to be differentiated from volition which succeeds an idea and operates in virtue of intent involved in purposeful action. b. Ethical considerations

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[26] Ward, PP, 453ff. Tennant, PT, I, 108f.
[27] Ward, PP, 464ff; Tennant, 124ff.

make it imperative also to distinguish between intent and volition. We can intend without willing. While intent may include desire and even resolution, volition requires transeunt action. c. Freedom of the will means determination by the pure ego that has chosen its end.[28]

5. Tennant's divergences from Ward

We note now the essential divergences of Tennant from Ward in the psychology of the self.[29]

(1) Tennant's interpretation of the pure ego as 'soul'

The interpretation of the pure ego as soul is an essential divergence from Ward's psychology, and we present separate exposition of this divergence.

i. The psychological approach of Ward and Tennant is identical

Let us first note Ward's position. Although in his metaphysics he interprets the dominant monad as soul in contradistinction from body, as empirical psychologist he specifically disavows the metaphysical conception of a soul.

> By pure Ego or Subject it is proposed to denote here the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing. This psychological concept of a Self is after all by no means identical with the metaphysical concept of a soul: it may be kept as free from metaphysical implication as the concept of the biological individual or organism with which it is intimately connected.[30]

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[28] Ward, PP, 453ff; Tennant, 127ff.

[29] For an exhaustive account of agreements and differences between Ward and Tennant, Cf. Scudder, TPT, 3ff.

[30] Ward, ROE, 207. Ward, PP, 35.

And in another paragraph, the reason is made clear.

> We cannot, if we call this being a substance use the term in the sense in which we use it of matter, for we cannot conceive the self as actual at all if we imagine it as experiencing nothing...If we call this being a substance, we must give that term the meaning that Leibniz gave it, and not that given to it by Descartes and Spinoza.[31]

We observe, next, that in the approach to the psychological problem of the pure ego the views of Ward and Tennant are identical. "All that is meant by it is the abiding subject."[32]

ii. Tennant postulates a metaphysical entity, comparable to Ward's metaphysical view

But while Ward, as empirical psychologist is not willing to introduce a metaphysical entity into psychology, Tennant, writing not primarily as psychologist, but presenting theistic argument in Philosophical Theology, does postulate a metaphysical entity. Following psychological exposition, in a footnote he says, "We need not cling to the name pure ego; all that is meant by it is the abiding subject to which the name soul can be given."[33] Thenceforward, the term 'soul' alternates with the pure ego, and we present, now, Tennant's metaphysical characterization of the pure ego.

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[31] Ward, PP, 382.
[32] Tennant, PT, I, 79, footnote.
[33] Tennant, PT, I, 79, footnote.

iii. Tennant's metaphysical characterization of the pure ego as soul

In his metaphysical characterization of the pure ego as soul, Tennant regards it as a monad in the three-fold sense of numerical singularity, imperviousness or privacy, and idiosyncrasy or uniqueness. (i) In its singularity, the soul is indivisible. The soul is not a unity of divisible parts. (ii) As private, it has no "windows," but is characterized with its own distinctive viewpoint. (iii) The soul is also a monad in the sense of idiosyncrasy or uniqueness. No other soul is exactly like this one. To use a term Professor Calkins sometimes uses of self, the soul is irreplaceable. It is immanently alive in feeling, thought, and activity. It has the capacity of feeling, and responds to its environment, attending to its objective continuum, receiving sense impressions from which it selectively formulates concepts, and en rapport with its environment it elaborates the factors which fashions the richness of its personality.

(iv) It is not an existent without an essence. Its essence is to funtion en rapport with its objects. (v) It is noumenal and ontal, that to which phenomena appear, "the one ontal thing that is assuredly known."[34] (vi) It is not substance in the pre-Leibnizian sense of

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[34] Tennant, PT, I, 97.

being "that which can only be conceived in terms of itself," "indestructible and indiscerptible." a. It is _a_ determinate logical substance, relatively permanent and causally efficient. True to Ward's demurrer, he declares,

> Its substantiality is not to be conceived in terms of spatiality, of the _in se_ or _per se_, or even of the _res cogitans_, but rather of the _conatus_ of Spinoza and Leibniz."[35]

b. It is not adjectival of any other soul or of God. It is also not an aggregate of experiences, as Aristotle wrongly believed. The thinker is no mere hypostatization of his thoughts nor the mere subject of his conscious states. The soul is no mere name for the unifiedness of its experiences.

c. The soul is a continuant in the sense of not being a collection of states connected by transeunt causation, but an active bond in the sense of the old notion of substance as substratum or support, which gives unity and continuity to personality (the pure ego, its states, relations and objects). Substance and causality are at bottom one, each implicating the other.[36]

(2) Tennant's revision of Ward's theory of attention

In a second instance in connection with the subject, Tennant shows a variation from Ward's theory of attention.

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[35] Tennant, PT, I, 95.
[36] Tennant, PT, I, 98f.

i. Attention as cognitive receptivity

Whereas Ward employs attention to include non-voluntary, passive sense experience as well as conative action, Tennant narrows attention to the meaning of cognitive receptivity, which he holds to possess some degree of activity.

ii. Metaphysical significance to extend subjective activity

The metaphysical significance of the variation is to extend subjective activity down to minimum perceptual awareness as well as to specific acts of attention.[37]

> If we are to credit the subject with 'one faculty' it is necessary to include distinguishable sub-species within it over and above perception of impression...In sensatio there must be so much of subjective reaction as required for receiving an impression...and that is not nil. Just as in the analogue of passive reception by wax of the impression of a seal, something must be credited to the wax in that it undergoes what in the same circumstances iron or water does not, so in sensatio.[38]

(3) Tennant's addition to Ward's discussion of personality

A third instance of divergence from Ward is noted in two aspects of the conception of personality.

i. Abnormal personality is cited as added argument for the view that mind is the objective 'content' of experience.

This view of mind, he says, accounts for sub-conscious

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[37] Epistemologically sensa are produced by the subject en rapport with things in themselves.

[38] Tennant, PT, I, 28f.

and unconscious mental functioning. The mind is to be regarded as a system of systems in interaction, elaborated by one and the same pure ego. Subliminal and supra-liminal mental systems interact and data of which we are not conscious at the moment of experience may be known reflectively; for example, the correction of binocular vision and the unconscious linkings in association. Stored knowledge is also such a cognitive dispositional system. Cases of abnormal personality in moderate and extreme forms are evidence that personality is an attribute of empirical ego, objective to the pure ego, and elaborated by it.

> Personality is a relative thing, an attribute of the empirical self, objective to its pure ego; while dissociated personality would seem to consist in a single subject's acting for different periods and even for the same period, according to different conceptions of itself (body and mind) due in the first instance to different 'body-feelings.' There is (ps) continuity of subjective synthesis where there is loss of consciousness thereof, or where there is (ψ) discontinuity.[39]

The metaphysical significance of this argument points to the unity and persistence of the pure ego regardless of its functioning with its different mental systems, and the distinction between empirical ego and pure ego is emphasized.

ii. The ethical and metaphysical significance of volition is made explicit by Tennant

In his discussion of volition, Tennant makes explicit

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[39] Tennant, PT, I, 124. The symbols (ps) and (ψ) in Tennant's usage mean, respectively, psychological and psychical.

the ethical and metaphysical significance of volition, which is only implied in Ward's psychology. It serves as basis for Tennant's theory of value. The old metaphysical problem of freedom of the will properly belongs to the days of psychological ignorance. But with the progress of psychological knowledge, we are able to analyze volition into its antecedent psychological factors. If by freedom of will is meant determination of volition by the subject, then it cannot be questioned. Perception, feeling, conation, voluntary attention, and ideation, all involve choice and activity by a subject. Determinism, in the sense that a consequent act is necessitated by some antecedent condition is a product of the abstraction of sensationist psychology. It is only because the pure ego is able to choose its ends and determine conduct in keeping with them, that mechanistic determinism has been suggested as a theory.[40]

(4) The psychology of valuation is developed by Tennant from Ward's psychology

Tennant's psychological theory of value is based on Ward's general psychology. However, he recognizes that Ward, in his posthumously published Psychology in Education, by his insistence that the truth of ethics remains necessary whether it can be applied or not, and in his assumption

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[40] Tennant, PT, I, 127ff.

that we cannot explain the principles of axiology by genetic studies, Ward takes a position as to the eternal prius of truth in ethics which he repudiates in pure mathematics.[41] Of the two alternatives, Tennant accepts the one that truth is valid only of the perceptual. His standpoint therefore distinguishes between the psychology of valuation and axiology. While axiology deals with both the over-individual and the over-social standpoints in value, the psychology of valuation deals descriptively only with value process as genetically experienced, by individuals or society. It avoids dogmatic presuppositions of absolute value apart from experients.

i. Aesthetic and moral values originate in subpersonal individual experience in the physical and social environment

In individual experience all primary aesthetic and moral values are subjective estimation projected into perceptual Objects in the common physical and social environment. It is a conative process and its mode of apprehension corresponds to the way in which ideas are developed in cognition.[42] In its apprehension perception is accompanied by feeling which makes the object desired as good. But value is not resolvable into feeling and desire. It

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[41] Cf. Ward, PP, 416; PAE, 153.

[42] Conation is here used in its strict psychological sense to include feeling.

is to be regarded as epigenesis. It is a teleological category sui generis.

(i) Value experience and emergence of its criteria are correlative with advance in self-knowledge. a. Individual valuation emerges with the self-interest contingent on the rudimentary knowledge of the bodily self. b. This valuation is followed by blind preference between pleasurable Objects. c. Deliberation prompted by self-interest leads to the establishment of criteria of value. Trial and error make for preference of the permanent over the transient, the intrinsic over the instrumental. Value movement occurs when intrinsic bads become instrumental and even intrinsic good. Old values are transcended and absorbed into new values.

> Psychologically a pleasure of 'higher' value to an individual, is one to which value is assigned only at a psychologically higher level of self-hood or self-knowledge. We always prefer a more pleasurable, to a less pleasurable, experience; but as the self grows, the pleasures to be weighed do not remain the same for it. The 'harder' choice still gives the subject greater pleasure, i.e. greater satisfaction than the rejected alternative could have given. But there was a time when it did not and could not do so, and it only does so now because the subject has developed.[43]

(ii) The psychological advance thus far, bespeaks only intellectual, unmoral development, but this advance is a sine qua non of moral status, which awaits sociali-

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[43] Tennant, I, 145; Ward, PP, 402.

zation. Developed intelligence may result in ideality of motives and conduct or its opposite.

ii. Moral status begins with socialization and achievement of personality

With socialization and achievement of personality moral status begins. "Baptized into the over-individual to whom all things are new, he (the individual) becomes a new creature." The fact of community leads to consideration of the common weal in governing the individual's conduct. "Spontaneous or primordial sympathy is a natural virtue that prompts the altruism innately written on the tables of the heart."[44] The individual, because he is not an unmitigated egoist controlled exclusively by private ends, in society directs his conduct in accordance with what he conceives the common good to demand.

iii. Personal valuation involves an ideal of self as end in itself

(i) With socialization there is the everpresent contrast of the self with other selves, and personal valuation involves the 'idealization of self' as an end in itself, in isolation from the self as a member of society. a. An ideal of self in which progress is realized involves subordination of sub-personal to rational or personal appreciations. b. Progress is attained by criticism

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[44] Tennant, PT, 146, 148.

of the 'lower' self by the 'higher.' c. Self-realization often conflicts with social good. "Personal holiness conceived monastically would be subversive of the commonwealth." d. A condition of 'personal' value-judgments is that the ideal of self must be both relevant and realizable. But to give detailed and concrete definition of self-realization in particular cases is impossible, as universalizing would make for extinction of personality.[45]

(ii) Conscience os the jural kind emerges when, as spectator of his own conduct at the mirror of social life, the individual approves or disapproves his own desires in accordance with social expectation. What society expects of him is what he owes to society. This owed-ness or recognition of duty or debt is the progenitor of oughtness. Moral status has been attained.[46]

iv. The relation of social convention to 'ought'

(i) While there is logical disparateness, there is psychological continuity between the externality of the earlier volitional conformity to social convention and the inward apparently unconditional ought-ness-to-be. When 'I owe' is no longer acknowledged to the Actual self, or to contemporary society, but to an idealized self, idealized society, or to God, it is transmuted into 'I ought.' Further abstraction may eliminate society conceived as

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[45] Tennant, PT, I, 150.
[46] Tennant, PT, I, 146.

the law-giver and the self, who obeys the law, and so arrive at the bare 'ought.'

(ii) Ought-ness-to-be is the axiological level reached intellectually by idealization and abstraction from the value-judgments of social experience. The prophet of social welfare does not necessarily pre-suppose an absolute good, but only keener intelligence than is possessed by the many. Moreover, value movement continues as criteria change.[47] Value-claims are tested and approved as true values. For example, the auto-mechanic, as an apprentice, finds that his work at the end of a day leaves him with excessively grimy hands and clothes, requiring much scrubbing and changing before he can be socially acceptable. The apprentice usually regards his work with a degree of self-pity as mere drudgery and a doubtful value-claim, necessary only in relation to economic subsistence. With passing of time, the early disadvantages are found to be compensated by increased skill. Work becomes invested with a new significance. Higher employee rating by his company, added distinction among fellow employees, and not the least, higher wages, unite to remove all doubts of his work as a true value. No longer an apprentice, but a master mechanic, he will go to any length to protect what he now regards as the absolute obligation and right of a free

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[47] Tennant, PT, I, 153.

man, the true value of work.

6. Critical evaluation of the Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self

(1) An instructive contrast of views of the essential principle of self

Because of the Tennant-Wardian view of the essential principle of self, before proceeding with critical comment, we introduce at this point an instructive contrast of this view on the one hand, which has logical affinity with Berkeley's thought, and the conception of the self by Hegel, on the other hand. "By the pure Ego or subject," in the Tennant-Wardian psychology is meant that "everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing." Esse is percipi, says Berkeley. The essence of the self is consciousness. On the other hand, in Hegel's logical organicism, the distinction between the perceiver and perceived is implied in the concepts of Spirit an sich and für sich, which are only dialectic moments of a single unitary self-unfolding development of Spirit. The essential principle of self in Hegel is systematic unity. Spirit an sich is the realm of the categories; in its antithesis, für sich, Spirit is estranged as it is externalized in nature. In synthesis, an und für sich, Spirit, returning to itself now involves Subjective (individual) Spirit, Objective (historical) Spirit as Right, morality and the State, and Absolute

Spirit or Idea.[48]

(2) Conception of duality in unity destroys organic unity of self

i. The Tennant-Wardian dichotomy of consciousness is an unwarranted breakdown of the unity of the self

This dichotomy of consciousness into subject and object already noted in epistemology, is most acute in the psychology of the self, where it appears as the pure ego (subject) and empirical ego (object). As Professor Calkins expresses it, "really self-consciousness is a unified experience, and subject self and object self are 'poles within consciousness,'"[49] or what we have already termed viewpoints. To make the distinction ultimate is to destroy the unity of self-experience.

ii. Implied promise of mere temporary poles in consciousness develops into ultimate distinction

The conceptions of pure and empirical ego prima facie promise to be merely the temporary distinction of each as a 'pole' within consciousness. In the attempt to controvert denial or implied denial of the existence of the real self, as in the atomism of Hume or the more recent series theory of William James, Ward undertakes to show that knowledge of the self (self-consciousness) is like all knowledge, the presentation of an object to a real

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[48] Brightman, in Barrett, CIA, 179f. Hegel, "Phenomenology of the Spirit" in Rand, MCP, 614ff. Windelband, HP, 614.

[49] Calkins, PPP, 234.

subject, and that the conception of duality in unity is applicable to all experience, including the self.

The presentation is "in his (the subject's) mind," and might be regarded as a psychical object, "to distinguish it from what are commonly called 'physical' objects, objects apart from immediate presentation, i.e. conceived as independent of any particular subject."[50] A presentation, and this includes the empirical self, "one presentation among others," is to be regarded as having a concrete relation to the subject, and has no separate existence independent of him. So too, Tennant declares

> Psychologically the I knowing and the pure ego as known are distinguishable: and logically they are two terms, viz. recipient and datum. Ontologically they may be numerically one entity with two aspects, one substance with two roles.[51]

But that the germ of ultimate distinction is implicit in the conception awaiting only explicit development, becomes apparent in the course of argument. This implicit germ consists in transferring the contrast of self and its object in knowledge of the environment of things into the realm of self, regarded apart from the transcendental function. To this end, the self is dichotomized into "the subject that is conscious and the object (Me) of which it is conscious," and the real 'I' or pure ego is regarded as a temporally later known existent. Ward

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[50] Ward, PP, 46.

[51] Tennant, PT, I, 76.

discriminates "this concept of the pure Ego, of the real self...*in order of time* from the earlier known self of the zonal series of empirical self."[52] Further, the first known of the concentric circles of empirical self is held to be "an unfailing 'double' of the actual feeling and living self."[53] "An unfailing double" must now be construed as ontologically distinct.

Tennant, likewise in arguing self-knowledge says

> At this level (self-consciousness) *M.p.O* expresses *but fact known*. It is inadequate to express the know*ing* of it, because no term in it indicates the knower. It seems obvious that I p′(*M.p.O*) is required and that the I is a concrete individual, if (*M.p.O*) is concrete fact.[54]

But if *M.p.O* does express but fact known, it can only be allowed because M, the sense presentation of O has been taken as a distinguishable aspect of an unexpressed term in the formula, as Herbart implies in the passage cited below. Only so can *M.p.O* be accepted as a concrete fact. So too, in the second formula that is held to be required to express knowledge of the self knowing or pure ego, Ip′(*M.p.O*) the "I" is only a distinguishable aspect. To make of it "a concrete individual" is to make the distinction ultimate.

(3) The dichotomy into pure Ego and empirical Ego creates ambiguity and concealment of the real self

This dichotomy into pure ego and empirical ego leads

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[52] Ward, PP, 362. Italics are the author's.
[53] Ward, PP, 365.
[54] Tennant, PT, I, 81.

to an awkward ambiguity and concealment of the real self.

i. The ambiguity is evident in the circuitous process of knowledge of the pure ego

Three concentric circles of self are successively overlaid, then inverted, that we may know the pure ego. The spectacle presented is actually three concentric circles of empirical self, of which the genetically outer is a 'double' of the real self. This is because self-knowledge is said to be attained in a process which progresses inwardly. The body, to which an object in the environment is external, serves as a center of spatial reference for such an object, and becomes 'me' in contrast to 'it.' This outer or "bodily self" presupposes the existence of the real self, which at this earliest stage of self-knowledge is only implicit. It therefore is a 'double' of the implicit real self. Further emphasizing the process of inwardness, zones of experience are discriminated as inner and outer, because they are referred to distinctions within the body based primarily on the intimacy of the affective influences of feeling which accompany organic sensations and perception of remote parts of the body. But knowledge of the pure ego becomes explicit with ideation, when in reverie and reminiscence, intuitions of the moment, memories of past doing and suffering, and hopes and anticipations of similar experiences compete for attention with perception of external objects, a generic

image of the pure ego is formed. On this wise, says Ward in a footnote, the primitive conceived of "the soul as a mannikin inside the man."[55]

Herbart's criticism of Fichte, who followed this division of the self originally made by Kant, implies exactly this ambiguity and confusion of the real self.

> Wer, oder Was ist das Object des Selbstbewustseins? Die Antwort muss in dem Satze liegen: das Ich stellt *Sich* vor. Dieses Sich ist das Ich selbst. Man substituire den Begriff des Ich, so verwandelt sich der erste Satz in folgen den: das Ich stellt vor das *Sich Vorstellende*. Für den Ausdruck *Sich* wiederhole man diesselbe Substitution, so kommt heraus: das Ich stellt vor das, *was vorstellt das Sich Vorstellende*. Hier Kehrt der Ausdruck Sich von neuem zuruck: es bedarf der nämlichen Substitution. Diesselbe ergiebt den Satz: das Ich stellt vor das, *was vorstellt das Vorstellende des Sich-Vorstellens*. Erneuert man die Frage, was dieses Sich bedeute? Wer denn am Ende eigentlich der Vorgestellte, sei? So kann wiederum keine Antwort erfolgen, als durch die Auflösung des *Sich* in *sein Ich*, und des Ich in das *Sich vorstellen*. Dieser Cirkel wird ins Unendliche fort durchlaufen werden, ohne Angabe des eigentlichen Objects in der Vorstellung Ich...Hier kommt es uns darauf an, dass jede Angabe *dessen, was* das Ich eigentlich vorstelle, wiederum die Frage nach demselben in sich schliesse; folglich die Frage schlechterdings unbeantwortlich ist.[56]

ii. This ambiguity is also evident in the confusion of genetic process with being

In the so-called knowledge of the pure ego, it seems

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[55] Ward, PP, 366 and Footnote 1.

[56] Herbart, SP, II, 94f.

as if a genetic process of knowledge has been grievously confused with being itself. The "zones" or concentric circles of self, according to the theory itself, are in reality aspects of reflective consciousness only analytically distinguishable, but are here abstracted by Ward and Tennant and given ontological status, an instance of the "psychologist's fallacy."

(4) The theory of the pure ego is inadequately empirical

The theory is inconsistent with adequate empiricism, at least in two particulars.

i. Introspection fails to discover a pure ego

Introspection finds no pure ego. Tennant, interpreting Ward, tells us that the pure ego "is 'pure' only in the sense of having fewer empirical qualities."[57] How otherwise is it to be known if not in experience? The reply that we get is 'intellectually.' But this process involves problems of its own. The body, through which certain of its attributes are said to be known, its identity and continuity, is the environment of mind, and enters consciousness only as sense perception. Sense perception of the body involves a perceiver already in existence, and the alleged proof of the pure ego presupposes throughout the existence of the perceiving self for whom the proof is presented.

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[57] Tennant, PT, I, 79.

ii. The type of knowledge rests on an epistemological distinction

The knowledge claimed of the pure ego, 'knowledge by description' in contrast with 'knowledge by acquaintance' while not inconsistent with empiricism, is epistemological theory and not empirical psychology. To rest in epistemological argument is to relinquish empirical method at its most crucial point, and that of maximum empiricism, the self, which is the presupposition of all knowledge. The procedure substitutes the indubitably certain for debatable speculation, immediate experience for questionable hypothesis, verifiable fact for doubtful theory.

(5) The Tennant-Wardian conception of personality is unempirical

i. The status of personality as thinking, willing self is its own and is not derived from the pure ego

Personality is said to be derived as a construct by the pure ego which as creator would have to be a prior existence. But the theory holds that it is not until after the individual becomes a person that he acquires the status of thinking, willing self, which status is then transferred to the pure ego. It seems, therefore, on the theory itself, that the status of personality is originally its own, and is not derived as creation by the pure ego, which is said to elaborate it.

ii. The conception of Anlage is hypothesis, beyond the reach of empirical verification

The conception of Anlage, mind as the objective 'content' of experience, or psychoplasm is based on unempirical evidence. The only datum presented is analogy with biological heredity. But this cannot be taken seriously. As Allport reminds us, "it is..(quite)..a leap from the determination of bodily structure to personality."[58]

We may be further reminded, even after granting some degree of truth in the hypothesis of 'inheritance' of characteristics of personality that even biological inheritance is an extremely complex and difficult area of scientific study, concerning many of whose problems geneticists are still unable to speak with finality. Inheritance of mind, even as Anlage or disposition is farther yet from the reach of investigation, since it would include the mind-body problem.

While admitting determination of personality by heredity, Allport remains discreetly conservative in statement.

> This doctrine of genetic determination does not state that personality is inherited, but rather that no feature of personality is devoid of hereditary influences. It means simply that if the genes are altered the personal characteristics are altered, not that personal characteristics are determined by the genes...the same characteristic may be influenced also by the surrounding conditions, by temperature, by the physical environment,

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[58] Allport, PER, 105.

> and in human beings by the complex social environment.[59]

The response of selves to the natural conditions of environment created by cold and heat, manifested in mental alertness and creativity, is able to account for wide variations in mental development. The Scotch-**Irish** stock in colonial New England developed widely different mental habits and patterns from the same stock transplanted to the highlands of the south. The disparity between the civilization of New England and that of the southern highlands is a standing example of the influence of the physical environment in the development of mind and its products. In the one case, a rigorous climate and a 'stepmotherly nature' proved instrumental in developing physical hardihood and the corresponding mental ability of men, whose names are justly celebrated in national life. In the south, a genial climate and luxuriant vegetation offered an easy living with a minimum of effort. As a result, the productive creativity of mind shown in the former case has been notably lacking in the latter, where civilization has had only a sluggish development, the product of feeble mental effort.

Further, the qualitative diversity of mind can hardly be accounted for on the theory of inheritance of mind, through the bioplasm. Where identical twins have been

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[59] Allport, PER, 105.

transferred to a different environment, the quality of mentality has been found by experimental psychologists to weigh far more heavily against the inheritance of mind than for it. So Anastasi, maintaining the greater influence of social environment than the biological factors of inheritance, declares

> Psychologically, the individual belongs to every group with which he shares behavior. From this point of view group membership is to be defined in terms of stimulational value rather than biological categories.[60]

And Widgery, pointing to the lack of evidence to prove the inheritance of mind, concludes, "it (mind) cannot necessarily be said to be in a line of evolution in the same way that the body is. There is no way of establishing scientifically the nature of the origin of the individual human soul."[61] This investigator believes that the psychologist must maintain an open mind to facts from all areas of this difficult problem and does well to exercise proper reticence before assigning mind to heredity.

(6) The hypothesis of Anlage is a supplement to the theories of presentation and attention.

The hypothesis of Anlage must be regarded as an addition to the Tennant-Wardian theory of presentations and the related theory of attention. It will be found so radically to modify the latter as to require an epistemological rather

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[60] Anastasi, DP, 598.
[61] Widgery, CE, 141.

than a psychological interpretation, if it is to be consistently assimilated to the theory of attention. With change in the standpoint of discussion from the experience of an imaginary individual to the concrete individual of historical life, the conception of the relation of the subject to the objective continuum, on the earlier view assigned to the theory of attention, now implies a change if psychoplasm and the theory of attention are to be consistent with each other. The one is subjective activity, a function of interacting subjects, the other an existent independent of the subject.

i. Attention is a relation involving subjective activity.

Attention is the relation of a subject to his objective continuum. According to Ward, it may be either involuntary acquaintance or specific voluntary acquaintance. Tennant insists that even in involuntary acquaintance some activity is involved in receiving an impression. Attention is immanent in presentation, "the form under which the subject apprehends his environment."[62] While Ward tells us, in a footnote, that the monadistic interpretation of the continuum would be a metaphysical first chapter which transcends psychological facts,[63] a critical appraisal of the factors involved require that we turn to this first chapter. Here attention is the logical relation of the subject to his

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[62] Marshall, CJWP, 138ff.
[63] Ward, PP, 412. Footnote 1.

objective continuum, and the problem now is the monadic interpretation of the environment which the physicist claims to be matter. The monadist finds the uniformity and regularity of this environment to be compatible with the spontaneous and purposive activity of living subjects, an activity that because it has become their habits of life, accounts for experienced uniformity and regularity.[64]

Regarding monadic activity now in relation to the epistemological problem, the changes initiated by the subordinate monads of the environment correspond to the sensations of the dominant monad, and conversely, the changes which the dominant monad initiates answer to the sensations of certain subordinate monads, and occasion movement, which is their response. Attention must then be construed as the active relation of a dominant monad or subject to the internal relation of the subordinate monads or subjects which constitute his brain. The presentation is not an independent existence, but is a relation between two existences, the active subject and his equally active objective continuum. Indeed, the presented sensum or presentation is the joint product of the functioning of subjects. This interpretation is consistent with monadology because it "is the form of the appearance of the monads which comprise a given subject's environment."[65]

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[64] Cf. 218ff.

[65] Marshall, CJWP, 146, Cf. Ward, RE, 302f.

ii. Psychoplasm is an independent existent

For consideration of the Anlage, it is recalled that the standpoint is now that of the concrete individual of historical life. The Anlage or psychoplasm is the objective content of mind, originally 'given' to the individual as the presentational continuum. It is "property" that is "bequeathed", an existent whose origin is independent of the apprehending self. It is not a functional relation to the self like attention, but is conceived structurally as comparable to instinct. For this reason psychoplasm must be regarded as an addition to the theory of attention, and assimilable to it only if presentations are regarded as appearances of psychoplasm.[66]

7. Critical evaluation of Tennant's divergences from Ward

(1) Interpretation of the pure ego as soul substance is offered for maintaining the ontological reality and unity of the self

Tennant's interpretation of the pure ego as soul sub-

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[66] Note on the relation of psychoplasm to Tennant's epistemological realism. It is noted that in critical evaluation of the metaphysical status of sensa, Tennant was held to be an epistemological realist. Now that psychoplasm is regarded as a supplement to the theory of attention, it must be also noted that while the supplement is compatible with Ward's panpsychism if presentations are conceived as appearances of the environment to a subject, it is harmonious with the independent existence of psychoplasm as the objective continuum and the activity of the subject in presentation. Tennant is not a panpsychist, but does hold these two views in common with Ward. The former view points to epistemological realism.

stance appears to be directed toward maintaining the existence of a real subject and the unity of self-experience. Some 'bond' seems to be required to hold together the conscious states of the empirical ego. This he finds in the concept of soul-substance.

(2) An excursus into the history of the idea of soul-substance demonstrates its metaphysical contradictions

The idea of soul-substance has historically presented endless contradiction which Tennant's theory does not eliminate. An excursus into the history of the conception will serve to show its contradictory nature.

i. Greek philosophy from Plato to the Epicureans and Stoics reveals conflicting views of the soul

(i) The earliest conception of the soul is that of breath, a quasi-material animating principle, a "shadowy vapor-like duplicate of his body," which animistic primitive man also projected into the things of his environment which, like himself, moved. This animating principle or ghost-soul, like the Homeric psyche, was believed to be capable of leaving the body during sleep or prolonged unconsciousness, death being the occasion of its final departure for some distant place.[67] Not having attained to the distinction between materiality and immateriality, however different from the things in his environment, for primitive man the soul was thought to be quasi-material. Belief in its separableness from the body was heightened by dreams and other abnormal phenomena of personality in which the individual travelled far from his body. The soul theory of primitive man was therefore that of a quasi-material principle of physical life.

(ii) In the thought of Plato the primitive view underwent a thorough transformation. Plato was the first writer in the history of thought to make a sharp distinction between soul and body. The soul has pre-existed in the eternal world, where it has beheld the true nature of the Ideas, and has to that extent shared in the reality of

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[67] McDougall, BM, 5ff; Rohde, PSY, 1ff.

that world. It is immortal. Its nobler part is inclined to Reason, the senses pull it down into error, and it must strive to overcome by Reason. In sensation and opinion, the soul is dependent on the body, source of the impediment which Reason must seek to overcome. The soul thinks, knows and wills. It is self-active, "the motion that can move itself."[68] It is utterly unlike the body, incorporeal and immaterial. It is simple, uncomposed, and is not subject to dissolution. To summarize, Plato's view of the soul is that it thinks, knows, wills, is self active and immortal.

(iii) Aristotle followed the basic Platonic distinction between soul and body. In his thought the soul is first the principle of organic life and of its classification. Among organic beings all alike possess the basic vegetative and reproductive processes. In addition the lower animals possess appetite, impulse, desire, sensation and the power of spontaneous movement. Man alone has reason. Each such physical process makes for a category for the classification as soul.

The soul is not to be regarded as matter, but it is inseparable from its body, which is the material cause of the individual organism. The soul is its formal, efficient and final cause.

> The soul is that (principle) whereby primarily we live, perceive and have understanding: therefore it will be a species of notion or form, not matter, (or substratum)...[69]

> The soul is substance in the sense that it is the form of a material body having in it the capacity of life. Such substance is Actuality.[70]

In the _Metaphysics_ where soul is the chief category, Aristotle also regards the soul as substance.[71]

Aristotle further distinguishes between the active reason, _nous poeticos_, the pure rational activity peculiar to man as distinct from the brutes, which is immortal, and the passive reason, _nous patheticos_, equivalent to such

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[68] Plato, _Phaedrus_, 245E. Cf. _Laws_ 891C-892-A.

[69] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, 2, 12.

[70] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, 1, 4.

[71] Aristotle, Met. Book Eta, I, 4-8. Note on substratum and derivatives. According to the Tennant-Wardian view, psychologically that which occupies space and is capable of being a plenum, the seat and source of qualities which we project into it, is regarded as the substantial. From this origin would arise the separation of a thing into its substratum and qualities or attributes.

conscious elements as sensation, imagination and memory. Windelband concludes that in his hypothesis of "the common sense uniting memory and imagination as the seat of experience Aristotle pointed to the unity of consciousness (Einheitlichkeit) with which the animal soul unites what is given in the individual perceptions of the individual senses to form collective perceptions or perceptions that perceive the object as a whole."[72]

To summarize Aristotle's metaphysics of the soul, he followed the Platonic distinction between soul and body. Individual organisms, whether in the external world or the human individual consciousness possess a substratum, the support for their existence. The body is material substratum for the soul and the soul is substratum for conscious individuality. To attempt to harmonize the obvious contradiction of the soul's both being and not being a substance it is said that the soul is not a substratum in the sense in which the body is substratum for the soul, but it is a substance in the sense of being the 'form' of a material body. That the contradiction remains is apparent when it is said that the soul is the immaterial vital principle or substratum of an individual organism. Being the efficient cause of the body it possesses self-activity. Its rational part is immortal.

(iv) The Epicureans and Stoics believed the soul to be material. They returned to the atomism of Democritus and a materialistic conception of the soul. The Epicureans thought it to be breath, heat, and air. The Stoics held a similar view. The soul is an innate pneuma or breath, composed of air and fire which pervade the body and support it. Lucretius recognized two forms of soul, soul (anima) and spirit (animus) both composed of the smallest, roundest and most mobile atoms.[73] The Stoics, however, influenced by their general world view and by spiritual elements derived from the nous of Anaxagoras and the logos of Heraclitus, combined with their materialism certain spiritual properties, and believed the soul to be endowed with rationality and purpose, like the divine World-soul, upon whom it was dependent.[74]

We observe in summary, that the Epicureans and Stoics regarded the soul as a material principle of the nature of air and fire, although the view of the Stoics is neither consistently material nor spiritual.

ii. The Christian conception of the soul is not uniform, but predominantly immaterial

The Christian conception of the soul is predominantly

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[72] Windelband, HP, 150.

[73] Lange, HM, I, 146.

[74] Windelband, HP, 187.

immaterial, but the materialistic view is also present.
(i) In the New Testament where are recorded the beginnings of Christianity in a Graeco-Roman culture, the Greek pneuma corresponds to the idea of the soul. Pneuma is spiritual, but analogy with the material air is present. "The wind blows where it wills...so is everyone that is born of the spirit. Also, on the day of Pentecost, the spirit came "like the rush of a mighty wind."[75] But on the whole pneuma is the living eternal principle of knowledge and belief of the Christian, the divine Spirit in man.[76]

(ii) The Christian Apologist, Tertullian (165-220), held a materialistic view of the soul. He did not deny the existence of soul. He held that both soul and body are material. A passage cited by McDougall illustrates the view.

> "All that is real is body. The corporeality of God does not detract from his sublimity nor that of the soul from its immortality. Everything that is is body after its kind. What is not body is nothing...The soul has the human form, the same as the body, only it is delicate, clear, and ethereal. Unless it were corporeal, how could it be affected by the body?"[77]

In summary, Tertullian's conception of the soul was material, yet immortal.

(iii) The Christian (and personalistic) doctrine of the soul was developed and vigorously set forth by Augustine (354-430). The soul is spiritual substance.[78] It is that within us which thinks, and thought cannot be an attribute of that which does not think. The soul is also volition and reflection, and these aspects of mind are not viewed in abstraction. The mind thinks, judges and wills. It is consciousness, and the sum-total of consciousness constitutes the permanent existence of a spiritual being, its aspects comprising a living unity. It also knows itself. When it is said to the mind know 'thyself,' then it knows itself by that very stroke by which it understands the word 'thyself,' and this is for no other reason than that it is present to itself.[79] Human self-knowledge is the analogy after which the divine Trinity in unity is understood.

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75. John 3,8; Acts 2,2 (Am Stand. Rev.)
76. Janet and Seailles, HPP, 191.
77. McDougall, BM, 29. Cf. Roberts (ed) ANF III, 531, 186
78. Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, 9,3, in NP NF, 3,127.
79. Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, 10,9, in NP NF, 3, 140f.

> Being, knowing and willing comprise all reality and in omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness the deity encompasses the universe.[80]

Professor Calkins interprets Augustine as repudiating by inference the corporeal view of the soul. This is based on her interpretation of Augustine to hold that reflective consciousness is attained only with effort. The soul must labor to find itself through "the more excellent vision of reason." But corporeal things, regardless of their magnitude are known "in the organs of sense"...with the force of perceiving."[81]

To summarize Augustine's conception, the soul is an organic unity, its conscious states being inseparably united. It is immaterial, an organic whole, and immortal.

iii. Alexandrian Neoplatonism has a spiritual metaphysics of the soul

Alexandrian Neoplatonism represents the attempt to construct a religious philosophy on the basis of Greek thought, chiefly that of Plato. Its leading spirit was Plotinus (204-269). The result was a pantheism in which individual souls were conceived as having emanated from the *nous*, the *One*, which is absolute unity in plurality, and *mind* or spirit. The universal soul is whole and entire in each individual soul, and is so able to impart unity to extended and divisible things like the human body with its many organs. In ecstasy, the immortality of the individual soul is assured by reabsorption into the One, its true home. In summary, Alexandrian Neoplatonism conceived of the soul as immaterial, as mind, a unity in plurality, and immortal.[82]

iv. Scholastic philosophy views the soul as individual spiritual substance

Scholastic philosophy, represented by Thomas Aquinas, in its conception of the soul, attempted to substitute the conscious individual for the dualism of body and soul. In the fifth century, Boethius whose works were available to the Middle Ages in his commentaries on Aristotle, defined a person as "individual substance of rational nature," and although this investigator finds no direct evidence of the influence of Boethius on Scholastic thought, yet Scholastic thought of the soul must be viewed as the result of centuries of development, although more directly of the attempt by Thomas Aquinas to combine in the Christian framework, the Neoplatonist view of the soul with the Aristotelian phil-

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[80] Windelband, HP, 280.

[81] Calkins, Art (1917) in *Psych Rev*, 24, 278-300.
Cf. Augustine (tr Tourscher) MS, 67.

[82] Janet and Seailles, HPP, II, 191f; Windelband, HP, 233f.

osophy.[83] The result was the conception of the soul as spiritual substance. It is a vital principle, sensitive and intelligent. It thinks, feels, and wills, and because it can exericise its functions independent of the body, it is immortal. The two principles of individuality, pure matter, (the body) and pure form (spirit) merge into one being, the soul, which in agreement with Aristotle, was held to be immaterial (spiritual) substance. A Roman Catholic scholar has well epitomized this view in a compact paragraph,

> There is but one specific substance in man--the compound self or ego. The soul was not a mere thinking machine, but the life-giving principle of the body as well, discharging the several functions of thought, feeling and volition either by itself, or conjointly with the organism.[84]

Scholastic philosophy viewed the soul as immaterial substance, body and soul together as conscious individuality. The contradictory character of this view is apparent. The soul is regarded as immortal.

v. Modern rationalists and empiricists hold conflicting views or agree in denial of soul substance

Upon reaching modern times, the metaphysical problems of the soul bequeathed from antiquity and the Middle Ages reappear in acute form. Two distinct currents of thought, rationalism and empiricism, both interested in the nature and powers of the soul, are found to hold antithetical metaphysical views. Rationalists vary widely and oppose each other, while empiricists either manifest scepticism or altogether deny soul substance.

(i) The metaphysics of Descartes (1596-1650) uncritically holds the soul to be immaterial, although the view is modified by materialistic tendency, leaving the view as a whole inconsistent. Descartes's view may well be seen in the light of the contemporary materialism of Hobbes, 1588-1679, who found in matter and motion the principles of all explanation, and who resolved all the phenomena of consciousness into motion in the brain. As against this complete mechanism, Descartes found a problem in harmonizing mechanism with the ideas of freedom, the soul and God.

Man, he concluded, consists in the union of two disparate substances, mind and body. A substance he defined as that which exists, so that it needs no other thing in order to exist. It is known through its attributes which are manifested in different modes. The attribute of body or matter is extension, that of mind thinking. Applying his method of doubt, he argued that since he thought, he

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[83] Boethius (tr) Stewart and Rand, TTCP, 85.

[84] Shanahan in Baldwin, DPP, "St. Thomas."

could not doubt his own existence. Cogito, ergo sum..

To mind and matter thus conceived are assigned two separate and parallel spheres. Man's body is subject to the mechanism held to exist in nature, while to mind was assigned the world of thought. The mind has innate rational norms by which it attains certain truth. Descartes conceived the union of soul and body as taking place mechanistically, in the pineal gland. From Descartes, soul substance thus conceived gets its initial impulse in the modern world. In summarizing his view, we note that Descartes uncritically took over from Scholasticism the view of the soul as immaterial. It is a substance separate from the body and parallel to it. Its essential nature is consciousness. Yet as mechanist, this immaterial view is modified by a materialistic conception of the mind-body relation.[85]

(ii) Spinoza (1632-1677) followed Descartes in the conception of substance as absolutely independent existence, but not his teaching concerning soul and body. He also followed his notion of inherent principles within the mind capable of attaining truth. These were believed by Spinoza to be self-evident principles a priori necessary as the propositions of geometry. Spinoza drew from the conception of substance as independent existence its only logical inference. God is the only Substance, the permanent substratum of everything. Deus sive Natura. God, or Nature, or Substance has an infinite number of infinite attributes of which only thought and extension are known to us. Since there is but one Substance, God, soul and body are not the two distinct substances Descartes thought them to be, and the distinction between material and immaterial substance disappeared in Spinoza's pantheism.

> The mind and the body are one and and the same thing conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension.[86]

Yet the reality of the finite world had to be accounted for, so Spinoza conceived of finite beings as modes of the infinite, God. To the infinite consciousness, there corresponds the finite mode, human consciousness functioning as ideation and will. The mind of the finite individual is conceived as a sum-total of ideas of which it consists. In a bold attempt to dispense with the finite soul-substance and material substance Spinoza develops a monism of substance and a spiritual atomism. To summarize, in Spinoza, the material body and immaterial soul both disappear in the monism

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[85] Descartes, "Meditations" 2 and 3 in Rand, MCP, 122ff.

[86] Spinoza, ETH, II, Prop 21, Scholium.

of infinite Substance. Finite individuals are accounted for as modes of the infinite, consciousness being conceived in terms of spiritual atomism.[87]

(iii) Leibniz's view of the soul (1647-1716) is to be understood in terms of his monadology. Reality consists of an unlimited number of monads, conscious beings. The monads are individuals, whose activity constitute their being. La substance est un être capable d'action.[88] Each is indivisible and indestructible. Three levels of consciousness are distinguished. Simple or bare monads never rise above unconscious perception. If perception is conscious and accompanied by memory, the monad deserves the name of soul. If the soul rises to self-consciousness and reason or knowledge of universal truth, it is spirit. Universal and necessary truths have their origin in the mind itself and are not derived from experience. We summarize. Leibniz transmuted the concept of soul substance into immanent activity, individuality and spirit, monads. Being indivisible, the monad is immortal.[89]

(iv) Empiricists are either sceptical or deny both soul-substance and material substance. John Locke (1632-1704) submits the idea of substance to a searching examination. In his controversy with Leibniz over innate ideas, he held that there are no innate ideas, but that all ideas come to the mind, which is a tabula rasa, from experience. He finds no idea of substance, but only the supposition of an unknown something as bearer or support of certain qualities. Spiritual substance, specifically, he holds to be "a supposed I know not what to support those ideas we call accidents."[90] Thus baffled by the idea of substance, Locke, in discussing personal identity later in Book II, declares that consciousness itself is that which constitutes personal identity.

> For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self.[91]

To this personal self, Locke now attributes all the characteristics of consciousness, alleged to be those of the

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[87] Windelband, HP, 408f; Thilly, HP, 295f.

[88] Jacques, OL, 2, 479.

[89] Monadology, in Rand MCP, 199ff; Falckenberg, HMP, 267ff.

[90] Locke, Essay II, 23, 2, 15.

[91] Locke, Essay II, 27, 10.

soul including "thinking, persistence and individuality." And Locke defines the self.

> Self is that conscious thinking being (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded it matters not) which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends.[92]

Yet as is observed in the foregoing citation, Locke does not take the final step in entirely denying substance. This was left, as we shall see, for Berkeley. We summarize Locke's view of soul substance. Unable to find the idea of substance, in experience,he deprived the soul of all its attributes of consciousness, and being sceptical of its existence. discarded the idea of substance and transferred its attributes to the conscious self or person, including thought, persistence and individuality.[93]

(v) In his repudiation of material substance, declaring that spirit only exists, George Berkeley (1685-1753) completely demolished the idea of soul substance. Berkeley agrees with Locke that the objects of human knowledge are ideas, "either actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind." But he continues,

> Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge there is likewise something that knows or perceives them...This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which I do not denote anyone of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them wherein they exist, or which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.[94]

Bodies, therefore have no existence apart from the mind. That secondary qualities have no extra-mental existence Locke had conceded. Now in addition, Berkeley shows that primary qualities are just as mind-dependent as secondary qualities. Apart from spirit that perceives, there is no existence, hence material substance is denied. He concludes, "from what has been said it follows that there is not any other substance than Spirit or that which perceives." Material substance, thus repudiated, only spirit remains--finite spirits and the Infinite Spirit, the origin or cause of ideas. In Berkeley's complete denial, the idea of material substance is discarded. But how conceive spirit? Because ideas are

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[92] Locke, Essay II, 27,17.

[93] Cf. Calkins, Art., (1917) Psych. Rev. 24, 278-300.

[94] Berkeley, PHK, I, 1,2.

passive and spirit is active, he believed that we cannot strictly have ideas of spirit, but only some 'notion' of it and the operations of the mind in willing, loving, hating, etc. It is defined as

> One simple undivided being. As it perceives ideas it is called understanding, and as it produces them it is called the will... By the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives. Moreover, because it is an active uncompounded substance...the soul of man is immortal.[95]

To recapitulate, Berkeley in his repudiation of matter completely demolishes the conception of a material substance. Only spirits are real, and soul is synonymous with spirit, which is defined as active, that which perceives, thinks and wills. It is indivisible, individual, and immortal.

(vi) Hume (1711-1766) denied the existence of both material substance and soul substance, Like Berkeley he first repudiated the idea of material substance.

> If we inquire into what the most accurate of philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance we shall find...no other meaning...but the idea of being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents...So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them.[96]

Not only does Hume deny material substance, he proceeds to do the same to spiritual substance. He finds the idea of substance to be meaningless whether applied to matter or mind. The simplicity and indivisibility of a thinking substance he thought to be atheism. Because he viewed conscious states in abstraction from consciousness, he failed to find that each state is "owned" by a self. He says

> The mind is merely a bundle of different perceptions which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity. There is no simplicity in it at one time nor identity at different times... To pronounce the final decision upon the whole, the question concerning the substance of the soul

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95. Berkeley, THK, 27, 138, 141.
96. Hume, PHK, 160.

is absolutely unintelligible.[97]

Summarizing Hume's view of the soul, he denied the existence of material substratum and also of soul substance. He could find only a bundle of disconnected perceptions, but no simple unified self.

vi. Kant denies the empirical existence of soul-substance, and maintains only the transcendental unity of apperception, as a self

The critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) set out to synthesize the truth of the rational psychology expounded by Descartes and the other rationalists, avoiding their dogmatic conclusions, with the truth contained in British empiricism, also avoiding its soulless, materialistic, and sceptical conclusions. He denied the empirical existence of soul substance, but held that experience implied a self-conscious thinker in the transcendental unity of apperception in the knowledge process. There can be no knowledge unless there is a single subject to unite in a judgment what is thought in the subject with what is thought in the predicate. Contrary to Hume, this argues for a knower or self, but not as the paralogistic reasoning of the dogmatists inferred, for a self-existent, self-identical, indivisible soul.

As to the idea of substance, he showed that the substantiality of the soul was due to a confusion of the logical subject with the real substrate. The conception of substance belongs to the realm of phenomena, the province of the external senses, while the idea of the soul as the unity of apperception, belongs to the internal sense, and can neither be proved or refuted, but remains to be thought as the unconditioned unity of knowledge of the phenomenal world, without which knowledge is impossible. I do not perceive myself through sense perception, but must think a self-conscious unifying being as the basis of all perception.[98]

To summarize the Kantian metaphysics of the soul, we note that in his synthesis of the truth of Continental rationalism with that contained in British empiricism, Kant denied the empirical existence of soul substance, but held that experience revealed a real self, a self-conscious unifying thinker and knower implied in all judgments.

(3) Tennant's view of the soul does not eliminate earlier historical contradictions

i. Summarized statement of historical contradictions

A summarized statement of the major historical contra-

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97. Hume, TRE, I, 4, 6.
98. Kant, CPR, B407-B432.

dictions and an attempt to demonstrate the reason for them will show that Tennant's view of the soul fails to overcome contradiction inherent in earlier soul theories. From the time of Plato who first propounded the dual conception of soul and body in Western thought, as a re-interpretation of earlier popular belief, and of Aristotle, who regarded both soul and body as substances, the idea of the soul, in the entire history of thought has presented contradiction in the attempt to conceive it metaphysically. There is contradiction in the thought of individual philosophers, as in Aristotle and Descartes, and also between different thinkers of a single school or of opposite schools of thought. By Aristotle and Aquinas, it is thought to be the principle of biological life. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Berkeley agree in regarding it as psychical, hence immaterial, the Epicureans and Tertullian as material, and the Stoics, an unreconciled combination of matter and spirit. Now, as by Aristotle and Aquinas it is regarded as the substratum of conscious individuality, again, as by Augustine, it is conceived as an organic unity of its conscious states.

ii. The idea of soul-substance is a metaphysical contradiction

Consideration of the origin of the conception of soul substance points to the contradiction as inhering in the idea itself. (i) It arises in the attempt to construe two experienced unities in multiplicity and their relative perman-

ence, the microcosm and the macrocosm, consciousness and its world, one immediately experienced, the other thought-constructed.

(ii) The consensus of philosophic thought has regarded the soul as conscious being--mind, though often in terms of its synonyms, whether the psychological individual of Aristotole, the consciousness of Augustine and Descartes, the personal self of Locke, or spirit of Neoplatonism.

iii. Tennant's view does not eliminate contradiction

It is maintained that Tennant's view of soul substance does not escape the contradiction shown to be inherent in earlier soul theories. From the conception of the soul as substratum "bond" for the "continuity" of consciousness, either of two mutually exclusive views may be inferred. One view is consistent with the soul as spirit. Referring to the pure ego, he says, "unless there be a spirit in man, it is idle to talk of a God in the world." This interpretation would be consistent with his acceptance of Ward's demurrer in empirical characterization of the pure ego as soul. "We cannot call this being a substance in the sense in which we use it of matter...as experiencing nothing." The other view is inferred from his insistence that "we might retain the old notion of substance as substratum or support (for the inherence of) thoughts, volitions etc.," because this is "the only sufficient ground for the unity, coherence and

determination which psychoses observably manifest." When the soul is said to be "not the mental life but is manifested therein," a similar statement could be made of the primitive ghost-soul.[94] Moreover, psychologically, substance is that which is spatially extended, and the notion is inapplicable to self. Further, the notion of a "bond" is philosophically ambiguous, in that it may be a figure of the spiritual quality of love and loyalty, as if Polonius might advise his son, Laertes, to "bind" tested friends to his heart with bands of steel. Again, a bond may refer to a material entity, as in the ancient legend, when Delilah bound Samson with new rope, rope being now the bond. The self needs no figurative entity as bond. In its own act of the specious present, through memory and anticipation, it transcends the temporal "now" and the spatial "here," and becomes its own continuity. This unity of consciousness is the only fact of self-experience.

(4) Tennant's conception of value as epigenesis avoids the genetic fallacy and value subjectivism

It is held that the psychological origin of the moral consciousness is traceable to feeling and desire, yet Tennant makes it clear that the moral consciousness is not resolvable into feeling and desire. Value is a category sui generis. It is epigenesis, an emergent. While value is constituted by feeling and desire, the moral consciousness "is not resolvable into feeling and desire." So Tennant avoids both the genetic fallacy and value subjectivism. His argument follows through to show that the value consciousness involves over-

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99. Tennant, PT, I, 94, 98, 101. Cf. 10, 23.

individual elements. As conceptual objects result from comparison in social intercourse of what is privately perceived, so also in social intercourse, individual valuations originating in perception are compared and modified. Based on community of life and interest, and because of the primordial sympathy and natural virtue "written on the tables of the heart," as the individual becomes aware of what the common good demands of him, he accepts it as owed. He no longer indulges egoistic self-gratification for private good. Because he esteems social approval as a greater good, his individual scale of values is criticized and modified in the light of social approval and disapproval. In socialization he attains the over-individual standpoint, and outward conformity becomes inner law.

(5) The view that an 'ideal of personality' is essential to its development is empirically sound

The role of an 'ideal of personality' is essentially empirical and sound. It serves as a goal of progress and furnishes a plan for action. It also serves as a criterion for criticizing empirical personality. All great personalities have experienced such an ideal as a sine qua non of their development.[100]

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[100] Brightman, ML, 243ff.

(6) Tennant's psychological analysis of obligation does not account for the unique nature of obligation

As derived by abstraction from social expectation or owedness, the view of obligation presented by Tennant fails to do justice to the unique and underived nature of obligation. While admitting the evolutionary history of the "ought," it must be maintained that we do well to remind ourselves that to place emergents in an evolutionary series is not to explain their uniqueness. An American psychologist says,

> Analysis establishes differences as well as similarities, and the differences between two things are neither wiped out nor explained by placing them in the same evolutionary series...Evolution may be original at every step, and may be going on with originality in our own experience. We ourselves may conceivably live in the sources; they may even be pouring themselves forth with greater freedom than in the case of early man.[101]

A British philosopher similarly holds,

> Continuity of process and emergence of real differences are twin aspects of cosmic history. One must not be allowed to obscure the other.[102]

It is held by this investigator that obligation is such a real emergent, and to attempt to explain it completely by its psychological and social genesis is to involve the fallacy of hysteron-proteron, in that it accounts for obligation in terms of social expectation, which itself

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[101] Coe, POR, 53.
[102] Pringle-Pattison, IG, RP, 103

presupposes obligation. The conscientious citizen fully recognizes the obligation to bear arms in defence of his country, yet hundreds of American youth, while recognizing the obligation were also convinced of the wrong and futility of war, and went to the conscientious objector's camp in obedience to a higher self-imposed obligation to protest social expectation. On the other hand, less courageous spirits did bear arms only because they feared the social ostracism and involuntary detention that were the penalty. In one case obligation is recognized without the accompanying compulsion which obligation implies. In the other social expectation is met not out of the feeling of compulsion characteristic of obligation, but only out of fear of consequences. There is an empirical uniqueness in the nature of obligation that social expectation or other psychological factors do not fully explain. The conclusion is irresistible that it is sui generis.

8. Metaphysics of the self involved in the Tennant-Wardian and the Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology of the self[103]

(1) In the Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self a mentalistic metaphysics is involved

The self is conscious experience. Further the polemic against a reductionist behaviorism and the fact that both the self and its presentations are mind involve mentalism.

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[103] For meaning of the abbreviated term cf. footnote 7.

For this interpretation, both in the theory of attention and its related theory of psychoplasm, presentations have been regarded as appearance of the environment to active selves. In the genetic process of self-knowledge and knowledge of other selves, the spatial body is distinguished from the inner agent, and the spontaneity and ultimate nature of activity--all taken separately and together imply a mentalistic metaphysics of the self.

(2) A monadic view of the self is involved in the Tennant-Wardian psychology

From the 'privacy' implied in the standpoint of discussion as individual experience , and from the wholeness of the continuum together with the rejection of series theories of the self which preclude atomism, monadism is involved.

(3) Recognition of the importance of an organic metaphysics of the self is involved in the Tennant-Wardian psychology, but is not completely attained

The elements from which an organic metaphysics of the self is inferred are the organic unity in which subjective elements are conceived; attention, feeling and conation being regarded as logically distinguishable, but not wholly separable, and the temporal continuity of the pure ego, self-identical in memory. But the dichotomy of the self into pure and empirical ego, psychological abstractions rather than mere temporary points of view, is contrary to a complete organic metaphysics of the self.

(4) An activistic metaphysics of the self is involved throughout discussion

Attention is the activity of the subject in connection with its objective continuum, and represents not only passive and involuntary diversion but also specific voluntary acts. The predominantly conative nature of the self involves intention, purpose and activity.

(5) Metaphysical freedom of the self is involved

Perception, feeling, voluntary attention, conation and ideation all involve choice. Personality that creates an ideal of the self and chooses ideals from its environment directing its development by means of self-imposed ideals is an ultimately free self.

(6) Time and the transcendence of time are involved

In the Tennant-Wardian psychology all present experiences of the self, its memories of the past and its anticipations of the future in conative striving, and the concept of the plasticity of the continuum involve time and the transcendence of time.

(7) The possibility of immortality is involved

The personality that finds meaning and purpose in life, and directs its progress in the light of ideals, if taken with the mentalistic metaphysics involve the possibility of immortality.

(8) A monadic view of the self is involved in the Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology of the self

The metaphysical characterization of the pure ego as soul, possessing a singularity, privacy, and idiosyncrasy, involves monadism.

(9) An ambiguous qualitative metaphysics of the self is involved in the Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology of the self

Tennant's view of soul substance is ambiguous in that the interpretation of the pure ego as soul substance may, on the one hand be mental, consistent with his own empirical view elsewhere expressed and with that of Ward, whom he has followed in psychological conception of the pure ego. On the other hand, from soul as "substratum bond" (for the inherence of states of consciousness) may also be inferred a metaphysically ambiguous entity.

(10) The Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology involves maximum activism

The Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology in extending activity of attention to include even minimum perceptual awareness involves a maximum activism of the pure ego or soul.

CHAPTER IV

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF IN THE SELF-PSYCHOLOGY OF CALKINS

1. The standpoint of self-psychology in relation to other standpoints of contemporary psychology

(1) Tentative definition of self-psychology and general statement of its relation to other standpoints

Self-psychology is tentatively defined as "science of the related self." It is to be reviewed first as one standpoint among others in contemporary scientific psychology. It was developed by the author because of intellectual dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of other standpoints, and because self-psychology offers, as will be evident in the course of exposition, a more organic view of the data of consciousness.[1] Two of these other views are specifically rejected, one is approved as satisfactory when consistently applied, and "close affiliation" with still another is acknowledged.

i. Rejection of idea-psychology

The standpoint of ideas treats of consciousness as a series of ideas to be analyzed, classified and explained by reference to parallel physical and physiological phe-

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[1] Calkins, FBP, vii, xii, 273ff.

nomena, which are inferred to exist. As noted in her biographical data, the standpoint of psychology as science of the related self is a development in her thought from the dual standpoint of "ideas" and "selves" represented in the Introduction to Psychology.[2] Professor Calkins held originally that the "idea," or "structural" standpoint is "self-consistent and possible" and even "useful."[3]

But there are structural aspects of consciousness, the relational elements for example, that defy complete analysis and classification. "The experience of 'and' and 'many' are peculiarly constant elements of this class." The consciousness of connection and opposition are others, but there are still others, and any enumeration attempted is only tentative and incomplete.[4] Of even graver significance for psychology is the abstraction for study of the various aspects of consciousness by structuralists. The psychologist may analyze an idea and explain it in terms of its conscious antecedent and accompanying bodily reactions, but the explanation is necessarily abstract, incomplete and hence unscientific. As a result, structuralists often omit the self from study. A standpoint which either

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[2] Calkins, in Murchison (ed) HPA, 36ff. Cf.18.
[3] Calkins, FBP, 273. Calkins, in Murchison (ed) HPA, 36ff.
[4] Calkins, FBP, 139. It may be noted here that experience is a synonym of consciousness.

denies or tacitly ignores the self must therefore be rejected.[5]

> Our study of psychology has surely shown that perception and recognition and thought, and more obviously but no more truly emotion, will, and faith, are incompletely described when analyzed into merely structural elements and referred to bodily conditions.[6]

ii. Rejection of 'functional' psychology

A second standpoint of contemporary psychology conceives it as "science of mental function." The term 'function' is itself ambiguous as it is inconsistently employed by adherents of the standpoint. However, common to all of them is the view of function as activity, and many identify function with useful biological reaction to environment. Further, the environment is sometimes regarded as social, sometimes physical. If it is social, reaction to environment is a social relation, inevitably a "personal attitude." On this view, functionalism must become self-psychology.

On the other hand, if function is regarded in the strictly biological sense as reaction to physical environment, we may classify and partially explain parallel psychic phenomena, taking the various kinds of consciousness as reaction to environment. But such an account is obviously partial and incomplete psychological description. For example, "to call fear the instinctive, self-preserva-

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5. Calkins, FBP, 273ff.
6. Calkins, FBP, 274.

tive reaction of withdrawal" is to describe only partially the emotion of fear, since aspects of consciousness are omitted from study. Being only partial, this account does not meet the requirement of scientific analysis and description . Finally, the psychologist cannot study consciousness in a vacuum. "To define psychology as science of mental function without referring the functions to a functioning self is an entirely artificial proceeding." Because of its abstract and partial account of the data of consciousness, the functional standpoint is rejected.[7]

iii. The standpoint of Gestalt psychology in emphasizing concrete wholes is similar to that of self-psychology

In their conception of experience as made up of non-atomistic wholes with subordinate parts, rather than of mechanical addition of parts, the Gestaltists have embraced an important truth, similar to the emphasis of self-psychology on the nature of the self as an organic whole. But they have neglected the supreme example of the Gestalt, the self or person as an integrated complex whole inclusive of parts and characters subordinated to its own distinctive unity.[8]

iv. "Close affiliation" with the standpoint of biological personalism

Professor Calkins recognizes in the standpoint of biological personalism a "close affiliation" with that of

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[7] Calkins, FBP, 274ff.

[8] Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 53. Cf. Köhler, in Bentley et al (ed.) P25, 25, 98.

the related self. Agreement and disagreement are noted. (i) Aside from the fact that this standpoint regards the self as related to its environment of personal and impersonal objects, the preeminent point of agreement is that both treat psychology as science of the person, opposing vigorously all impersonalistic views of consciousness. They also maintain in agreement an organic conception of the self. William Stern, biological personalist, characterizes the self as a unitas multiplex, and Müller-Freienfels's conception of the totality of the self is also a strictly organic view. The view is explicitly stated, "in every sensation is the I." Another agreement is in the monadic unity of the self. It is a unique individual. Stern refers to "ein letztes Ureigenstes," an ultimately most unique quality by which every person is contrasted with every other person.[9] Finally, they agree in their conception that aspects of the self are "personal attitudes." Müller-Freienfels distinguishes between volition and action, regarding the latter, like self-psychology, as basal "personal attitude" of the self to other self, emphasizing one's own self, egoistic, or other self, allocentric.[10]

(ii) Disagreement is noted in the fact that the biological personalists take "the embodied self" as the basal unity of psychology, and although they emphasize

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[9] Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 49f, quoted from Müller-Freienfels, Die Menschliche Personlichkeit, 95.
[10] Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 51.

consciousness, they include not only "consciousness as a distinctive and supremely significant response," but also "biological adaptation, nerve excitation, neural and physiological function." On the contrary, self-psychology accepts only the view that the self "has a body."[11]

(iii) The issue is not unimportant and there can be no compromise on the place psychologically assigned the body as environment of the self rather than directly the subject matter of psychology. But because of the close agreement on most essential points in characterizing the self, and because all schools alike, including self-psychology must determine and assign the place of the body (which of all objects of the self stands in closest relation to it), biological personalism is seen as providing a common ground for rapprochement of most schools of contemporary psychology. "I am convinced, none the less, that this biological form of personalistic psychology provides a middle ground on which most schools of contemporary psychology may meet."[12]

(2) Self psychology is scientific

The attempt to secure general recognition for the standpoint of the self in scientific psychology has encountered stubborn resistance, and on grounds no more tenable than was Hume's sceptical denial of the self in the

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[11] Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 44.
[12] Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 50.

eighteenth century. Other standpoints, particularly the behavioristic, have stoutly refused recognition to the standpoint of the self. As an auxiliary method behaviorism may be employed, but consciousness cannot be scientifically studied by an exclusively behavioristic method, for to study behavior could never be to study consciousness.

i. Self-psychology is not to be confused with soul-psychology

The self has sometimes been identified with the philosophical conception of the soul, and then declared to be "out of place" in psychology. But such an identification is wrong, as a historical treatment of the two conceptions, psychological and historical clearly shows. The soul of philosophy is traced back to Plato's dualism and beyond to the primitive's view that identified soul with breath. For its origin, the conception of the self is referred to John Locke, of the seventeenth century, and is empirical, while historically the soul is transcendent. The soul is the philosophical term uncritically applied to different functions of human or even sub-human individuals in the history of thought. It was variously conceived by individual thinkers, to express the vital principle of the body, as by Aristotle; to possess such metaphysical and ethical traits as self-identity in change, immateriality, immortality, value and control of the body, as by Plato, Augustine and

Descartes; it has been thought of psychologically, as consciousness or some one or more of its aspects, as by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes. Sometimes one or another of these three conceptions is emphasized by the thinker; and again as by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, the three are uncritically combined. On the contrary, although self, being an existence _sui generis_, is strictly speaking indefinable, we can point to its characteristics. Its properties are totality, a complex unity of many aspects, past, present, and future; it is qualitatively and numerically unique; it is a changing being; and is self-identical in all its changes; and it is related to itself and to its objects, personal and impersonal.[13]

ii. A scientific psychology must differentiate its correct subject matter

Again, it has been objected by some functional psychologists that the unit of psychological study is the psychophysical organism, "the mind in the body." Self-psychology, it is implied, is too exclusively psychological. But to this objection it must be replied that while we know of no disembodied selves, there is no such complete unity of body and mind as the critic presupposes. We might study the physiological funtions of the body, if we will, but this would not be psychology but physiology. Moreover as the

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[13] Calkins, Art. (1917) _Psych. Rev._, 24, 278-300; Cf. Calkins, in Murchison (ed), _HPA_, 45. Cf. historical excursus, suggested by Calkins's article, 138ff.

distinction between physiological and psychical function implies, the psychical function when studied, must be referred to a conscious-functioner, the self, the proper subject matter of psychological science.[14]

iii. Self-psychology employs scientific method

For still another reason, a positive one, self-psychology "refuses to be drummed out of the psychologist's camp." It employs the scientific method of introspection. Because its facts are not externalized, but "inner facts, selves and ideas,"[15] the psychologist must match data with method. In applying the method of introspection, he follows the fundamental pattern of scientific method, observation, analysis, classification and explanation. He analyzes his data, the self, its objects and attitudes, experiences of the individual, corroborated by the inferred experiences introspectively made by other individuals.

This scientific method of introspection may be experimentally guided. Because of the relatively greater difficulty of controlling introspection, there is a tendency on the part of contemporary psychologists to treat psychology abstractly as science of ideas. But all science rests on subjectively determined data, and psychology is in this respect no exception. The objection merely points up the need for more adequate training in introspection in order

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[14] Calkins, FBP, 277.

[15] Calkins, FBP, 6ff. Cf. Art. (1915), Am. Jour. Psych., 26, 495-524.

to avoid its difficulties. Although rejecting the behavioristic metaphysics which identifies bodily reaction with conscious self, self-psychology employs behavioristic method as auxiliary to introspection. Bodily reactions are studied because "the body is the constant object of perception, and bodily reactions "seem to correspond" with consciousness, hence the facts of consciousness can be explained in relation to them.[16]

2. Consciousness, the fundamental fact of psychology always involves a related self

(1) Consciousness is the fundamental datum of psychology

It cannot be too strongly insisted that the fundamental and only datum of psychology is consciousness. Behavioristic psychology has identified consciousness with bodily behavior, and undertakes on this conception to found a science of psychology.

But this is a mistaken conception. Behavior needs to be studied for its possible contribution to social efficiency, but it is the task of ethics, social science and education rather than psychology. The study of behavior is also a subsidiary branch of psychological science, comparative psychology. Based on introspection of and analogy with the normal consciousness, a study can be made of

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[16] Calkins, FBP, ix, 6, 87ff, 138, 166. Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 44. Cf. Calkins, Am. Jour. Psych. Art. (1915) 26, 495-524.

the behavior of animals, children and adult human consciousness. We may infer from these the consciousness which was manifested. This method, it is repeated, involves introspection and inference, and is not a study of immediate consciousness. It therefore cannot be exclusively applied to normal general psychology.[17]

(2) Consciousness is always personal

Psychology has sometimes been defined as "the science of consciousness." But this definition is loose and inadequate. Consciousness never occurs impersonally. It is better regarded as "science of the self-being-conscious." This conception recognizes that consciousness is always of somebody-being-conscious, and also that consciousness is of something or somebody.[18] Both emphases are important, that of the personal nature of consciousness and that of the self related to its object.

(3) Consciousness is immediately experienced as a self related to its objects

Consciousness is always direct, and is always of a self related to its object. "In being conscious I am always conscious (even if vaguely conscious) of myself as related to an object or to that totality of objects which I call my environment."[19]

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[17] Calkins, FBP, 8ff.

[18] Calkins, FBP, 2f. Calkins, Art. (1908) Jour. Phil. Psych. and Sci. Method, 5, 64-68.

[19] Calkins, FBP, 280.

With the ultimate metaphysical nature of consciousness and its objects, the psychologist has no immediate concern. He holds to his own business of the description and explanation of consciousness related to its environment, and leaves metaphysical questions to the philosopher.

(4) The conception of the related self in Calkins's self-psychology

Immediate consciousness reveals the self in relation to its environment of personal and impersonal objects, and we turn now to examine the conception of the related self. The preliminary caution is given that it is not to be confused with relational elements of consciousness. It rather expresses the concrete view of self-experience, and is found in both psychological texts, the earlier Introduction to Psychology (1905) followed by First Book in Psychology (1909) 1917.

i. The conception of the related self is a development in Professor Calkins's psychological thought

Although it is the result of a development, it represents the essential and mature conclusion of the author, attained following a definitely planned program of intensive reflection, extending over many years.[20] Because of the bearing of a view of the self as related to other selves contained in the Introduction on her metaphysical conception of the Absolute self which "includes" all other

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[20] Cf. Biographical data, **18f.**

selves, exposition of the view is presented below together with the matured view of the First Book and periodical articles.[21]

ii. The self is the unifier of the aspects of consciousness to which it is related

By the related self, Professor Calkins means primarily a concrete view of the unity of self-experience. Experience is always of something other than the self to which it stands either in receptive or passive relation, as in perception, or in active assertive relation, as is will and faith. Yet consciousness is a unity. The relation is one that includes even as it excludes--a "this-not-another rather than a this-with-another" relation, and the self is the unifier of the various aspects of consciousness to which it is related.[22]

iii. The matured view of the related self emphasizes "personal attitude" of self to object .

The matured conception of the First Book which is emphasized is the "personal attitude" of self to its object whereas in the earlier Introduction, the view expressed is that of the double standpoint, "structural elements" of the conscious self and the related self.[23] In the First Book harmonization of the two conceptions is attempted. The "structural elements" are the constituents, in-

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[21] Cf. Conception of all-including self, 299.

[22] Calkins Art. (1908) Am. Jour. Phil., Psych., and Scientific Method, 5, 64-68.

[23] Calkins, ITP, 154f.

trospectively discovered of each 'attitude,' of each form of relation of self to object."

> Whether I am receptively, actively, attentively or inattentively conscious, whether or not I am sharing my object with other selves, whether I am conscious of individual or class, I may always, by introspection, find within my consciousness further irreducible factors, the structural elements.[24]

(5) Definition and brief exposition of chief aspects of the related self

By way of illustrating application of scientific method to study of the related self, definition and brief exposition of the most significant abstract aspects of the related self are here attempted.

i. Perception and productive imagination

(i) Perception and productive imagination are both the consciousness of the unity of a particularized object in the differences of a complexity of sense elements, in relation to the self. The sensory elements may be chromatic, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, or algedonic. (ii) Perception is also a receptive or passive experience of a present externalized object, and is reflectively, if not immediately realized as impersonal consciousness, common to other selves.[25] (iii) Perception and imagination have in common their being known reflectively

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[24] Calkins, FBP, 333.

[25] It is as permissible, says Professor Calkins, to classify an experience by taking account of the characteristics attributed to it by after reflection as it is to classify with reference to physiological conditions, and to do the former is not to commit the "psychologists' fallacy."

or immediately as impersonal consciousness. In both, one is not predominantly conscious of selves. Both are also forms of particularizing consciousness, and both are sensational experiences. (iv) The differences are, imagination lacks reference to present objects, and also the consciousness of passivity.[26]

(ii) Attention

Attention is the unique and fundamental relation of the self to its objects, which may be accompanied by perceptual, emotional, cognitive, or volitional consciousness. By unique and fundamental is meant that attention is indescribable in terms other than itself. It also refers to the fact that in attention the self is abstractive or selective. One distinguishes and abstracts from the total field of consciousness an inseparable part of a given object, as the tree on the landscape rather than the landscape as a whole. Objects attended to are selected by the self on the basis of interest motivated by anticipated pleasure or displeasure, novelty or association with other objects of interest in the total field of consciousness.[27]

iii. Recognition and memory

(i) Recognition is the experience of the self as relationally conscious of itself as persistent, and of objects as related to its past. (ii) Recognition and

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[26] Calkins, FBP, 11ff.
[27] Calkins, FBP, 103ff.

perception are logically related, in that while both may contain sense elements, recognition is distinguished by its relational elements. (iii) In recognition, also, there is consciousness of the self as persisting, whereas in perception, awareness of self is unemphasized and unattended to.

(iv) A distinction is to be drawn between recognition and memory. Memory is reserved for experience of accurate reproductive imagination. It is often supplemented by recognition but is possible without it. Recognition is used to indicate the consiousness of an object as identical with that of earlier experience. It may accompany memory, perceptual, affective or volitional consciousness, and may be partial or complete. Its objects may be personal or impersonal.[28]

iv. Thought, conception and judgment

(i) Thought is the relating of its objects by the self, so as to form concepts and judgments. (ii) Conception is characterized by generalization or grouping of similar objects, and may pertain to any experience, perceptual, relational, emotional or volitional, when the consciousnes of generality is fused with that of the individuals thus conceptualized. Conception involves at once the experience of one-ness, plurality and similarity, which fuse with the consciousness of generality. (iii) Judgment is the relational consciousness of a logical whole as including

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[28] Calkins, FBP, 134ff.

or excluding certain emphasized features. It is an experience reflectively known as shareable with other selves.

v. Emotion

Emotion is the receptive experience of pleasure or displeasure with either personal or impersonal objects, which intensely individualizes both the object and the experiencing self. In emotion, the affective elements, which also may be externalized, are most often referred to the self that experiences pleasure or displeasure, and are usually connected with other experiences. One feels happy about something, as in being in a cool spot on a warm summer day, rather than in having to mow the lawn on such a day. Pleasure and displeasure are not necessary concomitants of a given experience, one may be indifferent rather than pleased or displeased. That these elements do occur is indicated by referring to them as attributive elements.

Social emotion is the most primitive type of emotion. It is the conscious pleasant or unpleasant relation of the self with another self or to impersonal objects. It is an individualizing, particularizing, experience, and may either be egoistic emphasizing one's self in the relation, or sympathetic (allocentric) emphasizing other self, or mixed egoistically ministering, while sympathetically directed.[29]

vi. Will and volition

(i) Will or volition is the experience of dominant

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[29] Calkins, FBP, 180ff. Cf. Calkins, in Murchison (ed), HPA, 47f.

assertive relation of the self to personal or impersonal objects. It is the consciousness of an egoistic, imperious connection with the object, and implies the subordinate relation of the latter. The object is also termed an 'end.' Distinction is to be drawn between outer volition, the will to act, and inner volition, the will to think. The volition to remember a forgotten fact, to guess the answer to the question of the radio quiz program, or "to understand the working of an intricate mechanism" are examples of inner volition. Although outer volition is so termed because it relates itself to an anticipated outer end, it does not necessarily follow that this end is attained. The volition is independent of external result.

The fact that I am prevented by bodily incapacity or by external circumstance from carrying out my purpose, does not alter the volitional nature of the consciousness itself. The volition is, in other words, not an external event, but rather the anticipation of an outer event (of an act or of its result) including the feeling of anticipation, the consciousness of connecting this definite experience with a future real event. "Outer will or volition remains what it is by virtue of its inherent nature."[30] (ii) On the other hand, in outer volition movements conditioned by affective or emotional consciousness are not necessarily voluntary movements. Volition must be an active relation of self to specific movement. One may

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[30] Calkins, FBP, 233ff.

have the impulse to act in perceptual or emotional experience, but volition must include the active relation of one's self to movement. This is insisted upon because in outer volition, one so actively relates himself to the end that movement may involuntarily follow as reflex movement without being specifically willed, consciousness occurring only after action has begun. (iii) Inner volition, being only another aspect of consciousness, does not, as fully resemble its object or end as outer volition, and it also involves as affective and relational consciousness of lack or gap as between volition and end. (iv) Within both outer and inner volition the fundamental distinction is to be made between simple will, without deliberation and choice, after deliberation. Choice may either be with effort or without specific effort, from habit and inclination. In the latter, no other alternative act being contemplated, choice does not involve strain and decision is comparatively easy.[31]

vii. Relational elements of consciousness

In exposition of recognition mention was made of certain elements of consciousness other than the sensational and affective, which form a part of these aspects and of attention and which are often neglected by psychologists, the relational elements. They are not concomitant with distinctive physical stimuli nor conditioned by stimulation of an end-organ though, they are accompanied by physiological

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[31] Calkins, FBP, 236ff.

changes in the association centers of the brain. Hence for experimental study the psychologist must rely entirely on introspection which is unusally difficult at this point.

It would be unwise to attempt a complete classification, since to do so may be to mistake for elemental an experience that is not really so, and any enumeration therefore is tentative and incomplete. "The experience of 'one' and 'many' are constant and seem to lie at the basis of most relational experiences." The consciousness of 'and,' 'but,' 'like,' 'different,' 'more' and 'less' also belong to the group.

viii. The temporal consciousness of the related self

The psychological account of the temporal consciousness is a difficult problem for Professor Calkins. But because of the peculiar view of time in her metaphysics, we bring together her most recent psychological utterances on the subject. The problem is acute at the point of structural analysis. Is the temporal consciousness a structural element that is further irreducible? Or is it, like attention, a unique personal attitude of self to object? Or again, does it involve both a structural element and the relatedness of a personal attitude? The following conclusions are reached as being "probable."

Professor Calkins "inclines to the view" that the basic fact of the temporal consciousness is "the immediate experience of the self as changing." Duration seems to be a complex of the relational element of "connectedness" and the affective elements involved in regret and irrevocability, which distinguish the past from the present and future, and of hope or fear of the future. But in addition, the temporal consciousness seems also to include a distinctive and unique elemental factor, comparable to the consciousness of extensity, but unlike the spatial consciousness in being probably not sensational. Without attempting to decide the difficult problem of the structural nature of the temporal consciousness, this summary statement is given. "The consciousness of time is an awareness of moments of past, present, and future as linked together." The two aspects of consciousness, perception and attention throw additional light on duration. The perceptual consciousness of rhythm is explained by its bodily concomitants, alternation of short inspiration with long expiration, and the alternation of strong and weak pressure in walking. In attention, the present moment of immediate consciousness is distinguished according to its duration, as of 'wide' or 'narrow' span.[32]

ix. Reasons why some contemporary psychologists ignore the self

Confronted with the comparatively greater difficulties

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[32] Calkins, FBP, 85f, 141, 320.

of the method of introspection, and hoping to transfer to psychology the exact methods of the physical sciences many contemporary psychologists have confined psychological method to analysis of the structural and functional aspects of consciousness. Professor Calkins finds it necessary, as did Ward and Tennant, to throw the weight of polemic and constructive argument to vindicate the existence of the self.

The desire to avoid being accused of "entangling alliances" with the soul of philosophy has already been noted.[33] Perhaps the primary reason for denial of the self is the nature of consciousness. Its very immediacy causes it to escape attention. "I am always conscious to myself, and I am therefore inattentive to this ubiquitous self."[34] But of all people, the scientist must not "forget" the self. The very nature of a continuous experiment presupposes the existence of a self who begins the experiment. It also presupposes that when the conclusion is reached, the experimenter who completes it is the same as began it.[35]

(6) Exposition of the term 'object' in the self-psychology of Calkins

i. Meaning of 'object'

The term 'object' expresses the fact that consciousness is always of myself being "conscious (even if vaguely

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[33] Cf. 167.

[34] Calkins, Art. (1917) in Psych. Rev. 24, 278-300.

[35] Calkins, in Murchison (ed) HPA, 56ff. Cf. Calkins, FBP, 8. This argument is only implied by Calkins. Cf. Brightman, Art. (1938) Personalist, 19, 136-143.

conscious) of an object or that totality of objects which I call my environment." Professor Calkins observes, on the authority of her former teacher, William James, that "the standpoint from which one speaks of objects...is dualistic," but declares that it is only psychologically, not ultimately so. Therefore the monist in philosophy may unconcernedly adopt it.

ii. Classification of 'objects'

The 'objects' of "the psychological self" may be impersonal, of externalized physical objects, assumed to be independent of the self, or non-external, as laws, formulae, or relations.[36] They may also be personal, other selves. Impersonal and personal objects may be, "private, or psychological objects, either myself in relation to environment, or my experiences." They may also be public objects, other selves.

iii. Improper uses of the term 'object'

Emphatic warning is issued against the behavioristic confusion of physical stimulus of consciousness with the object of consciousness. The physical stimulus is not perceived, but is only inferred and used to describe consciousness.[37]

(7) Impersonal objects of the self

Impersonal objects of the self are distinguished into two classes, based on the nature of the experience as

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[36] The question of the existence of externalized objects is not here considered. It is one for the philosopher. The psychologist merely uncritically assumes the presence of such independent objects.

[37] Calkins, FBP, 280ff.

private or public, non-external or externalized and regarded as independent of self. Laws, formulae and relations are examples of impersonal, private objects. Of externalized objects, one's own body, of which he is sensationally and so persistently and attentively conscious that it is often mistaken "as part of one's self, nature and things are the most common examples."38

(8) The related self and its body

i. The body as object of the self and of other selves

The body is the external object to which the self stands in closest relation, and it has "a two-fold relation to other external objects." "Through its in-going (afferent) nerves it is affected by them; through its out-going (efferent) nerves and muscular contractions it affects them." Through its gestures, movements and language, it presupposes the related selves in the environment.

ii. Reaction of the body to its related self

In treating certain aspects of the self, Professor Calkins distinguishes the bodily correlates of perception and productive imagination, thought, emotion and volition. The bodily reactions in perception and productive imagination are of two types. (i) "Reflex movements, unconditioned by antecedent consciousness," and accompanied or un-

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38. Calkins, FBP, 4f, 280ff. Art. (1915) Am.Jour. Psych., 26, 519-526.

accompanied by consciousness of movement and (ii) Ideomotor movements, conditioned by antecedent consciousness, either impulsive movements, relatively immediate and undeliberated or premeditated and delayed.[39]

iii. The learning process of self and its body

An instinctive interest in social intercourse is the basis for the development of skills. These recurring interests tend to become habitual and are the basis for learning in individual experience. Learning, individually acquired through habit or socially acquired through imitation "may either be mental or physical. There is a correspondence between the two and one implies the other." The education of hand and arm implies a corresponding training of reasoning and will.[40]

(9) Personal objects of the related self

i. One's own self

Among personal objects of the self, regardless of what other objects are in consciousness, one's self is always immediate, whether or not one is attentively or inattentively conscious of it. "I am my own personal and private object," and the experience possesses at least four fundamental characteristics, self-identity, complexity, uniqueness and relatedness to environment.

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[39] Calkins, FBP, 87ff.
[40] Calkins, FBP, 92ff.

ii. Other selves

"Preeminent among the objects of my environment are the other selves" who share with me the common environment. In both psychological texts, Introduction and First Book the existence of other selves is properly only assumed as a fact related to the different aspects of consciousness, and is not argued.[41] Psychologically, the existence of other selves is implied in such immediate or reflective experiences of sharing a common environment, as perception, conception, judgment, reasoning, and social emotion. In perception I am aware immediately or reflectively of a consciousness that is shared by others, and this is contrasted with constructive imagination,which is private to me. So, too, conception, judgment and reasoning are experiences reflectively known as possibly shared with other selves. Social emotions exist only as they particularize and emphasize other selves. In certain forms of social emotion, as in joy at my friend's success, Mitfreude, empathy is so pervasive that the boundaries of self-consciousness are enlarged. Lines of demarcation between self and other selves grow thin and eventually disappear. Indeed, while emotion is also a relation of one's self to impersonal objects, it is primarily a relation of one's

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[41] In epistemology, the existence of other selves is regarded as inference from the knowledge that they are included with me in the Absolute.

self to other selves, and it is to be observed that there is the double experience in which is "the awareness of other self" and the "immediate realization of one's self as a unique self."[42]

iii. Exposition of conception of other selves as untemporal found in the Introduction

In Introduction is contrast characteristic of the earlier standpoint in psychology as science of "ideas" and of "selves," the double standpoint, and also the contrast between impersonal and personal objects of the self. Continuing, Professor Calkins declares, that as to impersonal objects regarded as psychic events, psychology from the standpoint of "ideas" treats its data as psychic events causally related to each other "in time," but as it studies selves, since they are not primarily regarded "as realities in time," the causal method is not applicable.

> One thinks of one's body as beginning and ending at distinct moments, one thinks of one's ideas and feelings as occurring yesterday or today, but one does not primarily regard one's self as "in time," and one therefore does not think of selves in causal relations with each other.[43]

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[42] Calkins, FBP, 180ff.
[43] Calkins, ITP, 154f.

3. Critical evaluation of the self-psychology of Calkins

(1) The standpoint of self-psychology is carefully distinguished from other standpoints

i. By explicit distinction

Because of the comparatively recent arrival of psychology among modern sciences much confusion of standpoint has resulted. The dualistic metaphysics bequeathed from antiquity has been an initial handicap that has left many a psychologist confused about his particular data. The difficulties of making scientific method of precise quantitative measurement applicable to the data of introspection, as compared with the relative ease with which physiological data are experimentally measured, induced some psychologists to accept for study the more easily measured physiological data of the body, grievously confused with psychic data. But Professor Calkins carefully distinguishes the standpoint of self-psychology from that of other contemporary schools, thereby avoiding confusion of its standpoint from that of others. Trained in the "idea" standpoint, and having taught psychology from that standpoint, her earlier defense of the double standpoint of "ideas" and "selves" as both possible and consistent normally follows as a stage in development of thought. It is abandoned in the matured view of the First Book "not because I doubt the validity of psychology as a study of ideas, but I question the significance and the adequacy

and deprecate the abstractness of the science thus conceived."[44]

ii. A distinction is also implied in admitting persisting influence of "idea" standpoint

Because the evidence points in this direction, and because at least in two instances Professor Calkins refers to the influence of the double standpoint on her matured thinking and, further, because the double standpoint is implied in her view of time as untemporal, this investigator concludes that Professor Calkins in her thought and writings experienced great difficulty, if ever she did completely effect it, in making full harmony between the two standpoints, and transition to the standpoint of the related self. In First Book (ed. 1917) she acknowledges the presence of vestigial remnants, "the survival in my thinking of 'idea' psychology," and as late as her posthumously published autobiography, a book edited by Murchison, History of Psychology in Autobiography (1930) she declares "both conceptions are useful" ("ideas" and "selves"). The recognition of incomplete transition to the standpoint of related self, with reason assigned for it, emphasizes the volition of Professor Calkins to complete the transition, and implies the sharp difference in standpoint.

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[44] Calkins, FBP, vii.

(2) An organic view of the self is involved

i. Repudiates abstraction

Professor Calkins insists on an organic conception of the self. Its elements are not to be taken abstractly as both 'structuralist and functionalist' do, but only as aspects for scientific analysis and explanation; they are not separable from the self. Consciousness is a concrete whole. For this reason Professor Calkins abandoned her earliest structural viewpoint, when, as teacher, she used Titchener's Outline and Primer, as text.

ii. Holds view of the self as related to objects

The conception of the related self is a normal sequence to the view of the self as organic. The view of the object does not presuppose, as in the Tennant-Wardian psychology, the duality of subject and object. It is explicitly held that the self as subject is always related to its object, personal or impersonal, and the distinction does not constitute a duality, but only an aspect of consciousness, leaving the self a concrete whole. So, too, kinship is recognized with the Gestalt psychology, and "close affiliation" with the organic view of the biological personalists who likewise emphasize the unity and concrete wholeness of consciousness.

iii. Reasons for conclusion that the organic view of the self is implied

Although we have criticized the failure to effect

complete harmony of the two contradictory standpoints, the recognition by Professor Calkins of incomplete transition to the standpoint of the related self, with reason assigned for it, and the request that the reader "supply these expressions (mental corrections) in appropriate contexts" emphasize the intention to make a sharp distinction in standpoints. It is by virtue of this fact taken with positive reasons already cited that this investigator unhesitatingly concludes that an organic conception of the self is attained.[45]

(3) The psychological conception of other selves

i. Existence of other selves is assumed

The psychologist merely accepts the report of conscious experience, and does not argue the existence of other selves. It is, however, presupposed and implied by the various aspects of consciousness. Perception, unlike productive imagination presupposes a common environment which is shared by other selves and emotion individualizes its personal object as it does the subject.

ii. Conception of untemporal consciousness depends on abstraction

The view of the untemporal consciousness found in the Introduction is in error, because the view is based on abstraction. By the assertion that selves are not regarded

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[45] Calkins, FBP, vi.

"primarily as realities in time" is meant that it is possible to be conscious of other selves, without necessarily at the same time regarding them as experiencing change. But is this really so? To hold this view depends on the abstraction of some of its aspects from the self. For adequate interpretation the view must be referred to Professor Calkins's metaphysics of time to which reference is made in exposition of the position of personalistic absolutism.[46]

A tenable basis for knowledge of other selves must have self-experience as the minimum point of departure. Apart from this minimum it would be idle to speak of the existence of other selves. It is because we experience self that we can believe in other selves. Surely all self-experience is one of process and development, and must be temporal. The historical world implies the reality of time. Whether the history of the earth or the biography of the individual, history must be interpreted in the light of determination of consequent by antecedent. The childhood self passes into the self of youth and adulthood. Certainly, when reflectively conscious of other selves, analogy must inevitably bring us to the view of the temporality of the self. It is only when we abstract process or emotion from the self and lose sight of the unity of consciousness that such untemporality can even

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[46] Cf. 302.

be conceived.

Again, the psychological view of time as "the immediate experience of the self as changing" is no illusion, but the true view. Neither is time a mere mathematical device to be condensed or expanded or discarded at will. As Bergson shows, it is real duration. It "coincides with... a certain portion of my duration which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something (merely) _thought_, it is something lived."[47] It is therefore unempirical and impossible to conceive of time as untemporal.

(4) Calkins's psychological account of time is consistent with her epistemological monism and absolutistic metaphysics

i. Structural analysis fails to imply certain acute philosophical problems

(i) Professor Calkins's most recent account of time, a difficult assignment for any psychologist, is oriented from the standpoint of structural analysis, and does not imply certain acute problems of the self that are of primary interest to the philosopher. What, for example is the duration of the mind's grasp in an act of immediate consciousness? To use the figures of William James and Tennant, is the "specious present" comparable to a "knife edge" or a "saddle-back?" Is the present moment the mathe-

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[47] Bergson, CE, 12f.

matician's conception of an instant, or is the moment's experience, as Royce, the philosopher, would say, a "time-span," varying in duration accordint to interest, purpose and meaning, and including perhaps several mathematical instants? The "saddle-back" or "time-span" view is inferred from the bodily concomitants of the consciousness of rhythm which vary according to individual's tempo, and from the characterization of attention as variable, either of 'wide' or 'narrow' span.[48]

(ii) Another philosophical problem whose solution cannot be inferred on the basis of Professor Calkins's psychological account of time is the method of conceiving the relation of the self to its object. Although the self is personal, given in relation to its object, and James is cited as authority for the statement that "the standpoint from which one speaks of objects is dualistic," yet she holds that "the monist in philosophy may unconcernedly adopt it." Accordingly, therefore, the psychological account implies no method whereby the dual relation of self to object can be thought. Even the monist in philosophy, as psychologist, must deal with this empirical dualism. Is self numerically one in the sense that Broad would say, one entity with two roles?[49] Does the self

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[48] Note that both James and Royce are former teachers of Professor Calkins.

[49] Broad, OOC, 106. "The self, then occupies by turns two different positions, in one of which it is an object and is called 'myself' or 'me,' and in the other of which...it is called 'I' or ego."

transcend itself or its object? To these questions the idealistic epistemological monist would answer with denial. Then, it must be asked "On what psychological grounds is it held that the self related to its object is immediately 'given' in experience? And if it be replied, experience, the further question must be put. Is my experience of the 'Sunkist' orange eaten at breakfast the same as the orange itself? Or is not that orange only something referred to? It would indeed be difficult for me to conceive of that orange as having somehow physically entered my consciousness. Professor Calkins would deem this preposterous. The problem still remains, what is the method whereby the relation between self and object immediately experienced are psychologically conceived.

(iii) Once more, Professor Calkins's self-psychology fails to imply an important distinction within the self, the distinction between the datum self and the whole self. Although the empirical fact of 'givenness' is maintained, the conception of the 'datum self' is not used by Professor Calkins. The psychological factors of a "whole self" are also recognized. In memory, the self "links" its past with the present, and when memory is accompanied by recognition, identity of object with the previous object is established. The volitional consciousness includes anticipation of a definite event. The consciousness of time, "an awareness of moments, past, present and future as linked together"

could involve a "whole self;" but only if a transcendent self effects the "linking together," a self that is identical with that of yesterday, and with that anticipated in the tomorrow, yet transcending them. The self is identical, but not the past event, which has already been lived, is irrevocable, and actually involves a contrast with its present occurrence in memory. It can only be referred to. Likewise the future event cannot be experienced in advance, but only the anticipation of that event, which can only be referred to in the present. Unless the self is regarded as transcendent, we attempt the impossible of identifying the past event with the memory of it, and the future event with the anticipation of it, and thereby adopt an inadequate view of memory and anticipation. In so far as Professor Calkins merely states the fact that past and future time can be experienced in the present, but fails to imply a method by which this is possible, her psychological account of time is held to be inadequate, because past time is identified with the memory of it, and future time with the anticipation of it.

ii. Calkins's psychological account of time is consistent with her epistemological monism and personalistic absolutism

It is to be noted that Professor Calkins's psycho-

logical account of time is harmonious with her epistemological monism and personalistic absolutism. On reaching exposition of her personalistic absolutism, it will be observed that nothing in her psychological account of the self prevents her cordial acceptance of the critical realist's imputation of solipsism.[50] Nothing in psychology stands in the way of identifying known object with knowing self. Epistemology and psychology are consistent.[51]

(5) Inconsistency in view of the body as learning

Evidence either of imperfect revision or incoherent thought, probably the latter, is noted in the statement that learning may be a physical process. But "learning in individual experience" cannot be a physical process. The self may be educated to use the "hand and arm," or there may be learned reaction of the hand and arm with accompanying economy of time because what was originally a conscious process occupying a relatively longer time is executed with greater economy of time. It is only metaphorically that the self-psychologist can speak of physical process as being "learned." That the learning process is mental can be shown by reflection, when one can deliberately re-live the steps in such an experience as tying one's shoe laces, or buttoning one's shoes, cited by Professor Calkins.

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[50] Cf. 298.
[51] Cf. 90.

4. Metaphysics of the self involved in the self-psychology of Calkins

(1) A mentalistic metaphysics of the self is involved

Throughout the psychological writings of Professor Calkins, autobiography, texts and periodical articles, it is clear that the self is conscious experience. Distinction is made between the self and its closest environment, the body and from its other non-conscious objects. Further emphasizing mentalistic view is the militant polemic against metaphysical behaviorists who identify and confuse consciousness with body, and the distinction made between externalized objects and non-external principles, in treating of objects of the self.

(2) An organic view of the self is involved

In Professor Calkins's self-psychology all aspects of the self are related to it. The abstract nature of structural and functional standpoint is repudiated, and the views of biological personalists and Gestalt psychologists are recognized as closely allied to the view of the self as an organic unity which self-psychology involves.

(4) A monadic view of the self is involved

The uniqueness and privacy of individual experience, in which I am my own personal and private object, the contrast of self with other selves, noted especially in the abstract aspect of emotion; and further, the conception of the relatedness of the self, which is a concrete unity, involve monadism.

(5) The self of Professor Calkins's self-psychology is an active self

Activism is involved in the arguments for the various aspects of the self. In productive imagination, attention, and recognition; thought, conception and judgment; volition, will, and choice; and in the relational elements, there is involved an active, relating self. Also from the central conception of self-psychology, the related self, it is implied that the self is the relater of its various aspects. They presuppose it.

(6) Metaphysical freedom of the self is involved

From the distinction drawn between undeliberative will and choice which involves choice following deliberation, and from the further distinction between two types of choice, with and without effort, effort involving selection from alternatives rather than merely following the easy course of inclination and habit, metaphysical freedom is involved in Professor Calkins's self-psychology.

(7) Professor Calkins's self-psychology involves an inadequate metaphysics of time

In her most recent view of the First Book, failure to imply a method of conceiving the immediate experience of self in the temporal consciousness, a failure which applies generally, results in identification of past events with the memory of them, and of future events with the anticipation of them, and a corresponding inadequate view of memory and anticipation.

CHAPTER V

WARD'S THEISTIC MONADISM

1. Ward's rational empiricism and psychology are presuppositions of 'Theistic Monadism'

For logical connection we present in brief summary pertinent aspects of Ward's rational empiricism and the Tennant-Wardian psychology. As experience is defined, its basically conative aspect is obvious. It is "the process of becoming expert by experiment." It is actively shaped by our endeavor towards self-conservation and betterment.[1] It is also a unity of the duality of subject and object. The object is a presentation to the subject, and not a state of consciousness. The active, interested subject, a unity of feeling, attention and conation selects from a plastic presentational continuum (totum objectivum) which is accordingly modified.[2] Knowledge, whether perceptual or conceptual, involves a subject and an object. Self-consciousness or self-knowledge is the result of monadic interaction of self with its body, and with the bodies of other selves in the environment.

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[1] Ward, PP, 358.

[2] For the basis of our exposition of presentations as mental, cf. 137ff.

In intercourse with other selves, each percipient formulates conceptions of objects in the common environment, and so builds up his world. Between the percipient and his world there is humanity.[3] There is thus an organic connection established between the individual and humanity as a whole, based on intersubjective intercourse, and ultimately on the perception of other bodies, which the individual believes to indicate, as in the case of his own body, the presence of selves.

2. Ward's idealistic presuppositions and basic problem

(1) Interacting agents are the fundamental reality

Turning to the historical world, the events that first claim our attention are not material phenomena, but individuals. "Agents are first: and law and evolution in every sense are but second."[4] By means of intersubjective intercourse mankind becomes a society. As men exchange experiences, the common knowledge thus attained is extended throughout the group and insures greater efficiency in shaping the plastic environment to human ends.[5] "The process of self-preservation slowly

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[3] Ward quotes the remark of August Comte, "Entre l'homme et le monde (la Nature) il faut l'humanité" but he is careful to point out what he regards as a fatal defect in Comte's view of humanity. The entire truth is not comprehended in humanity regarded as an end in itself. The individuals who compose it must share in this end. NA, 437, RE, 20, 387.

[4] Ward, EIP, 247 f.

[5] Ward, NA, 461.

and imperceptibly modifies the self that is preserved."

> The creature is bent only on filling its skin; but in doing this as pleasantly as may be it gets a better skin to fill, and accordingly seeks to fill it differently...All that is required is that to advance to a higher level shall on the whole be more pleasurable or less painful than to remain behind.6

Applying an old scholastic distinction, human nature at a given time may be said to be a composite of two contributing factors. The already fixed habits of individuals and the established customs and traditions of society, routine nature, which hold the potentialities and promise of the future, natura naturata. On the other hand the new experiments,untried and often unforseen, new adaptations to environment still in the future which imply further spontaneity and growth, natura naturans.

> All nature is regarded as plastic and evolving like mind: its routine and uniformity being explained on the analogy of habit and heredity in the individual, of custom and tradition in society, while its variety is attributed to spontaneity in some form.[7]

(2) Pluralistic starting point and basic problem

From this historical world of mind, finite struggling individuals in a common environment, Ward's metaphysics takes its start, in mediis rebus, and his basic problem is 'can reality now be interpreted on this basis as the evolutionary development of a Realm of Ends?'[8] To do so,

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6. Ward, NA, 292 f. Cf. RE, 80.
7. Ward, EIP, 243 f.
8. Ward, RE, 18 ff.

he must avoid both the Scylla of the absolutist, who, beginning from above a priori ends with the disappearance of the Many in the seeming attainment of the One, and the Charybdis of the naturalist, who, finding the 'Realm of Nature' one of inertia, a rigorous closed mechanical system, is unable to return from its hopeless inconsistencies to the world of concrete reality. Ward's starting point determines that he will first examine the claims of naturalism to test its adequacy as a final explanation.

3. Refutation of naturalism

(1) Rise of nineteenth century naturalism

The physical sciences, hoping to make the fundamental categories of the so-called pure science of dynamics applicable to their respective concepts which were derived originally from sense experience, have exchanged their own inductive methods for the deductive methods of dynamics. Molar mechanics based on Newton's ideal of matter as 'solid, impenetrable and indestructible' mass has accordingly been replaced by the kinematic ideal of 'mass-points' in motion. It is then assumed that their positions and motions can be mathematically determined with the aid of the calculus of probability.[9]

(2) Naturalism abstracts from experience

i. Reality is replaced by quantitative symbolization

In this systematic organization of special sciences which in the first place rest on sensible experiences, it

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[9] Ward, NA, 52. Cf. Ward, EIP, 88.

is obvious that the advance into an ideal domain has been at the expense of a complete breach of continuity and loss of touch with concrete experience. Quantitative symbols replace concrete reality, and as "facts never sublimate into ideas nor inductive probability into deductive proof," nature is reduced to mathematical abstraction.[10]

ii. The mechanical theory of naturalism and man

When the naturalistic mechanical theory is applied to anthropological data of real man in a real society, the anthropologist learns nothing of the real factors at work in the making of history, for his concept of the average man is far removed from the real man possessing particular idiosyncrasy and actuated by this or that motive.[11]

iii. Naturalism and 'things'

For the physicist the problem is an inverse one. Finding it necessary to differentiate between his quantitative symbols and mental pictures of phenomena, he is forced constantly to revise his working models, increasingly ideal and abstract, in order to enhance their utility as working hypotheses, till the further he goes in idealization, the greater is his loss of any semblance of concrete reality. As with the anthropologist, the end-result is the same. From the mechanical theory of the universe there

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[10] Ward, EIP, 189.
[11] Ward, EIP, 191.

is no road back to the reality of the world and things.

(3) The naturalistic view of mind

i. Consciousness is an epiphenomenal by-product of matter in motion

Beginning from the mechanistic standpoint, mind is regarded as a secondary product of natural phenomena which are primary. Mind arises only as often as matter falls into the appropriate condition. It is a 'collateral product' of the meaningless rolling wheels, the laws of nature. Man is an automaton, his mind the epiphenomenal aura that accompanies the working of a mechanism.[12]

Further examination of the theory reveals the crux of the problem of the naturalist. Having denied causal efficiency to spirit as illusory of the mind of the experient himself, he now illicitly undertakes to apply the category of causality to phenomena. But he is like the rustic who sawed off the very branch on which he sat.[13]

To regard other persons as conscious automata is the most that the naturalistic theory would warrant. The naturalist is only entitled on his theory to say that regarding all nature as a mechanism and his neighbor's body as part of that mechanism, he therefore concludes that his neighbor is but a conscious automaton, but he is not

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[12] Ward, NA, 328ff. Cf. EIP, 192.
[13] Ward, EIP, 192ff.

entitled to apply the concept of causality to the phenomenal order apart from persons. The conscious automaton theory of mind must therefore be rejected as a vague and poorly disguised form of materialism.[14]

ii. Mind and the psycho-physical parallel

Then the naturalist falls back to his second line of defence, the psycho-physical parallel, which he claims to be a scientific inference from facts, and not a speculative hypothesis. The relation of the psychical to the physical series is held to be concomitance but not interaction.

But while psycho-physical correspondence is a fact, there being correspondence between psychosis and neurosis, there is no assignable concomitance between the quantitative uniformity of mass-points in motion and the qualitative diversity of states of consciousness. Moreover, because on his method of applying the law of the conservation of energy to the entire range of experience, minds as well as bodies, he fears resulting violence to this law, and is unable to construe interaction in terms of mechanism. The naturalist therefore denies this basal fact of experience, the interaction of the conscious subject with his objective environment.[15]

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[14] Ward, EIP, 196.

[15] Ward, EIP, 198 ff. Ward rejects occasionalism because of it association with Cartesian dualism. Activity for him is real because it relates to causation by finite selves, who are regarded as possessing immanent causal efficiency.

In describing the organism in terms of a mechanism, he confuses the standpoint of the individual experient (psychical) with that of the environment (physical). He is in this respect like the psychologically untaught blind man who must rely only on his sense of touch for experience of unfamiliar objects. On being brought for the first time to the Public Garden in the spring of the year, and informed of the riot of color bordering the walks, the blind man denies the very existence of color because he cannot 'feel' it. Lacking also the requisite psychological knowledge he would be unaware that only his physical handicap of blindness had hindered him as a conscious subject from relating two otherwise mutually exclusive senses, the 'touch' of tulip with the 'sight' of its brilliant saffron. Being blind, he lacks the necessary standpoint. So, too, the naturalist. At bottom, the psycho-physical parallel is merely an affirmation in mechanical terms of the dualism of two mutally exclusive and disparate abstractions, matter and mind.

(4) Refutation of the naturalistic view of evolution

i. Factors operative in organic evolution

Turning to the course of biological evolution and the factors operative therein, an important question that inevitably emerges is, how far is mind concomitant with life? Even as the naturalist assumes organization to be a mechanical effect of inert mass and force, so his answer is that

mind is a mere accompaniment of organization. It is not regarded as causal.[16]

But on the contrary, study the course of biological evolution from the lowest types of organisms to man. Take the unicellular paramecium as the counterpart of untutored primitive man. The advance to the higher multicellular organisms leads through an increasing complexity of adaptation and control of the environment and a corresponding increase in complexity of organic structure and function, division of labor, and coordination of organs and function.

So, too, on the human level. Begin with primitive man in nature, where, as Hobbes expressed it, life is "nasty, brutish and short." Then take the organization of life in a modern city, and its appropriate division of labor, where man by means of his art and industry has created an almost perfect environment. Nature is completely metamorphosed.

While no new elements may be involved and the laws of nature have been obeyed, in both instances, at the lowest level of biological life and on the human level, evolution and the organization of life have gone forward on the basis of two guiding principles (i) self-conservation and corresponding teleological adaptation and (ii) subjective or hedonic selection from the common environ-

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[16] Ward, NA, 375.

ment according to individual interest and preference.

ii. Possible alternative interpretations of the data of evolutionary theory

The naturalist employs a 'leveling down' method of interpreting the data of evolutionary theory, extending the range of matter and its laws so as to interpret teleological factors in terms of these. But the lex continui is equally available for the 'leveling up' method. The scale of life is just as continuous in one direction as the other, and the teleological factor isthen obviously determination by mind. Since we can understand human action only in terms of mind, it is more reasonable to infer the unknown from the known than the opposite. Simpler forms of life may correspond to equally simpler forms of mind.[17]

(5) Nature is a teleological unity

i. Teleological interpretation of nature's regularity

As the indispensable means of subjugation and control of nature for the practical needs of man, science regards nature as a systematic unity conformable to law. Since laws of nature are neither self-evident axioms of thought, nor are they perceptually presented, our next problem is, why the necessity of regarding nature as a system of laws, and what is the origin of the conception? The only coherent answer to the problem is that the unity of nature is a

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[17] Ward, NA, 275ff.

practical postulate of self-conscious individuals with a view to making their environment intelligible, and turning things to account.[18]

The stages in this conception are easity traced. As Kant showed in his notion of the unity of apperception, in the first place nature is a unity for us because our successive perceptions are united by the self into a single conscious experience. Connection between objects is not given but must be thought, a result of the predominantly conative nature of the subject and his corresponding practical activity. The second stage is reached with the development of social intercourse and reason. From his experience of doing and undergoing, the active subject in order to render his experience intelligible, interprets his own interaction with nature by means of the concept of cause, an implication of his own activity. Later he transfers this activity from himself to the objects, and with the help of the first analogy makes object interact with object. The unity and regularity of nature thus proves that nature is teleological in being conformable to human intelligence and amenable to human ends.

ii.The reality of activity

As viewed by Ward, activity may be defined as the ultimate causal efficiency of selves, human and divine. It

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[18] Ward, NA, 523 ff.

is ultimate because it is a constitutive fact of individual experience, implied in both thought and perception. It is efficient cause as distinguished from phenomenal cause, the uniformity of antecedent and consequent. Although our experience of activity is limited to experience of human beings, God is conceived as active in creating and sustaining the world.[19] It is absurd that the naturalist should deny the reality of activity and regard it as illusory, for as Descartes and Locke should have taught us it is only because we know of the activity of mind in thought and volition,that we know by contrast of matter as extended and inert.[20]

iii. Is reconciliation of mechanism and teleology possible?

The question has been put, "may not the universe be both mechanical and teleological at one and the same time, mechanical in its material and spatial aspect and teleological regarded in its spiritual aspect?" The answer, declares Ward, in a footnote replying to Professor Ritchie's question, from the side of teleology and spirit regarded as ultimate, "undoubtedly yes," but there can be no reconciliation from the opposite direction. The mechanical theory of nature does not tolerate spirit and spontaneity as determinant of material changes. To reconcile mechanism

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[19] Ward, RE, 7, 272 ff.
[20] Ward, NA, 346 ff.

with teleology would therefore create a situation similar to the man with an ill-fitting coat. Must not the coat be altered to fit the man? Surely the man is not to be altered to fit the coat. In this case a philosophy of nature has been devised to describe the real world without applying to it, and the answer is obvious.[21]

(6) Naturalism involves metaphysical dualism

i. Refutation of naturalism involves refutation of dualism

The refutation of naturalism's mechanical theory has also involved a demonstration of the hopelessness of metaphysical dualism. The same result is reached in both forms of the theory, that of the conscious automaton and the psycho-physical parallel, the imaginary sundering of experience into two worlds, both alike lacking in reality. The psychology of dualism eventuates in solipsism, the subject is shut 'in,' and the physics of dualism shuts itself 'out' of the world of experience.

In the former case there is no passing from the circle of ideas to know things beyond, in the latter, passage from matter to mind is equally impossible. A hopeless epistemological impasse has been reached, which the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, as we saw, does not resolve.[22]

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21. Ward, 606, f. Cf. Perry PPT, 96.
22. Ward, EIP, 200.

ii. The mind-body problem must be faced

Since we know nothing of disembodied souls, the problem of the relation of mind to body has to be faced. Historically, the first philosopher to present the problem in modern times was Descartes. He held that embodied souls imply a union of disparate substances, a blend of matter and mind. Such a union is both incompatible and incomprehensible. Locke agreed with Descartes,believing in the possibility of a miraculous systematic 'occasionalism.' Two possibilities have since been suggested, the now discredited ancient hypothesis of 'spontaneous generation' modernized as abiogenesis, which seemed to facilitate the advance to mind, and the Leibnizian conception of a teleological unity of dominant and subservient monads. This latter possesses the merit of a biologically sound approach, function and structure being reciprocally related as means to an end.

But Leibniz's monads are 'windowless' and their 'functional' or 'internal' and 'foreign' or 'external' relations were conceived in terms of pre-established harmony effected by the Monad of monads. This theological aspect of the doctrine Ward rejects, but the Leibnizian monadology will serve as a type to which his own pluralism will in general conform.[23]

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[23] Ward in Muirhead, CBP, II, 41 f.

We shall turn to Ward's monadism after first noting his rejection of absolutism.

4. Ward's rejection of metaphysical absolutism

(1) The principal forms of absolutistic metaphysics are rejected

Ward rejects absolutistic metaphysics in its principal historical forms, the ancient view of a static perfection, as in Plato's Idea of the Good and Aristotle's Pure Form, the One of the religious mysticism of Plotinus and the Indian and Christian mystics and the absolute of eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers. His rejection is especially directed against the latter. To this point G. Dawes Hicks quite pertinently remarks

> It was well-nigh inevitable that a mind imbued as was his with a sense of testing philosophical generalizations by their compatibility or incompatibility with empirical details should look upon Hegel's idealism as having been too cheaply won.[24]

(2) The metaphysical problem that is confronted

i. Rise of the idea of the absolute

The idea of the absolute arises in the attempt to account ontologically for the empirical multiplicity of the universe. Man first faces the world as plurality. Cosmological unity, as Kant clearly saw, is an ideal of reason, which implies ontological unity.

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[24] Hicks, art in Mind, 34 (1925), 280-299.

ii. Ward presents as an hypothesis, and rejects it, the immanent unity of society

We might conceive the implied ontological unity immanently as a society. This hypothesis is rejected because a "pluralistic whole is a whole of experiences but not a whole experience," and because "we can call nothing a real ground which implies no reality beside itself."[25]

iii. The hypothesis of absolutism is rejected

A second hypothesis, that of absolutism, is that we might transcend the world's plurality to find unity in an absolute One of another order. Philosophers through abstract speculation have passed over the Many at the beginning, trusting to deduce them afterwards from the absolute One. But in these systems, the reality of the Many becomes illusory and phenomenal and their independence and freedom disappear. Ward therefore rejects it.

(3) Ward's solution is a spiritualistic pluralism

In rejecting absolutism Ward turns to a third hypothesis, taking God and the world together as the real. His monadism is spiritualistic and theistic.

The idea of a primus inter pares does not admit of empirical verification, and even if we take a leap "in pure thought" and regard God as supreme though not absolute, this third alternative is not without its difficulties. Chief among these is that as result, we have only

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[25] Ward, in Muirhead, CBP II, 47. Ward, RE, 229.

the idea of a 'finite' God, and even this does not admit of dogmatic proof. As a member of the Realm of Ends, such a supreme monad would be limited by reason of the existence of the remaining monads, who possess freedom. To the demurrer of some 'radical' empiricist, who regards it as an illegitimate hypothesis, since it cannot be scientifically verified, it must be promptly urged that the business of philosophy is not to deal directly with matters of fact, but to understand the universe as a whole and to find in it meaning beyond the so-called 'system of nature' which the scientist describes. Ward's procedure, provided that it does not contradict experience, he maintains, is philosophically justified.[26]

5. Ward's 'Theistic Monadism'

(1) The Leibnizian presuppositions

Ward adopts a monadism of the Leibnizian type, rejecting specifically however, two Leibnizian features.

i. Modifications of Leibnizian theory

Unlike those of Leibniz, Ward's monads have 'windows' for interaction between themselves and with God, and he completely rejects the Leibnizian doctrine of preestablished harmony.

ii. Agreements with Leibniz

In agreement with Leibniz he adopts unreservedly the

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[26] Ward, in Muirhead, CBP II, 47.

principle of lex continui, utilizing it as the philosophical counterpart of the biological theory of evolution, and like Leibniz, he will attempt to discover the real from the standpoint of spiritualistic pluralism.[27]

(2) Ward's conception of monads and their relations, and his view of nature

i. Meaning of monad

The universe, he holds, is comprised of an indefinite number of monads, conscious beings, varying in rank according to degree of consciousness, from 'bare' monads of confused or undifferentiated consciousness to 'dominant' monads or souls. "The conscious self is the first paradigm of the monad."

ii. Characterization of the monads and Ward's conception of nature

(i) Monads are individuals. While no two are entirely different, all alike being conative and cognitive, seeking pleasurable situations or shunning painful ones, so making for continuous change, yet no two monads are alike. Each is a unique individual, for whom the remaining monads constitute his objective world.[28] At the upper limit, even the monad of highest rank is only primus inter pares and not absolute.[29]

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[27] Ward, RE, 52 ff.
[28] Ward, RE, 54.
[29] Ward, RE, 191.

(ii) At the lowest limit we note the characterization of the 'bare' monad. It has the minimum essential of a self in being conscious, but having no memory is unable to learn from experience. The totality of 'bare' monads serve as a medium of intercourse for higher monads, so eliminating the need of other 'systematic' or 'occasional' divine intervention. A 'bare' monad does not have a body distinct from itself and therefore must be its own body, since as Leibniz observed, "a disembodied soul would be a deserter from the general order" which implies matter and movement and their laws. The fact is that at the 'bare' monad we reach the limit of both body and mind, an ideal corresponding to the physicist's concept of a mass-point as the center of force. The psychical nature of the 'bare' monad corresponds to 'pure' sensation, a limit never actually reached. Its interaction is immediate without any intervening medium.[30]

(iii) At this lowest level Ward recognizes a difficulty for the principle of the lex continui in accounting for the 'foreign' relation of the 'bare' monad, but in virtue of the continuity between the organism and its environment, the panpsychist regards this universal matrix within which organisms are differentiated but not separated as a common medium of life and intercourse for

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[30] Ward, RE, 254 ff.

active beings. Since life is primarily adjusted to the lifeless and not the reverse, its unity and purpose in a 'realm of ends' would presuppose the lifeless as a 'system of means.'[31] There is no warrant for the assumption of an inanimate environment.

(iv) Nature is not to be construed as inert matter. The system of nature is a 'system of means,' a medium of intercourse for living beings. The laws of nature result from the striving of the lower monads to maintain themselves in the monadic environment, that is, from the spontaneous activity of the individual, their uniformity is "to be explained on the analogy of habit and heredity in the individual, of custom and tradition in society." The world is therefore an ordered cosmos and not a chaos of active multiplicity.[32]

(v) The spontaneous activity of the monads involves throughout an element of contingency, through which particularity and variety are effected. Not only does the bird have his feathers and the lizard his scales, but the rattlesnake has his venom, and physical evil, as part of this contingency, is inseparable from a developing world if there are to be free agents in it. By contingency Ward does not mean accident or chance. He contrasts the 'contingency of chance' with the 'contingency of freedom.' The former, ab-

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[31] Ward, EIP, 243 f.
[32] Ward, RE, 74 ff.

solute contingency is utter caprice. The contingency of freedom, placing the future of the world partly in the hands of free agents, is a denial of immutable law prior to events, and implies that there will be continually new and unexpected beginnings. In the contingency of freedom, there is a wide variety of response by different individuals to identical needs, and this is regarded as argument for pluralism.[33]

iii. Relations of the monads

Between the monads there is a relation of sympathetic rapport or interaction, which is said to be 'foreign' with respect to the environment. The 'foreign' relation of the monad is conceived as either 'dominant' or 'subordinate' and 'ministering.' 'Subordinate' monads range in descending rank from the 'dominant' monad or soul to the 'bare' monad at the lowest limit. Bare monads initiate changes, which from the side of the 'dominant' answer to his sensations. The 'internal' relation within a given monad, as of a brain to its mind is 'functional' or 'vital.' The relations of the monads of one organism are exclusive to that organism.[34]

When the monads are self-conscious persons, their interaction is said to be that of sympathetic rapport. "All that is strictly personal in social intercourse is

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[33] Ward, RE, 80 ff.

[34] Ward, RE, 256 ff, 217 f. Cf. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 44.

of this nature." Sympathetic rapport is defined as "interest that rests on cognition." It is a mutual exchange of personal attitudes from person to person, and is immediate. In maintaining immediate interaction between persons, Ward, who rejects occasionalism in any form, is substituting his own view of the immanent causal efficiency of finite selves for Lotze's occasionalism, which arises from his conception of individuals as modifications of an absolute substance. This view, he contends, would make persons as well as things "nothing but modifications of the Absolute," and is inconsistent with Lotze's own pluralism. Hence Lotze did not seriously maintain this view of persons.[35]

iv. Ward's solution to the mind-body problem

The panpsychist recognizes but one qualitative reality, mind. He regards the mind-body relation in terms of interaction between a dominant monad and the organization of subordinate monads of his brain, ministering to the dominant monad. This interaction serves the mutual convenience of all monads alike. Regarded from the side of the dominant monad, the relation between his subordinate monads and himself is functional because internal and vital. Monadic function in the mind-body relation will now be considered functionally and psycho-physically.

In the mind-body relation, as in general, the relation is that of interaction between dominant and subservient

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[35] Ward, RE, 215.

monad. It is to be noted that the internal or functional and the external or foreign relations between monads are incompatible and mutually exclusive. In its internal function, the relation of subordinate to dominant monad is that of a ministering subject, and the interaction is regarded as a relation between subjects. When the monad assumes a foreign or external relation, as when a brain becomes the object of a physiologist, it loses its relation as ministering subject, so that a monad cannot be at one and the same time both subject and object.[36]

Monadic function also determines the rank or standpoint of monads. The rank of a given monad depends on and varies with the number and organization of the system of subordinate monads which he controls. This would imply that the difference between the developed human self and the self of the domestic animal, whose potentialities are yet undeveloped is essentially that of standpoint. The rank of a dominant monad that has suffered brain injury with consequent loss or disintegration of some of the neurones, is usually deficient to that extent. So, too, when a subordinate monad assumes the foreign, external relation, as when the brain of another dominant monad is in interaction with an outside observer, the dominant monad is impoverished to the extent of corresponding loss

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[36] Ward, RE, 257 ff, 461 ff. Cf. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 44f.

of subjective standpoint. It is this incompatibility or exclusiveness of relation as between foreign and functional that gives rise to the mind-body problem.

Now we are prepared to note the relation from the viewpoint, respectively, of the physiologist and the psychologist. Stating the problem otherwise, we must discover the relation of monads in perception; how, as the monadist regards it, a brain, which is to the physiologist only a "small part" of his environment, is for the psychologist, the active mind of a dominant monad, that apprehends "the whole" of the environment. The answer lies in the incompatibility and mutually exclusive character of functional and foreign relations. For a dominant monad, or subject, the system of subordinate monads (his brain) is diaphanous in that he is ordinarily unconscious of its processes in functioning as ministering subject, meanwhile his experience can be that of "the whole" environment of monads in the foreign relation to him. Correspondingly, to the physiologist the brain of a dominant monad, no longer a ministering subject sustains a foreign relation to him, consequently only "a small part" of his environment.[37]

(3) The monads comprise a 'real of ends' that point to God and reveal him as their immanent yet transcendent unity and ground

i. Theism is a postulate of the practical reason

Like Kant, Ward concludes that theism cannot be estab-

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[37] Ward, RE, 461 ff. Cf. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 44f.

lished theoretically, and again like Kant, that while it cannot be a matter of knowledge, it is one of faith (practical reason). In both ontological and moral aspects, theism must be referred to the practical reason for its proof.

> The theoretical demand for a ground of the world, then, as well as the practical demand for the good of the world is met by the idea of God.[38]

At this point Ward relates faith to reason. He quotes approvingly a passage from Wundt's System der Philosophie, "Philosophy can prove the necessity of faith, but to convert it into knowledge, for that she has not the power." He also connects his position with Anselm's famous principle, Credo ut intelligam and with the Johannine account of a saying of Jesus, "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."[39]

ii. The rationality of faith

Such faith is none the less rational. Although its beginning is part of a 'primitive credulity,' "an unscientific trustfulness...engrained in all living beings," it is based on practical enterprise and is correlative with the theoretical reason.

> Psychologically and historically there is nothing unique in the faith of theism at all; it is only the full and final phase of an ascending series, beginning with an instinctive belief in the better, and ending in the rational belief in the absolutely Good with its corollaries, the existence of God and the life hereafter.[40]

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[38] Ward, RE, 423.
[39] Ward, RE, 416 ff.
[40] Ward, RE, 416.

iii. The demand of the theoretical reason for higher unity is met by a postulate of the practical reason

The theoretical reason demands for the 'realm of ends' a higher unity than pluralism of itself can satisfy. This demand is met by the practical reason which postulates a transcendent One. (i) Society is an organic whole, an immanent inclusive unity. Ward joins his interpretation of Hegel's conception of Objective mind to Kant's conception of consciousness in general, Bewusstsein überhaupt,[41] in which according to his interpretation Kant distinguishes between judgments of perception, which because of social reference have objective validity and judgments of perception in individual experience. On this basis Ward regards society as an organic unity.[42] It is a social consciousness based on common understanding, thought, and action, and is mediated by intersubjective intercourse. It does not exist apart from individuals, but is rather a residual fund of experiences of individuals expressed in principles, customs, and in the spirit of a people, in which individuals share.

> It is true that society is wholly constituted by its members, and is nothing apart from them, but it is equally true that in forming it they pro tanto transfigure and at the same time transcend their isolated selves. By intersubjective intercourse

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[41] For the difference between Hegel's view and Ward's, cf. 236.

[42] Ward, RE, 126, 121, footnote. Cf. Ward, NA, 471 ff.

> they attain to the trans-subjective or truly objective, both in knowledge and in action; and the more clearly they differentiate themselves from others the more distinct their own self-conscious personality becomes.[43]

This view is based primarily on his interpretation of a passage in Kant's Prolegomena.

> All judgments are at first mere perception judgments; they hold good simply for us, i. e.--for our subjectivity. It is only subsequently that we give them a reference, namely to an object, and intend (wollen) that they shall hold good for us, not only at the moment, but at all times, and in like manner for all persons...In the one I merely compare the percepts and combine them in one consciousness of my own state. In the other I compare and combine them in one consciousness in general.44

(ii) But this 'highest unity' which pluralism yields is not adequate to the demand of the theoretical reason. Hesitatingly, Ward asks, "is such a whole really a unity at all: is it more than a totality?" Then he makes answer, "It is a whole of experiences but not a whole experience, a whole of lives but not a living whole."[45] Nevertheless, he holds that "the unity of society is the last word of philosophy," and quotes Hegel approvingly as he continues the quest for a still higher unity than that which pluralism yields.

> All philosophy is nothing else than the study of the determination of unity...always unity, but in such a way that this is always further determined.[46]

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43. Ward, RE, 124.
44. Ward, RE, 121, footnote. Cf. Kant, Prol. 18, 20.
45. Ward, RE, 229.
46. Ward, RE, 158/ Cf. Hegel, VGP, 53.

(iii) This demand is met by the practical reason which postulates a transcendent One, "who is also immanent and active within it" (the world) and with whose will the will of the many would accord. The postulate of such a transcendent person, as a person interacting with other persons, would constitute the reality of the moral ideal for individuals and society which the best men recognize and identify with their highest good. "The highest good of each (is realized) in the highest good of all." Men regard the imperatives of the moral ideal as absolutely binding because it is self-imposed. At the same time, because this transcendent person is conceived as also immanent in the world, "man does not stand alone" in his progress toward the ideal, the best in the universe is friendly to him. Since, too, the desires on which the moral ideal is based are rational, the postulate of God as their reality is also rational.

> To imagine this petition answered (Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven) is to imagine humanity motivated by a single wise and righteous will...The will of the Many and the will of the One would accord completely.[47]

(iv) The transcendent One is also immanent. He answers to the need for a ground, a ratio essendi of the pluralistic world. He is a creator, and "because it (creation) is his utterance and because he ever sustains it, he

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[47] Ward, RE, 138, 420 f.

is immanent in it, it is his continuous creation."[48]

(v) Creation, in the Wardian sense, needs to be made explicit.

a. Negatively viewed, it is not to be construed as 'making out of nothing,' a conception that is contradictory. It is not to be thought either as transeunt causation from the side of the world or as immanent causation, implying change in God. Nor is creation to be conceived as a temporal act at a finite date in the past, nor yet is it the "crown and completion" of theism. b. Positively stated, creation means that the world exists in and through God as its ratio essendi, who is both immanent and transcendent.

> The Being to whom this intellectual intuition belongs will be creative; its objective experience will contain nothing that is merely given to it, but only what is ultimately posited.[49]

c. Creation is also epigenesis, not in the scientific sense of the mere unfolding of what was "completely existing in miniature" in the germ, but rather in the sense of creative synthesis, bringing to light new beginnings. Creation so conceived applies primarily to the

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[48] Ward, RE, 240.

[49] Ward, RE, 234 f. Intellective intuition is to be referred to Kant's distinction between passive intuition, the content of experience, and the synthetic activity of the categories, its forms. Stated otherwise, the objects of the Divine being are noumenal, not phenomenal.

method of evolution. But the result from the cooperation and conflict of free individuals is the same as creation without this method.

> For the pluralist, in short, these agents are themselves creative, and if they were not, they could never come to entertain the idea that they are creatures too.[50]

iv. The 'realm of ends' implies a central principle of the good, an absolute Good as ultimate end and immortality

(i) The good is implied in all monadic striving and in all ideals. The historical world is one of free agents, bent on self-conservation and motivated by some idea of the good, the ideal of mind as it is in itself. They work not at external ends and not at mere hedonic satisfaction, but at "the reign of reason and the good."[51] (ii) The incomplete, though ever-increasing realization of the good by monads, and their continued striving after higher good imply a central principle of the good and an absolute Good as ultimate end.

> The realm of such ends, as ideally at least an absolute unity implies one Supreme End for the whole and for each of its members, the precise opposite of what a system of means implies.[52]

(iii) If progress is to have a real meaning and not to be a mere ignis fatuus, the pluralist seeking the

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50. Ward, RE, 271.
51. Ward, RE, 381.
52. Ward, RE, 428.

perfection of the good is justified, on empirical grounds, in postulating a single personality or Supreme Spirit of the world as its Supreme end.

Ward recognizes a crux at the upper limit of pluralism. Theism, he believes cannot be reached on a strictly empirical basis. He has now come as far as he believes empiricism will take him. Unless there can be found some ontological principle to account for the experienced relatedness and order of the world, and especially some spiritual principle "of 'conservation of value' tending to prevent rational self-conscious spirits from lapsing back into merely animal souls," pluralism is condemned to a hopeless task.[53] True, society does attain a teleological unity. Isolated communities that are only geographically neighbors, by federating into a society attain a teleological unity, in which the individual achieves higher good. So a supreme unity for the Realm of Ends would likewise "increase the worth of the universe, both intellectually and morally." A suggestion of some theologians (and one might now add a later Gifford lecturer, Alexander) that there are orders of beings superior to man, bears indirectly on the problem, in that such higher beings would extend the lex continui. "The principle of continuity indeed almost forces us to posit higher orders of intelligence than our own" not only as ministers of Providence, but as

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[53] Ward, RE, 214 f.

spectators of universal history.[54] Having prepared us for the surrender of empiricism by reminding us that the business of the philosopher to make the universe as a whole intelligible, he now adds that faith is none the less practical reason, and is so philosophically justified if it enables us to account intelligibly for the universe.

(iv) The resulting idea of God would not correspond to the traditional conception of God. The latter may be characterized as a supreme being, whose existence involves wide, though not complete metaphysical disparity with finite selves. His omnipotence is fundamental, and is manifested in absolute knowledge, freedom, and goodness. But Ward conceives God as the central and highest member of the plurality of finite selves. His supremacy implies relativity and limitation due to the existence of other monads also possessing freedom and iniative.[55] "As ground of the world he limits himself." Since God could know only possibilities and tendencies, but not particular forms which future actions of free beings will take, this limitation involves the divine omniscience. His knowledge, however, admits of no surprise and his ultimate purpose cannot be frustrated. His ultimate end is best expressed as love. The love of God in creating the world as set forth by Christianity, which expresses this truth in the purest form we know, implies both incarnation, as self-revelation, and immortality.[56]

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[54] Ward, RE, 185
[55] Ward, RE, 191.
[56] Ward, RE, 191,244.

(v) The idea of God, the absolute Good, has immortality as its implication. Man's moral task in the achievement of progress in the good is endless and the hope of immortality is reasonable and justified.

> Since faith in the unseen and eternal is open to us, is it not rational to embrace it, since there the essentially rational, the absolute Good is not merely a hope but a reality? And in the name of reason what else can it be?[57]

6. Ward's conception of the selves and their relations in the light of metaphysics of the self

(1) Finite selves and persons

i. Society is instrumental in extending the significance of mind

Ward's panpsychism is based on the analogy of the human self. The consciousness, individuality, and activity of other monads or selves must be analogically inferred from our own self-consciousness. We do have evidence of these aspects of other selves, but because we have no evidence of their self-consciousness, the term is reserved for selves who have self-consciousness, the minimum essential of personality. Ward's view is that knowledge of other selves and self-consciousness develop _pari passu_. It is only in society that self-consciousness is possible. Further, at the social level, selves become increasingly rational. Intersubjective intercourse leads to an attempt

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[57] Ward, RE, 429.

to understand the environment. By analogy with themselves and comparison with each other, concepts are formed, and the significance of mind and rationality are greatly extended.

ii. Ward applies to interaction between persons his teaching of the ultimate reality of finite selves

Attention has been called to the fact that Ward's view of the interaction of persons is a substitution of his own conception of the immanent causal efficiency of the finite self for Lotze's view which involves occasionalism. But Ward's conception has itself been properly criticized as an inadequate and inconsistent addition to his own view of knowledge of other selves by ejective analogy. Even the most intimate personal intercourse is epistemologically mediate and not immediate as Ward now holds in his theory of interaction.[58] It cannot be conceded, therefore, that Ward's teaching on personal interaction, an inconsistent addition to his theory of knowledge of other selves by ejective analogy, contributes in any way to an activistic metaphysics of the self. The problem of interaction remains.

iii. Society is the medium of the development of value

(i) The origin of the concept of an object of value, Ward says, citing Meinong, lies "in the fact that

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[58] Bertocci, EAG, 119 f.

a subject takes, could take, or at least reasonably should take an interest in that object." This is to say that value originates in individual experience.[59] It is only "psychologically objective--temporary and individual." (ii) With socialization and self-consciousness, there is an advance in "the explicit recognition of the value of the self as paramount." The self becomes a standard by which all other interests are evaluated. With growth in regard of self as its own end and corresponding inwardness of ends, the ideal of self also attains higher levels. Observation and imitation of the achievements of others are important factors in the development of psychologically objective value.

(iii) An even higher level of psychologically objective development of value is attained in socialization. With the organization of the primitive horde into a clan or tribe, instinctively drawn together by mutual interests, based on spontaneous sympathy or goodwill and apart from selfish or utilitarian calculation, the ideal of goodness for the common weal is added to that of goodness for self. "The good of each member is dependent on its relation to others." Further, with the increasing exercise of their responsibilities as members of society, individuals attain to clearer consciousness of themselves

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[59] Ward, PP, 396 ff.

as rational and moral individuals.[60]

iv. Reason and morality imply existence of the objective mind

In his conception of society as an organic unity, Ward argues that society is truly a living reality, over-individual and complex. It is "the objective mind that is at once immanent in and dominant over its several members, who thereby attain to self-consciousness and think and act as rational persons." This view of society is the extreme opposite of the atomistic or nominalistic idea of society as a mere collection of independent individuals held together by private interests, promoted by association and secured by the hypothetical contract, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau conceived. It is as Hegel expressed it, "the unity of the individual and the general." But the view is quite different from Hegel's "organism." Ward's view of the organic unity of society means that by intersubjective intercourse individuals in society attain a common consciousness in thought and action, an objective viewpoint. By Objective Spirit, Hegel means the body of persons, not a mere composition of individuals, but a concrete whole, which is the source of their spiritual life. Logical priority is with Objective Spirit rather than the plurality of Ward's view.[61]

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[60] Ward, RE, 121.

[61] For further exposition of the concept of objective mind and its relation to the thought of Kant and Hegel, cf. 26

(2) Inferences from the conception of God for the metaphysics of the self

i. God is a member of the realm of ends, a person

Theists have often attributed to God absoluteness and infinity, yet hold that man is made in his image and likeness. Both statements cannot be true. If the principle of continuity is to obtain, for God, as for me, the world must be an object of experience, and God the subject of that experience. Like man, he is limited by the world yet "reacts upon it," and "in some measure modifies it." Above all, like man, God would have his unique standpoint, in his case "in a quite special way, it is the highest." There is an even more insuperable difficulty in the way of thinking of God as infinite and absolute. As interested in the world and active in it, he would have to be "subject to its fundamental conditions" of process and change. "We may suppose his time-span to exceed ours infinitely," and credit him with intuitive rather than discursive thinking, his grasps of truth _sub specie aeternatis_.[62] But all this is unwarranted by life and experience. God must therefore be conceived as a person.

ii. Creation involves intelligence, purpose, and moral development

Although there is no empirical analogy for creation,

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[62] Ward, RE, 194. The reference here is to Royce's view of the distinction between the time-span of the finite and infinite persons, and his view of God's experience as _sub specie aeternatis_.

the difference between God's creativity and ours need not imply utter disparity. On the human side, creation implies intelligence, purpose, and activity. On the side of God, who is to be regarded as transcendent as well as immanent, creation is at once 'pure activity' and 'original insight,' idea and deed. God is the world's ground, and it is his continuous creation.

Reflecting on God's motive for creation, since we have no basis for objective certainty, if we accept the subjective conviction of religious experience and assign to God the motive of love, this would sufficiently account for creation as a new value experience for God. Further, God's "end can only be the Good;" but because it is mediated by free beings created to achieve it, it involves moral evil and tardiness in achieving his end. But as there is no fundamental dualism in the world, evil exists only as hindrances which develop struggle against moral disorder. These hindrances constitute a challenge to the development of moral goodness and the eventual attainment of the perfect good at the upper limit of moral evolution.

7. Critical evaluation of Ward's 'Theistic Monadism'

(1) Ward's refutation of naturalism is devastating and adequate

i. Naturalism is a transfigured materialism

His insight that naturalism is only a disguised modern version of materialism is well-taken.

(i) Mechanism is only a nineteenth century version of some 'old habits of thinking'--as old as Leucippus and Democritus, to whom in common with the earliest speculative thinkers in the Western World physical objects bulked so large as to suggest the boundlessness of an apeiron.

(ii) That naturalism is a constantly recurring mode of thought deserving equally recurring refutation finds contemporary illustration in metaphysical behaviourism and neo-realism. As one reads Ward's refutation, it is clear that whether the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus or the neutral entities of Perry and other neo-realists, the method and metaphysics are the same. The method is analytic and the metaphysics materialism however subtly disguised, and neither the ancient theory nor its recent descendants are capable of making the physical universe intelligible.

ii. Naturalism abstracts from mind, and is unable to reach reality

(i) Physical things are intelligible only through mind, and this fact Ward sets forth in symphonic arrangement, playing alternately on different variations of the main theme. The concept of 'inertness' and 'extendedness' are notions derived by contrast with the prior experience of mind as active and unextended. The category of 'causal efficiency' is derived from the experience of the active self. We then transfer it into phenomena making objects

interact. The world is intelligible only to minds, and only minds, within limits can 'turn things to account.'
(ii) Ward exposes naturalism's abstract theory of nature, utterly insufficient when confronted with real men and a real nature. So, too, in view of the twentieth century's interest in nuclear physics, the physicist must be constantly reminded that his micra are only symbols and not onta, they are not the real world.

(2) The basic error of naturalism lies in its metaphysical dualism

i. This error is clearly seen in its conception of mind

(i) That the basic error of naturalism lies in its metaphysical dualism becomes clear in its conception of mind. In its theory of mind, either as an epiphenomenon or the concomitance of psycho-physical parallel, the crux of the problem is in the metaphysical dualism which infests it, and which Ward shows conclusively to be untenable.
(ii) Dualism depends for its validity on abstraction. It must exclude such significant factors in evolution as teleological adaptation and individual preference, both 'irreducible' traits of mind, and both strong factors in development of the physical organism as well as the mind.

ii. Mechanism rests on abstraction from mind

Having abstracted activity from the experience of

conscious beings, the naturalist then attributes motion to what on his own theory is inert mass. "But inertia is a negative term and becomes meaningless if we have no experience of activity."[63] The physical world could never have been regarded as in motion apart from intelligent beings who are themselves active.

iii. The most coherent hypothesis is that the universe is mental

(i) The most coherent hypothesis of the facts involved is that the universe is mental in nature. We should infer the unknown from the known by a method of 'levelling up' rather than 'levelling down.' Hence Ward is a thorough going panpsychist. The world can only be understood by mind, and mind only is capable of discovering its values. (ii) On the other hand, we conceive of the 'lumpishness' of matter only by contrast with nonspatial mind; of force, only because the self is an active being.

(3) Ward presents no argument for the metaphysical 'objectivity of value'

i. In argument, Ward leaves value a human category

This investigator sought in vain, in Ward's writings published in his lifetime, some argument for the metaphysical 'objectivity of value.' As Ward refers conceptual

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[63] Ward, RE, 8.

thinking to social intercourse, so Tennant, Ward's disciple, in the absence of such an argument, makes the possible and logical implication that, correlative with conceptual thinking, epistemologically, value is a derivative of intersubjective intercourse. Tennant, however, while holding that value is essential to an empirical argument for theism, rejects the view that God is the source and home of ethical ideals. That Ward, however, does not intend a thorough going humanistic account of value is suggested in his closing chapter of Realm of Ends by an appeal to faith in the transcendent existence of the eternal values, so far unattained on present levels of progress, but demanded by the lex continui and the need of aspiring persons who still yearn for the best. In two post-humously published works, he also makes similar reference; in "The Christians' Ideas of Faith and Eternal Life," a chapter in Essays in Philosophy, he remarks that the true, the beautiful and the good "are not temporal events," and in Psychology Applied to Education, that truth is eternal, and is not subject to the human contingency of being applied.[64] But Ward presents no argument for the metaphysical objectivity of value.

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[64] Ward, RE, 449. Ward, EIP, 355 f. Ward, PAE, 153.

ii. Sorley uses a Wardian argument for the rationality of faith to prove the metaphysical'objectivity of value'

A possible argument for the 'objectivity of value' is employed by Ward only to indicate the rationality of the practical reason. As knowledge obtained by the theoretical reason stems from man's cognitive nature, so because man is also and predominantly a conative being, his 'faith' in God is the outcome of his practical enterprise initiated by the practical reason, rooted in his conative nature. It remains for another Wardian disciple, W. R. Sorley, to present this correlation as argument for 'the objectivity of value.'[65]

(4) Ward's 'Theistic Monadism' manifests a humanistic emphasis but a definitely anti-humanist conception of God

i. The humanistic emphasis

Ward's conception of society as an organic whole, which he regards as progress toward the demand for 'higher unity' suggests a humanistic emphasis, in the sense of treating religious values as merely the highest social experiences and ideals of man. Furthermore, the postulate of theism by the practical reason stems from man's conative nature, and the faith of theism is 'of a piece' with human trustfulness and enterprise.

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[65] Sorley, MVIG, 72 ff.

ii. The anti-humanist conception

But Ward cannot by any means be considered a humanist. The humanist would certainly derive no comfort from his refusal to accept the unity of the totality of selves, consciousness in general, as the ultimately real One and world ground. Positively, his near Platonist conception of eternal values should be added.

(5) Ward's Theistic Monadism, like Bowne's Theism reveals a definitely 'Kantianized' mode of thought. It is 'Kantianized' however with a different emphasis from Bowne's work. In referring to his thought historically, Bowne calls it a "Kantianized Berkeleianism," meaning primarily that it represented a view similar to Berkeley's idealism, enriched by Kant's doctrine of the creative activity of thought. Ward uses Kant's doctrine of the synthetic activity of the mind as an argument for the reality of the finite self, but not directly in his theistic argument, where Kant's view of the primacy of the practical reason is employed. Bowne, however, building a broader base of theistic argument, includes other arguments than the great 'catholic beliefs' of mankind, supported by the practical reason. The epistemological argument involving the creative activity of the mind is one of these. Both thinkers select these two important aspects of Kant's teaching for use in relation to theism but apply them differently.

8. Metaphysics of the self involved in Ward's 'Theistic Monadism'

(1) Ultimate reality of the finite self

The ultimate reality of the finite self is involved in holding theism to be a demand of reason in its theoretical and practical aspects and in Ward's conception of God as a person, who though confronting evil, yet realizes value.

(2) A monadic conception is involved

Negatively in Ward's argument refuting naturalism's theory of mind as epiphenomenon and psycho-physical parallelism, and positively in argument for the teleological unity of nature as inference from the self, a monadic conception of the self, the concrete unity of conscious experience is involved.

(3) Panpsychism and his view of the social mind involve mentalism

Ward's thorough going panpsychism and his view of society as "consciousness in general" involve a mentalistic metaphysics of the self and 'personality as the key to reality.'

(4) An activistic metaphysics, freedom and ethical responsibility of the self are involved

Two of Ward's arguments involve an activistic metaphysics of the self, his insistence that the notion of causal efficiency is derived from experience of the self, and his teaching that creation is epigenesis mediated by

finite selves. The latter also involves finite freedom and responsibility.

(5) Space and time and their transcendence are involved, and immortality

In Ward's argument for theism as the practical demand for the perfect good of the world towards which the historical world continually strives without complete realization, time and space, and the transcendence of time and space by the self, and its immortality are involved.

CHAPTER VI

TENNANT'S COSMIC TELEOLOGY
IN RELATION TO THE SELF

1. Transition from phenomenalistic theory of knowledge

Having established in his phenomenalistic theory of knowledge that the soul is the only ontal or ultimately real thing concerning which knowledge can be claimed, Tennant passes from studies of the knowledge-process to inquire into the possibility of ontal knowledge of the world.[1] And since for the empirical theologian, theology must be the outgrowth of discursive thought on the world, man, and his experience, physical science is one source of his data. Preliminary studies in this area of thought will therefore engage attention.[2]

2. The in~~d~~adequacy of scientific explanation of the world

(1) Tennant's appraisal of science

i. Rationalistic science is unacceptable

Before continuing exposition we can profitably at this point examine Tennant's appraisal of science, and particularly his use of the term 'rationalistic' as applied to science. As a former teacher of science he

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[1] Tennant uses the term 'ontal' to mean the ultimately real or non-phenomenal.

[2] Tennant, PT, II, 1f.

is quite competent to offer the "higher criticism" which will enable the teaching of science to become a "stimulant" rather than an "anaesthetic." His invective is reserved for the rationalistic science, which ministering primarily to a "pride of intellect" unconsciously becomes abstract obscurantism,and is then as unacceptable as rationalistic philosophy.

Its claim of impartiality and disinterestedness at bottom only reveals another interest, the cognitive, exclusive of the conative. Because "there is no synthetic process uncaused by interest," cognition and conation are not separable. Science, regarding them so, in this way unconsciously adopts a rationalistic trend and a particular epistemology. So it substitutes concepts for percepts and fails to recognize "that it is as interpretative as philosophy."

ii. Mechanistic naturalism issues in a metaphysics

Moreover, mechanical naturalism regards the world as one of mass points in motion, or absolute space-time. The world is then viewed as the primary existent, and the soul as only a subsidiary derivative of it. In this way speculative science issues in a world-view that is an alternative to the theistic view of the world.[3]

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[3] Tennant, PT, I, 334 ff; II, 1, 2, footnote.

iii. Ward's refutation of naturalism, devastating and adequate, is presupposed

Ward's criticism of the mechanistic interpretation of nature and the self is to be regarded as complete. Tennant tells us in one of his illuminating footnotes that illustrative content only has been superseded but not its pertinence to and value as argument against the naturalist's view, which Tennant also repudiates.

(2) The inadequacy of science is primarily due to its methodological abstraction

i. Mistakes conceptual description for ontal reality

Science assumes its methodological procedures to be final and complete transcripts of reality. The imperceptible micra of its kinematic theories are interpreted on the basis of molar mechanics as having ontal counterparts, and the physicist fails to recognize that they are only ideal conceptual short-hand descriptions.[4]

ii. Abstraction by selectiveness

A second methodological abstraction consists in abstraction from the real world by selection of such aspects as lend themselves readily to mathematical treatment and quantitative measurement. But science must face the truth that while its 'essential' is the measurable, a particular fact may be "no more Real than the unmeasur-

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[4] Tennant, PT, II, 43 ff.

able." Selective data may represent the unique and unrepeatable events which science, interested in individuals only for purpose of classification, excludes from consideration, although they are equally as historical as the repeatable.[5]

iii. Abstraction of the alogical elements of the world

Also excluded from consideration by science are the alogical, irrational surd elements of the world which it does not find conformable to its scheme of law. The world contains brute facts that are not reducible to logical order, and consequents that could never be logically predicted from their antecedents. There are aspects of things that "do mock the grasp of thought."[6] Hence there can never be an exhaustive rational science of the world.

iv. What science considers "irrational" is teleologically explicable

This leads to the observation that Facts which for science are "irrational" in the sense of being "without law" are not only of interest and value but are also explicable teleologically. It is even possible that the alogical elements of the world, physical evil and beauty, for example, may possess meaning and "revelational value"

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[5] Tennant, PT, I, 343 f.

[6] Quoted from Dante, Divine Comedy,"Purgatory," Canto 29.

to beings who not only think, but feel and value as well. In a teleologically ordered world the alogical may be instrumental to moral and religious values.[7]

3. Teleological explanation of the world yields a compelling cumulative argument for theism

(1) 'The wider teleology' will supersede the Paleyan type

Tennant's teleological argument for God is not to be conceived as that of Paley, invoking evidence of particular organic adaptations, any one of which is considered as capable of proving existence of a divine creator. Darwin's argument for natural selection in organic evolution invalidated argument of the Paleyan type by showing proximate causes to be sufficient to account for the adaptations which Paley cited as proof of God.

(2) Tennant's argument is 'the wider teleology'

'The wider teleology' is the outcome of "synopsis" or "conspection" of the knowable world, and of "the conspiration of innumerable causes to produce by their united and reciprocal action and to maintain a general order of nature."

i. The world is an order in which thought and thing are mutally adapted to each other

There is prima facie no explanation for the mutual

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[7] Tennant, PT, I, 340 f.

adaptedness of thought and thing, nature and knowledge. This applies both to perceptual experience and to the richer analogical and interpretative reasoning. As to the former, the primary mystery is that the world presents an intelligible cosmos when it might conceivably have been a determinate chaos. Further, that things are amenable to the more interpretative kind of knowledge, thus manifesting affinity with human beings, although denied logical coerciveness, gives this argument weight in the wider teleological interpretation.[8]

> It is in that Nature evokes thought of a richer kind than is involved in scientific knowledge, and responds to thinking such as in neither logically necessary nor biologically needful, thus suggesting a Beyond, that considerations as to the relation between thought and things assume their chief significance for the teleologist.

ii. The world is an order of guided evolutionary organic process

In the absence of any accounting for the origin of variations, and neither Darwin nor his successors offer 'internal' or mechanical explanation therefor, there remains the hypothesis of "directivity in the process, and plan in the primary collocations." Guidance and plan of the evolutionary process in the organic world as a whole, whereby variations have occurred and the fittest 'arrived'

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[8] Tennant, PT, I, 81 ff.

would then suggest 'external' directivity in the process.

iii. The world is an order in which the inorganic is adapted to the organic.

There is apparent continuity of intelligence and purpose between the organic and the inorganic world.

> The fitness of our world to be the home of living beings depends upon certain primary conditions, astronomical, thermal, chemical, etc., and on the coincidence of qualities apparently not causally connected with one another; and these primary conditions in turn involve many of secondary order.[9]

"Reasonableness" or "mother-wit" would regard the 'probability' that this apparent preparedness of the world to be a theater of life is due to chance as "infinitesimally small."[10]

iv. The world is an order in which values exist and are appreciated, understood and desired by human beings

On the telescopic and on the microscopic scale, from "the starry heavens above" to the siliceous diatom below, the scientific imagination has reported flowers that "blush unseen" and gems that the "unfathomed caves of ocean bear." "Nature is sublime or beautiful, and the exceptions do but prove the rule." (i) Beauty is created by human minds in rapport with the ontal world. Ontal nature is so intrin-

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[9] Tennant, PT, II, 83.

[10] Tennant, PT, II, 86 f.

sically constituted that "minds can make beauty as well as nomic order out of it." It is in man that nature "comes to herself." "Without man she is but 'a broken circle.'" (ii) Moreover, aesthetic, moral and religious values coalesce. Spirits like Wordsworth find in nature a "mysterious presence" of "something far more deeply interfused, whose dwelling is the light of setting suns." Hence the common sense there is in the romanticist's paradox. "Beauty is truth, truth is beauty."[11]

v. The world is an order instrumental to moral experience by persons

(i) "Man is organic to the world" says Pringle-Pattison, and Tennant agrees with the conception interpreting it to mean first that man is an emergent of cosmic evolution, "That man is organic to the world" means that man's "body and the bodily conditioning of his mentality" have genetic continuity with nature's humbler and earlier-born children." (ii) The assertion also denies that man is an "alien intruder" in a world that is indifferent or hostile to his moral aims. "In the fullness of time Nature found utterance in a son possessed of the intelligent and moral status." Morality, conditioned by man's intelligence is in turn dependent on the regularities of nature. (iii) Even if the bodily appetites and impulses

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[11] Tennant, PT, II, 91 ff.

are the source of moral evil, in the struggle between reason and non-moral impulse, they also provide the conditions of man's higher moral nature. Obstacles to be overcome help to develop moral stamina and the virtues. Nature, in producing human beings and the conditions of their acquiring moral status is instrumental to morality.[12] In this further sense nature and man are organically one.

vi. The world is an ontal order of inter-connected substance-causes[13]

(i) The facts of adaptiveness that have now been surveyed are each separately capable of teleological explanation, but it is when taken in their dove-tailing and inter-connected wholeness that a 'sufficient ground' is sought, and divine design forcibly suggested. (ii) There is no logical necessity that a chaos of disparate assemblages should conspire to be an intelligible cosmos, "but the ontal world is a nexus of causes," for which non-theistic philosophy offers no sufficient reason. (iii) If we accept the hypothesis that an intelligent Creator designed the world as a "theater for rational life," "mystery is minimized and a sufficient reason is assigned."

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[12] Tennant, PT, II, 100 ff.

[13] For the empirical derivation of the categories of substance and cause see note on substance-causes, 261.

> Nature is so constituted as to admit of routine formulae,...and that fact...could not be forthcoming if in the ontal realm there were not as much of regularity-nexus as science will ever discover in the phenomenal.[14]

(3) Teleological interpretation of the data adduced argues the intelligent design of the world

i. Meaning of teleological interpretation and answers to possible objections

(i) By teleological interpretation is meant interpretation with reference to the foreseen ultimate end or final cause for which a process is initiated. As thus defined, the only known final causes are agents who intend a given actualization. (ii) Teleological argument does not depend on logically coercive proof, but on reasonable belief grounded in cumulative evidence, and pragmatically as well as logically confirmed. Like science, it must depend on "the probability that is its guide," and must accept psychological certitude in the absence of Objective certainty. (iii) The theistic argument advanced assumes primarily that the known world, besides being capable of scientific descriptive explanation, can also be explained teleologically as an ordered cosmos. But a possible objector might interpose, if design be proved of the known world, it would not necessarily "yield proof of

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[14] Tennant, PT, II, 13.

design in the universe." Conceivably the known world as distinct from the knowable universe, might be only an "ordered fragment," an oasis of order in a desert of chance. The known world may even be a "chance product of mind-less agency." But Tennant replies, argument must first deal with interpretation of the known, before appealing to conceivable possibilities of the unknown. At any rate, argument must not assume a mechanical theory which is contradictory to the facts of the known world. But coming more direct to the objection, as the term itself suggests, the "oasis is not an isolable fragment." Oasis and desert are at least interdependent. "The one has orderedness only by permission...of the other." If the force of the objection lies in the assumption that human personalities have been produced in a corner of the universe by the evolutionary cosmic process as a result of "random variations," similar to variations by natural selection in the organic realm, the objection is only a conjectural appeal to the unknown. It can be shown to be "overwhelmingly impossible" in the light of the second law of thermo-dynamics.[15]

ii. Teleological interpretation of cosmic data implies intelligence

That the world is the outcome of intelligence is

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[15] Tennant, PT, II, 78 ff.

forcibly suggested by the facts cited in the theistic argument. To begin with, the world is an order, "when conceivably it might have been a self-subsistent chaos." Further, it is an order of interconnected adaptedness, which so interpreted renders meaningful the progressiveness of the evolutionary process, and the variations which occur in the organic realm.

Moreover, the conspiration of numerous inorganic elements to constitute the world a theater for life strongly suggests a directive intelligence. The possibility that these manifold co-incidences have occurred by chance, meaning thereby the absence of sufficient ground, is infinitesimally small. Science would not support the suggestion of chance. The complexity of the environment needed to sustain life cannot reasonably be attributed to blind forces or pure mechanism. Nor can the existence of the present inorganic world be conceived on the analogy of the principle of natural selection which is operative in the organic realm. Of a struggle for existence of rival worlds, the scientist has no knowledge. The cumulative data advanced, when teleologically interpreted, point reasonably to an intelligent agent as source of their existence.[16]

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[16] Tennant, PT, II, 86 ff.

iii. The world's values suggest meaning and value for persons

Tennant finds that contrary to the Kantian view, the sublime in nature is not of itself capable of use as theistic argument from design. But it does make a distinct contribution as a link in the chain of theistic argument, in showing that the world as a bearer of values manifests its affinity with man, who can appreciate as well as understand. Beauty is created by human minds out of rapport with the ontal. Since values alone can provide guidance to the world's meaning, the "beauty (of nature) may well be a meaning." For the theist, this meaning is to be related to "the world's intelligibility and to its being a theater for moral life."[17]

Tennant now turns to the moral consciousness as possible argument for theism and rejects the view that God is the direct source and home of moral ideals and values. He does maintain that these values "constitute an essential and indeed the most significant part of the data...for a synoptic view and interpretation of the world." It is the fact that 'man is organic to Nature' that now relates and ties in the argument from moral values to the remaining data of the theistic argument. Tennant takes an "anthro-

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[17] Tennant, PT, 89 ff.

pocentric" view of the world process. "Man's body with all its conditioning of his mentality, his sociality, knowledge and morality is 'of a piece' with Nature." The world process has "man not only as its end term, but also as its end or goal."[18]

This "anthropocentric" view of the world is no presumptuous claim that man as zoological species is the highest being under God, or the final stage of progressive cosmic evolution. It does not profess to fathom completely the divine mind. It does mean that rationality, appreciation, self-determination and morality afford the best known clues to the divine end. Man, his intelligence and realization of the highest values are essential to discerning the final purpose of the world process.[19]

4. The nature of God and his relation to the world process

(1) The Being to which cosmic teleology points is first a Designer and Creator

i. God is not a mere world architect

God is not to be conceived as in the classical design argument, a mere world architect. "Design in the world as a whole is impossible unless it involves creation." Even if allowance is made for epigenesis through creatures,

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[18] Tennant, PT, II, 99 ff.
[19] Tennant, PT, II, 113 ff.

an immanent divine activity throughout the nature and trend of the world process must have been implicit from the beginning.

ii. A dualism of God and the world and an infinite regress in space and time are not involved

The conception of a Creator is also intended as a denial of a dualism in which God is thought to have existed prior to and without the world, and to have shaped the world out of recalcitrant matter. Creation is to be conceived as the free activity of a transcendent experient, who 'posits' or 'plants out' substance-causes, "other ontal beings with existence for self."[20] The notion of creation is empirically inexplicable and ultimate, but must be thought as an act of which "human volition is the nearest analogue." Further, in conceiving the act of positing we

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[20] Note on substance-causes. Empirically the categories of substance and cause are mutually involved. Because the soul from which the category is derived is the immanent cause of its own states and acts, and does not produce similar effects in the not-self, hence a substance, and because neither subject nor its act is separately presented, the two categories are thus fused. Neither can be without the other. In Tennant's metaphysics, the divine creation that is 'posited' or 'planted out' is regarded as "ontal beings with existence for self." Ontal nature then, which includes man's body is constituted of substance-causes, or things in themselves. This view, be it also noted, is harmonious not only with the empirical derivation of the categories of substance and cause, but also with the phenomenalistic theory of knowledge which regards sensa as constituted by rapport with things in themselves.

must distinguish between logical sequence which is temporarily disjoined from antecedent and the created 'historical Actual process' as posited by the world ground, which need not involve temporal disjunction.

> Creation can be conceived as idea and deed together, and the divine transcendence not as temporal priority, but as consisting in the difference between God and his utterance--which pantheism identifies.[21]

iii. The Designer and Creator is a self

Since the human self is our highest example of intellect and purpose, the agent of creation is conceived in terms of a divine self, who is a unity of thought, feeling, and volition. Like Ward, Tennant thinks of creation in terms of 'intellective intuition,' which, as is not the case with human selves, posits its own objects. While the volition and its object are distinguished, they are not separated. Idea and deed belong together. This being so, God is not a mere subject. Since "God without the world is not God," the world is the object from which the divine ego distinguishes itself, and the minimum essential of personality, self-consciousness, is fulfilled.[22]

(2) God is also personality

i. God is a person

It will be recalled that in the Tennant-Wardian psy-

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[21] Tennant, PT, II, 173 ff.
[22] Tennant, PT, II, 125 ff.

chology, personality, as distinct from mere subjecthood requires self-consciousness and capacity for rational and moral development. It can be further brought to mind that, on the human level, sociality conditions the development of rational persons and their ethical nature. Tennant objects to the idea of a developing God, because as ground of the world, intelligence and ethical nature are presupposed in creation.

But the absence of the conditions of human personality does not "render meaningless the ascription of personality to God." Personality is our highest interpretative concept, and there is no incompatibility in the notion that higher souls and a supreme Spirit possess faculties and capacities indefinitely transcending those which human persons achieve, only by means of embodiment and society.

ii. God is the only perfect personality

If to call God supra-personal means that he transcends the limitations of human personality, this term would be acceptable. But if the term applies to an agency divested of volition, purpose, and ethical nature, this would result in impersonality, and the conception is rejected. The minimum essential for conceiving the divine personality "is that it be characterized by intelligence, valuation, and volition."[23]

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[23] Tennant, PT, II, 166.

Especially would God's intelligence be free from such human limitations as are due to sense experience and other physical handicaps. He would not be subject to the need for discursive and analogical knowledge. His knowledge would be noumenal, of things as they are. The difference might be epitomized in the contrast that "God's objects are things _per se_, whereas ours are phenomena." As noumenal subject, too, he could be everywhere at all times. Not only would past and present be known, but also all future, in so far as predicting what the world process tends to become through epigenesis from what is implicit in its primary collocations, due allowance being made for creaturely spontaneity.

iii. God's ethical nature is the result of positive moral factors

The righteousness and holiness of God although not the outcome of moral struggle and attainment are none the less due to moral factors. They are the outcome of volitional self-determination and consistency. His ethical love is expressed in the creation of beings of rational and moral status.[24]

iv. Human freedom conditions the mode of man's knowledge of God

In order that human freedom be not invaded, God has

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[24] Tennant, PT, II, 148.

chosen not to reveal himself in an over-powering "beatific vision," lest such a revelation of himself be coercive. He wills rather as a condition of man's ethical freedom that man, as he must attain knowledge of any kind, come to know him as the result of pragmatic venturesomeness.

(3) God's relation to the world process

i. The transcendence of God

In conceiving the relation of God to the world deism is repudiated. God is not transcendent in the sense that a mechanism might be independent of its maker, who, after its creation withdraws to become a passive spectator of its course. Transcendence must be interpreted as the world's dependence on God's nature and will. "God is ever its ground," and the world is Actual in that it is itself free and creative.[25]

ii. The immanence of God in nature

Any view of immanence that would identify the world with God, such as is implied in the Spinozistic phrase Deus sive Natura is dismissed as empirically impossible. If we adopt a personalistic metaphysics, immanence would be regarded as the ceaseless divine activity within the world of spirits, and the laws of nature would be the orderly method of God's activity. But attractive as is this

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[25] Tennant, PT, II, 209, 213.

view "in some respects" Tennant objects that this means the direct activity of God in the world process and would set aside a "delegated autonomy" for the world. God would then be directly responsible for physical evil, implying a malevolent God. But if we conceive of physical evil as the "inevitable consequences of interaction between continuants or substance-causes," originally designed by their creator to maintain orderly realization of the highest good, the divine nature is absolved from malignant intent. On the other hand if we adopt a dualistic metaphysics, and allow that degree of relative independence of the substance-causes of which physical nature is phenomenal, immanence could then be conceived as the active guidance by a supreme Spirit of the world-elements, whether 'continuous' or 'occasional,' introducing change of direction without change in the total mass or energy involved. Even regarded miraculously, it would not contravene a general providential control to which theism is committed.[26]

Tennant holds that the doctrine of the divine immanence is not needed by his theistic argument. The beings planted out by God "are more or less perduring, and do not need continuous new outputs of divine creativity." Also the orderedness of the evolving world is sufficiently

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[26] Tennant, PT, II, 215.

accounted for by the nature and activity of its original constituents. Yet theism "has a use for the conception of immanence if not a need of it." However, it must be thought as the conserving activity of God, by rapport with or action upon its constituent elements, exercising a continual directive or creative activity to compensate for the conceivable erratic tendencies of some of its elements. Insistent on these restrictions, Tennant concludes that immanence in nature, in the sense of action upon or existence in the world cannot be included in the class of divine attributes as a reasonably grounded belief. It can only be conjectured, but cannot either be verified or disproved, and is not needed for metaphysical interpretation of facts in the theistic argument.

iii. Divine immanence in human personality

(i) Divine immanence in human personality must not be regarded as in unmoralized religion, a species of cataleptic 'possession,' nor as conceived by some of the Church Fathers, "prevenient grace." Immanence must not be conceived in any form that would supersede the person's activities or invade his freedom. It would be incompatible with the moral character of God.

(ii) Tennant finds the idea of a divine illumination, either of man's conscience or reason, as suggested

in the idea of a divine Logos, to be incompatible with human freedom. We must view the transcendent activity of God in creating persons of rational and moral status, so as to regard him as now respecting their moral dignity, the freedom of man.

> Any immediate touch or influence of God upon human souls or personalities needs to be conceived consistently with the theistic belief that the purpose of the world is ethical or includes the ethical.

Yet there well may be communication (as in the fellowship of intercession) between Him and the monads more intimate and immediate than that which subsists between human souls. Further, since man's body is 'organic to nature' it would be unduly dogmatic to deny to God, on ethical grounds the possibility of some contact with persons, that is of the sub-personal or of the sub-conscious order.[27]

5. Critical evaluation of Cosmic Teleology

(1) The "empirical argument for God" in relation to the self and the world

The theoretical axis on which the empirical argument for God turns is epistemological. There is a mutually reciprocal relation between knowledge of the three terms, the self, the world and God. Self-knowledge originates

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[27] Tennant, PT, II, 219 ff.

with the awareness of the self implicit in embodiment, and the body is 'of a piece' with the world process. Reciprocally, knowledge of the world and of God is attained interpretatively in terms of the self.

i. Both the soul and God are reflectively known

The pure ego, or soul, conceived as the owner of empirical consciousness is not known by direct acquaintance, but is mediately or reflectively inferred to account for the experience of a subject self which is presented only in the quale of the object 'me,' and also to account for the unity or "bondedness" of self-experience.[28] Likewise, God is not directly experienced, but is a teleological inference to account for the empirical cosmic data given in the theistic argument.

ii. Knowledge of other selves is a pragmatically justified teleological belief

The belief in other selves is not based on direct experience, but is teleologically mediated by a process of analogical inference. From our own self-knowledge, we interpret the bodies in our environment which behave like our own, in terms of selves, and the belief is pragmatically justified. The belief in God, too, is a teleological in-

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[28] Cf. 111, 115, 118

ference from empirical cosmic data that is pragmatically justified.

iii. The intellectual status of theistic faith is commensurate with that of science

The belief in God, like scientific knowledge is based on reasonableness and interpretation. The concepts by which science interprets the world are derived from analogy with self, and in reality, scientific knowledge is based on the teleological belief that the world is intelligible and calculable.

(2) Tennant's post-theistic appraisal of metaphysical theories implies agnosticism

On the way back from his theistic argument, Tennant surveys the metaphysical view involved in the relation of God to the world from the respective standpoints of dualism and spiritualistic pluralism. Conforming to Tennant's approach, and as a stage in our inference of Tennant's metaphysics of the self, we now consider the problem similarly from the standpoints of subjective idealism, dualism, and spiritualistic pluralism.

i. Tennant's appraisal of subjective idealism viewed in relation to theism

We first look at the problem as Tennant might, if he had included subjective idealism in his post-theistic

survey. In maintaining that the being of an object consists in its being perceived, Berkeley, the typical exponent of subjective idealism, abolished the distinction between the act of sensing and the sense datum, and regarded the latter as a modification of the subject, which was divinely caused.

But, Tennant would insist, the ultimately Real world, regardless of its metaphysical status, is first "there" to be perceived. The mind cannot "spin" the metaphysically Real world, "the whole furniture of earth," out of its own subjective states, and the sense datum is not to be identified with the subject as subjective modification. It is the outcome of subjectively unalterable fact. Sense data of the world are presented to a perceiving subject as objects, and their epistemological objectivity does not involve their metaphysical status when not presented. On his view, Berkeley could never transcend solipsism, and the strict logical implication of his subjective idealism would preclude the possibility of the theistic argument of Cosmic Teleology.[29]

Further, Tennant, who rejects occasionalism in every form, because of his view that the ultimately Real constituents of the world have "delegated spontaneity," finds unacceptable Berkeley's reference of the perception of

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[29] Tennant, PT, I, 223 f. Cf251.

metaphysical Reality to divine causation and specifically, the occasionalistic view of the divine immanence which such reference involves. Subjective idealism would deprive substance-causes of their "delegated spontaneity."

ii. Tennant's appraisal of dualism in the light of theistic requirement

Tennant's position, before reaching theism, is that on the basis of his epistemological presuppositions, there is no means of crucially deciding between dualism and spiritualistic pluralism. Spirit may well be the appearance of matter. Now regarding dualism from the standpoint of the relation of God to the world, while "a relative (as distinct from absolute) dualism scarcely becomes untenable," yet "it becomes a more obviously dispensable theory." By relative dualism, Tennant means that the immensities of the physical world are meaningless apart from their value in connection with the interaction of spirits. With reference to God, matter would also be meaningless. It would imply a defective view of creation, as though stages were needed in the creation of spiritual beings, God's final end.[30]

Coming to construe the divine immanence in nature dualistically, there is no reason why spirit cannot act on matter without violating known physical laws. But if matter

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[30] Tennant, PT, II, 215.

has no relative independence, and the apparent nexus is only divine fiat and phenomenal, there would be no _natura_, _naturata_, or _naturans_, and nature would be unpredictable. But dualism is an even more tenable view if we drop systematic occasionalism, and adopt enough transcendence in the conception of God as would allow free play of the beings, of which the physical world is phenomenal. But whether there are any inert metaphysical beings, as there are spiritual beings, empirical philosophy is not able to decide on the basis of evidence at its disposal. No crucial argument decides Tennant in favor of even relative dualism.

iii. Tennant prefers spiritualism for its many advantages

Tennant finds many advantages in spiritualistic pluralism. In the first place, he thinks that it affords a more satisfactory solution of the mind-body problem. Further, its view of natural laws as statements of the routine habits of spiritual monads is altogether reasonable and reconcilable with a theistic view of the world. Above all, spiritualistic pluralism's view of the ultimate causal efficiency of finite selves, allows for the free play and "delegated spontaneity" which the ultimately Real world is conceived to have, in order not to be inert matter, and yet distinct from God.[31]

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[31] Tennant, PT, II, 218 ff.

iv. Tennant is metaphysically agnostic

But Tennant holds that spiritualism can neither be proved nor disproved of the ultimately Real world. Epistemologically, sensa are known to have qualia and relations of their own, which the mind does not create, but are what they are by virtue of their objectivity. On the other hand, we have seen that the dualist cannot prove that matter is not appearance of spirit. Both primary and secondary qualities may be appearances of the Real world. Faced with this dilemma, Tennant implies agnosticism.

This conclusion is consistent with the earlier conclusion of ambiguity, reached from consideration of Tennant's epistemological presuppositions. In his refutation of the mind-body relation assumed by causal realism, Tennant holds that the realist cannot prove that sensa are not inseparable from the creative activity of the mind. They are the end result of a long chain of causes, and come into existence only in connection with the subject, and a psychical result is incommensurable with other known physical causes. On the other hand, he insists against subjective idealism that in the act of sensing, the Real world must first be "there" to be sensed. This double emphasis confirms the conclusion derived from his theistic argument, that Tennant is metaphysically agnostic.

(3) The conclusion of agnosticism concerning qualitative metaphysics is inharmonious with other areas of Tennant's theistic argument

i. The cosmos reasonably suggests intelligence

In every area of investigation, the empirical facts of the world, epistemological, organic, inorganic, aesthetic and moral adaptedness point convincingly to Self as the only sufficient cause. The logic of scientific knowledge impartially applied does not tolerate suggestion of the chance coincidence of inert matter to produce the kind of a world ours is. It takes intelligence to find its meaning and values. The world is organic to embodied selves. The entire theistic argument finds in intelligence its true climax.

ii. Theory of the thing in itself (substance-cause) which presupposes metaphysical agnosticism, is based on abstraction

(i) The theory of the thing in itself is based on an epistemological abstraction. It assumes as Kant did, that our knowledge is incapable of apprehending ultimate reality. Kant attributed the reason to the requirement that experience must have a sensory content. Tennant goes deeper and locates the source of his view of the relativity of knowledge, at the point of the inadequacy of the sense organs. But marvelous as it seems, even to the extent of

involving theistic explanation, as Tennant has argued, a person is adapted to knowledge of the world. This argument must be accepted at its full face value. As Pringle-Pattison has observed, the chasm which has been dug between the knower and ultimate reality is one of the philosopher's own making. It must not be allowed to mask reality from us so that we know merely dim inklings of it. In the absence of positive truth to the contrary, reality must be assumed to be of the nature of what is known. After all, we can test our hypotheses according to their coherence with the known, and to paraphrase Tennant's thought in another connection in a slightly altered form, the unknown must not be presented as argument against the possibility of knowledge. What shines through is a revelation, and it is so because "knowledge and reality are complementary elements to one system."[32]

Further, the theory of substance-cause is also based on abstraction at the point of substance. A psychological abstraction used as basis for metaphysics can only result in an inadequate metaphysical theory. Reality is not to be construed as an underlying substratum, in which either primary and secondary qualities or states of consciousness inhere. The notion of a substratum, unlike that of cause,

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[32] Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 116

is not needed to render experience coherent. Indeed, "true metaphysics has (of course) nothing to do with the futile quest after pure or abstract being."[33] To be sure, the causal agency observed in the cosmic process is not given in sense perception. This was Hume's contribution of permanent significance to the problem of causation. But, as Kant showed, persons find it necessary to affirm cause if experience is to be rendered coherent.

(iii) It is this experience of productive agency, and not of a substratum that introduces us to reality. The assimilation of the category of substance to that of cause would make this true even on the basis of Tennant's epistemology. While we have no experience of a substratum, we do experience self as active. And we can well afford to rest in the unity of self-experience as the only coherent empirical fact, and relieve ourselves of the futile quest for this abstraction of dualistic thought. For the epistemological and metaphysical reasons cited, it is maintained that the view of reality as substance-cause or thing in itself, presupposing agnosticism, is inharmonious with other areas of the theistic argument.

6. Metaphysics of the self involved in Cosmic Teleology

(1) An ambiguous position as to qualitative metaphysics is involved in Tennant's "empirical argument for God"

A mentalistic metaphysics of the self is involved in

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[33] Knudson, POP, 171.

arguments which conceive of the ultimate Reality of the world as best interpreted in terms of intelligence, purpose and value, and of God similarly on the analogy of intelligent, purposeful and ethical personality. On the other hand, since substance-cause is as near as we can determine the nature of ultimate Reality, neither spiritualism nor dualism can be proved to the exclusion of the other, and agnosticism is implied.

(2) An organic conception of the self is involved

That the world is not a chaos of disparates but a cosmos of thoroughgoing adaptedness, a coherent whole, intelligible by teleological inference of selves, presupposes the world as an organic whole, and accordingly a view of the self as a monad and an organic unity is involved.

(3) An activistic metaphysics of the self is involved

From arguments which base both his conception of the metaphysical ultimate, substance-cause and the fundamental relation of God to the world on analogy with the activity of the finite self, Tennant's Cosmic Teleology involves an activistic metaphysics of the self.

(4) Human freedom is involved

Tennant's insistence on the "delegated autonomy" of the ontal creatures, substance-causes, and that the immanence of God must not be thought in any way as to violate their

autonomy, that although God is their ground, they are none the less "planted out" separate and distinct from him, together with Tennant's repudiation of mechanistic naturalism involve the freedom of the finite self.

(5) Time and the transcendence of time are involved

In Tennant's Cosmic Teleology, his view of the organic and inorganic levels of the world's existence as historical, and his conception of the divine foreknowledge involve time. Foreknowledge involves the transcendence of time, at least by the divine Self.

(6) Immortality is involved

Consummation of the divine purpose of creating beings with moral aspirations, given the divine nature of righteousness and love, as Tennant conceives it, involves immortality.

CHAPTER VII

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF IN THE PERSONALISTIC ABSOLUTISM OF CALKINS

1. Ultimate reality is of the nature of mind

In metaphysics as in epistemology and psychology, the ultimate reality is maintained to be of the nature of mind. Before turning to exposition of her personalistic absolutism, we first examine Professor Calkins's study of the argument of Hegel's objective idealism, in order to observe those factors, consideration of which eventuate in absolute idealism. Although no attempt will be made to determine the extent of direct influence by Hegel, especially since there is also an obvious kinship to the absolute idealism of the neo-Hegelian Royce, her teacher, we note that there is a marked similarity between Professor Calkins's interpretation of the metaphysics of Hegel and her own. Of his thought she declares, "Hegel's essential argument, expressed and implied, for monistic spiritualism is profoundly significant and convincing."[1]

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[1] Calkins, PPP, 361.

(1) Hegel's objective idealism argues that reality is absolute one

i. Ultimate reality is the whole of reality

Hegel first applies the principle of the dialectic to the conception of the limitation of reality.[2] He shows that ultimate reality cannot be limited and particular and unrelated. Its self-identity implies at least its negative, and consequently its not-otherness. Sameness and otherness are two correlative aspects of an alleged particular reality. Since it is related, it could not be ultimate. Further, "to be an event or thing or self means to be causally and reciprocally related, that is, to be necessarily linked with others" by way of influence and comparison. "Cause and effect," says Hegel, "are conceived as separate existence only when we leave the causal relation out of sight." For these two reasons, then, because its self-identity implies others, and because it is dependent on them, single, but limited reality cannot be ultimate, and this conclusion holds true of both simple and complex realities that are less than complete reality. The existence of the lesser reality implies what remains. "Ultimate reality is all of reality," Das Wahre ist das Ganze," the true is the whole.

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[2] The Hegelian dialectic is the principle that in order to attain the true or whole, thought must differentiate itself into its antithesis; then returning, constitute from the differentiated opposites, a new synthesis or unity.

ii. Ultimate reality, viewed numerically, is not an organic system of separate beings

In the next step it is shown that ultimate reality is not a systematic plurality of separate beings. The dialectic of limitation has demonstrated that the particulars in such a composite would each imply others and be dependent on them. Moreover, even if these beings were organically related as a systematic unity, such an organic whole could not constitute ultimate reality, for no one of these finite beings could know that the system is complete. This denial of the conception of reality as a pluralistic organic whole is significant, because it involves the view of Leibniz, Ward and other idealistic pluralists.

iii. Ultimate reality is a self-differentiating unity

Ultimate reality, Hegel contends is the unity of individuality, whose existence is logically prior to its members, and is distinguishable though not separable from them. It is both a "totality of its particular members, and... simple, particular or exclusive individuality.[3] Again, "the One forms the presupposition of the Many; and in the thought of the One is implied that it makes itself Many.[4] Hegel asserts but does not argue that ultimate reality is an all-including Individual.[5] The argument,

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[3] Calkins, PPP, 377ff. Cf. Hegel, ENC, 185. Italics by Professor Calkins.

[4] Hegel, ENC. 185.

[5] In the absence of an adequate term for an individual that is neither a system nor as organism, the capitalized word preceded by the indefinite article, as "an Individual," is used.

however, is "perhaps implied by Hegel and certainly in accordance with the spirit of Hegel" is presented by Professor Calkins, with indebtedness to absolute idealists from Hegel to Bradley.[6]

(2) Hegel argues that ultimate reality is spirit or person

i. Ultimate reality is neither inorganic nature nor organic beings

Ultimate reality is not inanimate and non-conscious as conceived by physical scientists. Physical nature, thought to be inanimate is only a composite of related parts. As it has been already argued, a composite of particular realities lacks completeness, and their hypothetical completeness could not be known. Nor could ultimate reality be conceived as life, either of individual organisms or of the human race. For in the first place, life must mean something more than the inorganic, and biologists have not yet been able to make an unambiguous distinction between the inorganic and the organic. Some even hold that life is completely defineable in terms of physical and chemical change. Moreover, the conception of organic life as ultimate reality is contrary to the conclusion already reached that ultimate reality is an all-inclusive complete whole. Further, ultimate reality

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[6] Cf. 306.

cannot be conceived as the life of the human race. For the human race is nothing more than a plurality, "an indefinitely expanded succession of finite beings," and according to biological science, this conception of the totality of lives of the human race would only be a composite of externally related individuals, which has already been found to come short of ultimate reality. This hypothesis must therefore be abandoned.[7]

ii. Ultimate reality, viewed qualitatively, is absolute self or person

Can we regard the totality of selves in intercourse with each other, a social consciousness based on mutual understanding, sympathy, and activities of selves as a "qualitatively conscious" absolute One, which is "yet a One of Many?" Hegel tests this hypothesis by analysis of consciousness into the two fundamental aspects of knowing and willing. But each knowing self is confronted by an objective world independent of him, hence a mere knowing self could not be a self-sufficient absolute Individual. There remains the hypothesis that ultimate reality is constituted by the totality of willing selves. But will also presupposes the existence of its object and is therefore limited by reality external to itself. It could not therefore be ultimate reality. Finally, a totality of limited selves would only be the sum of the consciousness

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[7] Calkins, PPP, 382ff.

which the particular selves have of each other, and would not be a unique singular Individual which ultimate reality has been argued to be. A totality of selves would be consciousness, but only the combined experience of particular limited selves and not the whole experience of an absolute Individual self. To be ultimate it must be "absolute Idea, that is, self - the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself and is completely self identical in its otherness."[8]

iii. Ultimate reality as absolute self experiences historical development

Professor Calkins considers it beyond the scope of her work to show in detail how Hegel applies his fundamental teaching that ultimate reality is absolute self to its differentiation as Objective mind in the historical process. Only a brief statement is presented. Hegel's view is that this absolute self, timeless and inclusive of all reality, differentiates itself by progressive reconciliation of opposites in universal human history, the history of mankind being "none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom," "the progressively closer relating of selves" in ever widening groups" rather than the mere unfolding of temporal events. As the seed bears an organic relation to the plant, so in society, Objective Spirit, the active body of living individuals, becomes the source of

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[8] Calkins, PPP, 388. Cf. Hegel, ENC, 218f.

spiritual life manifested in the family, civil society and the state, which is the highest visible embodiment of the spirit of the people.[9]

2. The contemporary absolute idealist refutes realism

(1) The realist's fundamental criticism

In our exposition of her idealistic epistemological monism we noted Professor Calkins's enthusiastic endorsement of the refutation of materialism by Berkeley and Hume, and the equally warm approval of Berkeley's spiritualistic pluralism, and in this chapter her high estimate of Hegel's objective idealism.[10] Following a century in which the predominant characteristic of thought was the progress of the sciences, the twentieth century (contemporary) has produced a definitely anti-idealistic trend in philosophy. This century is one of protest, and especially characteristic of it is the protest of various realistic theories against the conception of ultimate reality as mind or spirit.

However widely they differ among themselves as to the exact qualitative nature of the real, contemporary realists hold in common the view that there is nothing distinctive in the relation of consciousness to its objects, and that

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[9] Calkins, PPP, 390. Hegel, PH, 63f. Hegel recognizes, declares Professor Calkins, that the timelessness of the absolute and the reality of temporal development present a problem, but he relinquishes neither horn of the dilemma.

[10] Cf. 280.

the world cannot be conceived exclusively in terms of consciousness. As to the precise nature of the non-mental they differ widely in conception and statement. To one it is energy; to another the "ultimate" data are "events or happenings." To the critical realists the data of perception are "essences." Only negatively are realists agreed that all these objects of knowledge are not mental.[11]

(2) The idealist's refutation of specific criticisms of realism

i. The idealist meets the criticism that idealism is incompatible with common sense and science

To the realist who appeals first to common sense, meaning popular belief, as a refutation of idealism, it must at once be urged that the philosopher does not pretend to justify his views by popular vote, but only to interpret experience, and provided that the result is a coherent account, a philosophy "should neither be justified nor discarded by the extent of its conformity with popular beliefs." As to the more serious criticism of being incompatible with science, the idealist acknowledges no obligation" to square philosophy with the progressively varying and often conflicting hypotheses of scientists," yet the idealist, too, admires the noteworthy achievements of science, and calls attention to the idealistic conception of nature, which he claims to be a coherent account

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[11] Calkins, PPP, 406ff.

of the physical universe.[12]

ii. Refutation of the criticism that idealism is epistemologically untenable

The mental nature of the object is said to be an insuperable difficulty for the idealist. Consistent idealism is said to cancel the distinction between knower and known because it is unable, on account of qualitative identity, to distinguish the numerically other. The realist's conception of an extra-mental object is held to be a necessity for epistemology.

But the idealist replies that there is no logical reason why known object as well as knowing subject should not be mental in nature. Objects that are qualitatively identical are easily distinguished numerically from each other. Not only is the orange eaten at breakfast known not to be pineapple, but it was empirically distinguished as a 'Sunkist' and not an 'Indian River' orange. Further, I readily distinguish myself from other selves. In argument my thought is not confused with that of my opponent. The same is true when I imitate my friend. I recognize his philosophic style, deem it worthy of imitation, and consciously study to improve my own by imitating it. Idealism is therefore justified in the position that objects of knowledge can be and are mental.[13]

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[12] Calkins, PPP, 416ff. Cf. 292ff.
[13] Calkins, PPP, 411, 417.

iii. Refutation of the realist's criticism that idealism is unproved assumption: idealism is based on experience

To the realist's criticism that the idealist merely assumes but does not present argument for his position, the idealist refers to the warrant of experience as proof. James Ward well expresses the fact. "Man only knows the world as it faces him and he interacts with it and he knows it only so far as he finds it intelligible."[14] The idealist claims that for thoroughgoing idealism the nature of reality is not analogically known or hypothetically inferred, but is immediately experienced. Far from assuming the mental nature of rock or axiom or law, in his awareness of it the idealist claims to have discovered it.

When on the contrary, the realist claims that he has immediately experienced extra-mental qualities of objects, he must be told that he has only confused his own reflective thought with direct observation, conceptualization with reality. He needs to distinguish between immediate experience and the reflective consciousness which attempts to explain direct experience. Argument must be based on the fact experienced, as the idealist's argument is.

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[14] Calkins, PPP, 419. Cf. Ward, RE, 28.

3. Contemporary absolute idealism is personalistic

(1) The meaning of person

i. Person and its synonym

The term 'person' and its derivatives are used without definition other than self or consciousness. Accordingly, no distinction of 'person' from self is made on the basis of distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. It is not possible on the basis of the classification of selves presented in a later paragraph to infer and assign to the 'person' a different and higher status than self.[15] The essentially social nature of the self as will appear, in metaphysics as in psychology, is fully recognized; so also is the important ethical fact of choice, struggle and achievement by the finite self. But in ethics and metaphysics, as in psychology the 'person' is the self.[16] In order to comprehend fully the relation between the two terms, the converse question must now be put, 'Is every self a 'person'? 'Are the un-communicating selves of the panpsychist, pebble and lake, also 'persons'? In the absence of data for contrary inference, on the basis of Professor Calkins's metaphysics these questions must be answered affirmatively. "Either the individual finite self or the all-including being... when it is also a mental being, is obviously a person or self."[17]

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[15] Cf. 293f.
[16] Calkins, GMG, 2ff.
[17] Calkins, PPP, 451ff.

ii. Experience of self is immediate

Consciousness of self is immediate. By immediate is meant 'given', and not requiring proof. The view that self-consciousness presupposes a high state of development results from the confusion between consciousness of self and reflective consciousness. "All consciousness is self-experience," and the assumption that consciousness of self presupposes a more advanced stage of development only arises from failure to make the distinction between consciousness of self and reflective consciousness.[18] The characteristics of consciousness, as unique, as 'included', as sensationally, affectively and relationally experienced may only be confusedly apprehended, but consciousness would not be consciousness if it were not awareness of one's self in relation to an object.[19]

(2) Contemporary absolute idealism is panpsychistic

i. Preliminary psychological possibility of panpsychism

The position of contemporary absolute idealism (personalistic absolutism) is panpsychistic. He agrees with the pluralist in asserting the existence of many reals, but maintains that they are only parts of one unique and all-including self. He therefore asserts, like the pluralistic personalist, the qualitative nature of reality as mental, but differs with him quantitatively. He holds

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[18] Brightman, POR, 350.
[19] Calkins, PPP, 428.

that the universe is "one in a sense more fundamental than that in which it is many." "The many are the expressions of the one." The entire universe, physical and social, is believed to be of the nature of consciousness. Following the thought of Leibniz, it is noted that in human consciousness there is a wide variation in degree of attention and activity. Between the lowest level of torpid and dazed consciousness, as in the moments of first awakening from sound sleep, and the level of wide awake, alert, and keenly interested consciousness, there are innumerable levels of attentiveness and activity. The entire physical and social universe is regarded as a complex of related selves. On this basis it is possible to assign a definite place to nature in the panpsychist scheme.

ii. The hypothesis of sub-human selves and their evolution from inorganic nature

From analogy with our human conscious life a consistent hypothesis is proposed, of selves whose consciousness is more inactive and more inattentive than the sleepiest human consciousness retroactively experienced. The human self may have developed from such a relatively less stable level of selfhood which constitutes the inorganic world. Corresponding to successively higher levels there could also be progressively higher orders of selves able to learn by trial and error to adjust themselves to a fixed environment, as well as the still higher orders,

distinguished by memory and anticipation, human selves.[20]

iii. Classification of selves

Assuming this hypothesis, admittedly beyond the reach of verification, on the basis of ability to communicate, selves may be classified as inter-communicating, capable of inter-personal intercourse; communicating, able to communicate but lacking the power to respond articulately; and un-communicating, the inorganic world. Although we speak metaphorically of their being communicative, the consciousness attributed to the sun, lake or sky is "in terms of the referred sense-images of the scientist."[21]

iv. The contemporary idealist's (personalistic absolutist's) conception of the human body

Since the human body must be included in an account of nature, the following account is given. (i) From the standpoint of the idealist, the body is its owner's conscious experience, mental. "Our experience of the body is the body."[22] As such it is a complex of organic sensations. (ii) The body is also a public object, an indication to other selves of my being and presence.

> My visible, tangible, and audible body is from this point of view a complex experience, shared by me with other selves who are in communication with me - an experience which suggests to them the existence and the presence of _me_, a self

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[20] Calkins, PPP, 429ff.

[21] Calkins, PPP, 432. Calkins, Art.(1919)_Phil.Rev_.28, 115-146.

[22] Cited by the author from Parker, SN, 86.

with individuality of its own.[23]

The portions of the body, like cerebrum, liver, or spleen, that are seldom if ever directly experienced, are inferred to exist to account for their occasional abnormal function, when they do become objects of direct experience. They may be conceived monadistically, following Leibniz and Ward as the signs of monads, 'subordinate' to me, the 'dominant' monad.[24]

v. The contemporary idealist's (personalistic absolutist's) conception of natural law

The view of nature held by the personalistic absolutist is that nature is not the result of some inexorably fixed mechanical force. Natural laws are conceived as generalizations based on the uniformity of antecedent and consequent observed in experience. The laws of nature are regarded as the settled modes of activity of selves, which because of uniformity of consequent and antecedent may be empirically predicted and anticipated.

4. The absolute self is an all-including self

(1) The meaning of absolute

i. Self-limited and a complete whole of ultimate reality

By absolute is meant "not un-limited, but 'self-limited', or 'unlimited' by anything external to one-self." In this respect the absolute conforms to the requirement

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[23] Calkins, PPP, 433.
[24] Calkins, PPP, 433f.

attained by application of the Hegelian dialectic to the limitation of reality. Being the whole of reality, it implies no remaining other, is complete and ultimate.

ii. An Individual

By absolute is also meant that the absolute is an Individual, "a unique individual which perceives, thinks, feels, and wills as an individual." The doctrine of the absolute self would be "a baseless pretense unless it conceives self as common sense and psychology conceives it." "Obviously, the Absolute is a persistent, unique and complex being," experiencing all consciousness, including sense experience, emotions and volition as the finite self experiences it.

> The absolutist does not deny the existence of many reals, but merely asserts that the really many things are parts of one unique and all-including being and that the universe is one in a sense more fundamental than that in which it is many.[25]

(2) The absolute self is the logical answer to specific empirical problems

Like the pluralism of Ward, the absolutism of Professor Calkins is advanced in the attempt to find an answer to empirical problems in other areas of philosophical thought. One of these is epistemological, two others are metaphysical.

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[25] Calkins, PPP, 442.

i. The problem of error

Take the phenomena of illusion and the non-veridical consciousness as examples. The person who sees the oar under water as bent is not in error; nor is the experience of an indefinite number of shapes of the dinner plates on the stage of the theater seen from the second balcony by a plurality of persons actually in error. That is the way they experience them. Multiply these examples of the non-veridical consciousness by an indefinite number of finite persons who could have the experiences, and the result is chaotic. "Only the existence of an all-knower (or absolute person) can explain the possibility of actual error," "a being who has both experiences, the 'erroneous' and the true."

ii. The problem of the transcendental or universalizing self

(i) In his doctrine of the unity of apperception Kant set forth as its three-fold characterization that it be a temporally identical, a thinking or actively categorizing self, and third, that it be a universalizing self, _Bewusstsein überhaupt_. The argument for this third characterization appears in the "Refutation of Idealism," _Critique_, B, and in the "Fourth Paralogism," _Critique_, A. In both passages Kant teaches the existence of a real permanent "thing outside me," so that "to our percepts there corresponds something real in space." "_Es correspondirt unseren_

äusseren Anschauungen etwas Wirkliches im Raume."[26] Kant teaches the existence of a "real thing outside me," and not the mere consciousness of it. Also ist die Wahrnemung dieses Behaarlichen nur durch ein Ding ausser mir und nicht die blosse Vorstellung eines Dinges ausser mir möglich."[27] This external object is not to be confused with the Ding an sich, which cannot be known. The former is known and is the idea of the transcendental self. It is therefore, not independent of some consciousness.

Kant's solution to the problem of the identity of the self to whom this object is 'given' is that it is the object of the transcendental or universal self, as distinct from the empirical self. He thus distinguishes between a greater and a lesser self, but does not complete the solution of the problem. He seems to say that any finite self, "in its universalizing consciousness... may be transcendental" and perceive objects more real than the ideal objects of the particularizing, momentary self. But Kant fails to realize the impossibility of the required conception of overlapping selves, and so bequeaths the problem to his successors for final solution.

> In a word, Kant seems to imply that the different transcendental selves overlap each other - that you, he and I, as conscious of the same object have

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26. Calkins, PPP, 231. Cf. Kant, Kr. RV, A, 375ff.
27. Kant, Kr. RV, B, 275f.

somehow a common experience.[28]

(ii) Confronted with this problem, Berkeley might have replied that this Greater self is God, whose objects are eternal things. Fichte and Hegel did answer it by teaching that the transcendental self is an absolute or all-including self, as the personalistic absolutist also maintains.

iii. The problem of solipsism

The realist claims that in idealism, the mind does not pass beyond the circle of its own ideas to apprehend objects. To the contrary, the idealist maintains that his belief in the existence of objects is verified by an appeal to reason. Consciousness never occurs in a vacuum, but is always of some object related to the self. The personalistic absolutist further holds, that his doctrine of an all-including self harmonizes his anti-solipsist conclusion with the idealistic principle, and so offers "the one escape from solipsism."[29] Two steps are involved in his conception. (i) All consciousness is maintained to be consciousness of other self. It is recognized as "the direct awareness... of something-other-than-self." Fichte termed it the not-self, and regarded both self and not-self

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[28] Calkins, PPP, 231ff. This problem hinges on Professor Calkins's interpretation of the term 'transcendental' to mean 'universal', referring it to Bewusstsein uberhaupt. Cf. Ward's interpretation of this latter term, 226f.

[29] Calkins, PPP, 413, 422ff.

as limiting each other, and as manifestations of a deeper reality, as all-embracing One.[30]

(ii) The second step is the conception of an all-including or absolute self, of which all that exists is numerically a part. "In being aware of myself I must then be directly aware of this greater self of whom I am a part." Individual finite consciousness in being involuntarily limited is "awareness of (it) self in the character of mere part of this Greater self." On the other hand, "consciousness of the more-than-myself is my awareness of partial identity with the self whose nature it is to be greater than I." In this partial identity "I know myself for what I really am." But both experiences, "that of limitation and of the greater self belong to the adequate knowledge of myself." "Any less than absolute self would know itself as limited, and thus... imply an all-including person."[31]

(3) The absolute self in relation to finite selves

i. The absolute self is the author of their existence

As to its existence, each finite self is "definitely and distinctly willed by the absolute," "a definite purpose of his." This fact, it is noted, is not an exact parallel to the empirical account of creation held by Ward and Tennant, but is comparable in being Professor Calkins's

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30. Calkins, PPP, 422, 320f.
31. Calkins, PPP, 453f.

explanation of the origin and existence of finite selves as a fulfillment of the purpose of the absolute.

> Each finite self is thus a distinct expression of the individuating emotion and will of Absolute Self; my consciousness of my uniqueness is no illusion and the ultimate reason why I am I and you are you is that each is definitely willed by the Absolute.[32]

ii. The absolute self purposes the freedom of finite selves

The quantitative relation between finite selves and the absolute is that of part to whole. Each finite experience is identical with that part of the experience of the absolute which it constitutes. To this extent the absolute self experiences all that the finite self experiences. Yet it does not follow that finite selves necessarily feel and will with the absolute. The absolute self "has thoughts that are not their thoughts," and the finite self has a measure of freedom. It is possible that the will of the finite may even be temporarily rebellious to the absolute self. Even his rebellion is due to the absolute self having purposed precisely this freedom, of which his temporary opposition is a manifestation.

It is true that the finite self is unable in the long run to be in opposition to the ultimate inclusive purpose of the absolute. The finite self is, therefore, "partially but not completely free, his opposition to the

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[32] Calkins, PPP, 471.

absolute will (is) futile," since finite freedom extends only to the specific and temporary, but not to the ultimate and inclusive purpose of the absolute. Although the absolute experiences the temporary opposition of the finite self, he is not in agreement with it and does not will it, but opposes it. The freedom of the finite self is to be regarded from the standpoint of its temporary nature as against the inclusive and complete purpose of the absolute. The temporary inharmonious and rebel purpose of the finite self, taken in isolation may be in rebellion; but taken in relation to the whole or inclusive purpose of the absolute, must be viewed in the light of "other purposes and fulfillments as balance," which as Royce expresses it, "atone for the rebellious volition and its outcome." The will of the finite self differs from the absolute as a sector from the circle of which it is part. There is qualitative identity of the sector with the circle but the circle is complete, so the absolute in completeness transcends the will of the finite by what it adds.[33]

iii. The absolute self experiences yet transcends the change experienced by finite selves

While the absolute self, unlike the finite self, "is no ultimately changing being", since that which changes is by definition incomplete, yet the absolute "shares our awareness of change while himself unchanging." He shares

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[33] Calkins, PPP, 474ff.

finite temporality but is also non-temporal. As to the conductor the melody of the whole is present in its completeness simultaneously with the succession of its separate notes, so too, the larger consciousness of non-temporality does not lose the temporal incompleteness, but gives it just as it is, its place in the completed whole.[34]

> In the experience of the finite self we have an example of the non-temporal consciousness. In our emotional experience of loving or hating we are not inevitably conscious of other selves as temporally conscious. We may at such times regard other selves as unitary and unique beings without a thought of their temporal nature.[35]

(4) The metaphysical status of finite selves

i. Excluded conceptions of the self

(i) Negatively, the self is not the soul as conceived by the entelechist. This means specifically that the self "need not be conceived as having inherently a decisive influence on phenomena." (ii) Neither is the self the unknown underlying substratum which Locke conceived as the support of ideas.

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[34] Calkins, PPP, 460f. Cf. Royce, WI, II, 141f.

[35] Calkins, PPP, 461. For psychological discussion of the non-temporal self, cf. 187, 193.

ii. The positive conception of the self

The self has a definite metaphysical status. It is a relatively persisting, yet changing, unique, complex, related being. The persistence or continuance of the self means that in all the changes which accompany bodily growth, the self retains its identity. This may mean immortality, but need not do so. The uniqueness of the self is its peculiar individuality. No other self is numerically or qualitatively identical with it. It is a monad in the primary sense of the term. This individuality is a consequence of its having been constituted by an utterly unique purpose of the absolute self. Each is an individual distinguished though not separate from the absolute... and the consciousness of individuality "is no illusion."[36]

iii. The finite selves comprise an organically related community

According to the conception of the including self, the included selves are organically related to each other, and reflectively aware of other self not only as single individuals but as a related society. Cooperative purpose is achieved, for each self unites with other selves "to express the complete will of the absolute self." "The One Will of the Absolute is organically composed of many... because in such variety of ideals there is greater significance", and the individual selves

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[36] Calkins, PPP, 427ff.

are conceived as being in a measure free in respect to one another."[37]

iv. The immortality of the finite self

(i) Since we know of no disembodied selves, and experience of the finite self involves a body which in course of change comes to dissolution, what bearing has this fact on the problem of immortality? It will be recalled that a body has been regarded as only a public sign to other selves of one's existence and presence. For this reason the absolute, having no need of it, has been conceived as without a body. The removal of a finite body may mean only the removal of a familiar sign from the community of selves. (ii) Of greater significance idealism offers ground for hope in the possibility of immortality. At this point Professor Calkins cites J. M. E. McTaggart, who declares

> It does not follow because a self which has a body cannot get its data except in connection with that body, that it would be impossible for a self without a body to get data in some other way... If a man is shut up in a house, the transparency of the windows is an essential condition of his seeing the sky. But it would not be prudent to infer that if he walked out of the house he could not see the sky because there was no longer any glass through which to see it.[38]

Further, the personal form of idealism which holds that ultimate reality is not merely mental but also personal,

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[37] Calkins, PPP, 467, 473ff.

[38] Calkins, PPP, 456. Cf. McTaggart, SDR, 105.

non-atomistic and indivisible, argues strongly for immortality for pluralist and singularist alike. (iii) Personalistic absolutism adds the argument from the moral consciousness. Many pluralists think that the conception of an included self deprives finite selves of individuality. The pluralist considers them only illusions of personality, hence finite selves cannot be immortal. On the contrary, the personalistic absolutist argues that the absolute might express himself in "temporally endless" as well as "temporally limited" forms, and though a man may not directly realize himself as immortal, he is conscious of himself as possessed of specific and unique duties. "It is the nature of duty to be endless." Finite selves are "persons with ever-widening duties to which no time limit can be set." The personalistic absolutist therefore on this basis also holds to the immortality of the moral self.[39]

(5) The absolute self, an Individual, is a relating whole of its included parts.

i. Selves are organically related parts of the absolute

In discussing the relation of the absolute to finite selves, they have been argued to be "identical parts of the absolute, and in the argument for the metaphysical status of finite selves, it is shown that they constitute

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[39] Calkins, PPP, 479ff.

"an organically related system." In order to determine the nature of this relation, because it is a basic and vital concept in Professor Calkins' system, and said to be implied by Hegel, we turn to investigate the nature of relations as interpreted by her.

ii. Relation is impossible on the basis of pluralistic theories of relation

(i) The internal theory of relations holds that relation is a quality inhering in one or other or both of the terms related. But if relation is a quality of either or both of the terms, it becomes a part of them, and in the absence of a relating tertium quid, leaves them as they were, unrelated. (ii) Opposed to this theory is that of external relations held by Perry and other neo-realists. Relation is said to be effected between neutral entities, independent of and external to each other, as when brain comes into a certain spatio-temporal relation with an object, such as a chemical formula, and is thereby known. But waiving, without acceptance, the neo-realist's metaphysics and dealing only with the problem of external relations of the terms involved, Professor Calkins observes that independent externality and mutual relatedness are incompatible and contradictory. If the possibility of knowledge depended on an external relation between brain and object, to know the chemical formula would be impossible, for the

external relation independent of brain and object could never connect the two. An alleged relation external to both brain and object would be a tertium quid, a new reality, which would in turn require relating, and so on ad infinitum. The theory of external, like that of internal relation, must therefore be rejected.[40]

iii. The fundamental relation is 'including' and 'being included'

The many related terms or selves are all parts of one unique all-including Individual self, and "are at the bottom one in a more fundamental sense than many."[41] "The fundamental and primary "relations" are thus the character of including and being included. The related terms are not independent of each other but "really parts of a whole, and related only by virtue of being included in it."

> The very nature of personality as a concrete including whole may be cited as an illustration of this 'including' and 'included' relation. It is at once a unity of many divergent points of view, of fears and sympathies, of past, present and future - all held together in a single unity of an including being... These relations are ultimately the unifying processes, or functions of a Being which includes all the lesser wholes. This conception of relation being granted, there is no checking the sweep of the argument to the all-including being.[42]

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[40] Calkins, PPP, 442ff. Cf. Bradley, AR, 32. Dependence of the argument for relations on nineteenth century absolutists from Hegel to Bradley is acknowledged.

[41] Italics are the author's.

[42] Calkins, PPP, 448.

(6) Goodness is an attribute of the absolute self

i. The good is the inclusive purpose

The theist is interested in the ethical aspects of the absolute self. "The fully personalistic absolutist seems constrained to attribute goodness to the Absolute Self." By 'good' is meant in the Aristotelian sense, the self-explanatory object of will, "that which is willed for itself and for the sake of everything else that is willed", a value, at once intrinsic and instrumental. "The self-explanatory purpose, hence the absolute must be all-embracing and complete."

ii. Physical and moral evil have disciplinary value

The initial difficulty of the theist who objects that perfect goodness is contradictory to the crucial problem of physical and moral evil and error arises from his conception of God as both omnipotent and good. But the brute facts of experience cannot be ignored. There is, to be sure, the disciplinary value in suffering nobly borne, and in the achievement that comes as the result of struggle. What are in themselves evil "are yet essentially elements in lives which are heroically good.[43]

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[43] Calkins, PPP, 461f. Cf. Calkins, GMG, 32ff.

iii. Evil is both shared and transcended by the absolute

(i) Even granted the disciplinary value of physical and moral evil, there are "the griefs which narrow and belittle the mind" and other evils, which it is impossible to treat as subordinated elements of widened and strengthened lives. (ii) But in the absolute evil and error are both shared and transcended. "In a real sense he shares our shame, is afflicted in our afflictions, knows our grief." "But it is not conceivable that a self whose will constitutes reality should choose evil for himself if that evil be positive and unsubordinated." His goodness is "not by virtue of the human volitions included in him, but by virtue of the goodness of his whole, his completed purpose."[44]

(iii) Accordingly, "he conceives each purpose which is in itself a sinful purpose" atoned for "by a later choice of the repentant sinner" or by another choice of some other conscious self - so that the two, "the sinful will and the "atoning" will constitute a whole which is rightly described as good."[45]

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[44] Calkins, PPP, 463f.
[45] Calkins, PPP, 461ff.

(7) The absolute is not identical with God

i. Royce identified the absolute with God

The terms God and the absolute have been used interchangeably by Royce, who believes them to be the outcome of reflective philosophy. Royce means primarily that God is the object of religious experience, the personal object of human devotion and worship.

ii. Reasons which forbid the identification

This respect is one of the few in which Professor Calkins diverges from Royce, and she states definite reasons. (i) The absolute is an epistemological object, and need not be the object of emotional experience. (ii) Conversely, the object of religious experience need not be conceived as absolute. The worshipper may indeed so regard him, but there is an increasing tendency on the part of contemporary philosophers to regard God as finite, just because he is above everything else a personality. To the personalistic absolutist "God and the Absolute are not synonymous."[46]

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[46] Calkins, PPP, 465f. Cf. Royce, CG, 45ff.

5. Critical evaluation of the personalistic absolutism of Calkins

(1) Idealism is the starting point of personalistic absolutism

i. Consciousness is fundamental

Personalistic absolutism takes its rise from the sure foundation of experience. Consciousness is primary and fundamental. This idealism is personal. It is not to be confused with soul-substance nor the unknown substance for the inherence of conscious states, nor even a vaguely implied 'core' of being. It is the living whole of conscious experience, all its parts and states constituting the unity of consciousness.

ii. Consciousness is a unity

This investigator would emphasize this aspect of the argument, the unity of consciousness, from which personalistic absolutism takes its rise as opposed to the Tennant-Wardian view which makes an ultimate distinction between pure ego and empirical ego, and the Tennant-Wardian (rev) psychology which regards the pure ego or soul as a substratum bond for consciousness. Professor Calkins holds, this investigator believes rightly, that the unity of consciousness is the only fact of which experience warrants assertion.

(2) Consistent idealism is not necessarily solipsistic

Professor Calkins is in error in allowing the realist's claim that a consistent idealism necessarily issues in solipsism, from which personalistic absolutism is needed to "rescue" idealism.

1. Immediate experience is of the datum self

It is true that we do have an immediate experience of self. But of what is this immediate awareness? Introspection reveals the sensory consciousness of a book lying open on my desk. I remember that I brought it from the Boston Public Library some days ago, that it was recommended for reading in a class in "Metaphysics", that I have used it previously. Moreover, I plan to refer to it in the chapter which I am now writing. Memory linkages referring to the past called up the presence of this book, and, vice versa, the book calls to mind experiences of recent months, and both unite with my purpose for the immediate future. These past memories and future anticipations were not part of my immediate experience at the beginning of this page; but because they have come to immediate consciousness as memory linkages with the past, and also now have a complex future reference, I speak of them as aspects of my whole self, and I am now conscious of myself as related to the book. All this Professor Calkins would allow.

Now attention shifts to another book of which I have had less experience, with its different linkages of summer residence and different library and due date. I am conscious, too, of myself as related to this second book, for use in another connection. I speak of my consciousness of these different books, each having its distinct meaning and the self to which they are related, as my datum-self, signifying (i) that the self is given in the experience of the books, my objects, and (ii) that it is 'given' as related to these books, which have definite meaning for me.

ii. The datum self and its object are transcendent

My 'meaning' in both instances is not to be identified with the sense perception of the books (which is not at any time a confused whole) but transcends perception, and points to that to which I refer or 'intend' as the 'meaning' of the perception, namely the books and their associations for me, the self to which they are related.

iii. Idealism, joined to epistemological dualism is not solipsistic

Summarizing briefly, my act of knowing involves three entities, a self and two books which transcend immediate consciousness, the objects of my reference, and idealism with epistemological dualism is not solipsistic.[47]

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[47] Brightman, POI, 14ff; Pratt, in ECR, 85ff.

(3) Comparison of the panpsychism of Ward and Calkins

Having found Professor Calkins to be, like Ward, a panpsychist, we now make a comparison of their views, and especially because of their difference in conception of the quantitative nature of reality, and their philosophical kinship to Leibniz.

i. Their agreements with Leibniz and with each other

(i) Because Leibniz is the first philosopher to develop panpsychism systematically, and because both Ward and Calkins refer to him as their panpsychist authority, we note first their agreements with Leibniz and with each other. Like Ward, Professor Calkins accepts the Leibnizian view of the complete psychical nature of reality. They also agree with Leibniz in recognizing degrees of consciousness as implying levels of self-hood in a descending order from human selves to the slumbering selves of the inorganic world. Like Leibniz, they both exclude memory from their conception of these selves of the inorganic world and the lower levels of self that do not learn by experience. The selves of the inorganic world are barely conscious, simple unremembering selves of a moment.

(ii) From their basic agreement as to the mental quality of the inorganic world follows the common qualitative view of Ward and Calkins regarding nature, and the human body. Nature is not, as the physicist claims, inorganic matter. The human body, regarded *en bloc*, is the immediate experience and also the public object of its owner, and a public object to other selves in the environment, a sign of the presence of a self. The inferred portions of the body are conceived monadistically as signs to the dominant self of subordinate communicating selves.

ii. Differences of Ward and Calkins from Leibniz and from each other

(i) We note first the harmony that exists between certain views of Ward and Calkins in their divergence from the Leibnizian attempt to reconcile mechanism and teleology in the conception of nature. Leibniz referred the forces observed in nature to the mechanistic principle, while the system as a whole was regarded teleologically as the divine purpose actively realizing its ends in phenomenal form. Ward and Calkins present a common front as against Leibniz. They regard natural law as statements of the routine activity of finite selves. Because of the uniformity of antecedent and consequent, natural laws are predictable within limits. The teleological reference is to the finite self rather than to preestablished harmony effected by God.

(ii) The basic cause of the difference in the panpsychism of Ward and Calkins is the difference in quantitative metaphysics, pluralist versus singularist. This difference shows itself particularly in the relation between the selves. While Professor Calkins grants the existence of a plurality of selves, they are conceived as included in an absolute self. A complete account of the relation of the finite included selves to the absolute is given earlier in this chapter. It will be recalled that Ward, rejecting the Leibnizian doctrine of preestablished harmony, conceived of finite selves as having 'windows', unlike those of Leibniz, for interaction between themselves and with God. Professor Calkins's selves also have 'windows' for communication with each other. They are related to each other as different parts of the absolute, with whom they are qualitatively identical. Their windows are also open to the absolute. The experience of the absolute includes that of each finite self. But the finite self's direct experience of the absolute is only of that part of the absolute with which his experience is identical. His direct experience of the absolute is therefore partial. The freedom of the finite self is also partial in Professor Calkins's conception. It is not, as Ward holds, derived primarily from experience of activity of the finite self. She does regard freedom as directly experienced, but it consists in being primarily a purpose

of the absolute, and is partial only in the sense that a sector is part of a circle. It is qualitatively the same, but while the circle is complete, the sector is partial.

(4) When not occasionalistic, pluralistic or singularistic idealism implies panpsychism

i. Criticism of the method of occasionalism

In its method of conceiving the universe as ultimately real only in relation to mind, the idealist, pluralist or singularist, has two alternatives, personalistic and panpsychistic. The one is held by the personalist, who regards the universe as the product of the systematic and orderly activity of God in the world. The superior advantage of his conception is that it explains the scientific thought of the universe discovered by observation that phenomenal reality is of the nature of activity. The personalist distinguishes between phenomenal nature and ontologically real agency, and refers the reality of this activity to divine causation. The personalist is thus able to give a coherent account of physical nature.

What are the objections to this view? Tennant interposes two objections. He states that removal of 'delegated autonomy' from the substance-causes, and referring causal agency to God makes him directly responsible for physical evil and implies his malignancy. It should be recalled that the problem of evil, not in the direct range of this investigation is a problem for any metaphysical theory,

and that that problem ought not to be aggravated and emphasized by starting out with the initial handicap of such pre-conceived notions of God, as his absolute omnipotence, later to attribute evil, physical or moral, to malignancy. It may even be that the respect in which God lacks omnipotence cannot be fully comprehended by the concept of 'self-limitation'. The freedom of finite beings and the recalcitrancy of the material with which he must work may be other factors. We can well afford not to relinquish the ethical attributes of goodness and love, but rather assign the acuteness of the problem of evil to such other factors as cited, and go deeper for its solution.

Tennant finds a second objection in the possibility that the regularities of nature, when causal nexus is referred to divine volitional fiat, are more precariously reposed than in the natura naturata conceived as the fixed habits of finite beings.[48] This investigator holds that the superior intelligence, goodness and constancy of the supreme being, here presupposed as minimum essential of God's character, empirically based on his activities in creation, afford far more secure ground for uniformity than the fixed or habitual activity of finite beings. For the personalistic theist, the explanation of the reality of activity must be ultimately referred to divine agency, whether direct or through the mediation of creatures in an

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[48] Tennant, PT, II, 215. Tennant argues this as a possible objection when immanence is conceived dualistically.

epigenetic process.

ii. Panpsychism is criticized

(i) It is important to distinguish panpsychism from its ancient and modern counterparts of hylozoism. The ancient Milesians of the sixth century B. C., probably taking over current or earlier animistic speculations about nature regarded matter as possessed of life and activity. In the eighteenth century, the French 'ideologists', probably influenced by the thought of Leibniz, regarded every particle of matter as possessed of mentality. But the hylozoists were hardly more than superstitious speculators, while the panpsychist originates his hypothesis with consciousness, and is throughout empirical in method.

(ii) Panpsychism offers a consistent hypothesis, which Professor Calkins admits to be beyond reach of verification, but of which a contemporary writer says in reference to that of Ward, "panpsychism in considering the conative activities of lower types of mental organization does make organic life more intelligible.[49] The evolutionary development of structure and function in plants and animals are correlated with their activities. Reasonable analogy of these activities of bodies in our environment suggest interpretation of them as indicating the existence of selves. (iii) But panpsychism, too, involves

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[49] Bertocci, EAG, 124.

such a problem as Ward found at the point of "awakening the slumbering monad." The development of the organic from the inorganic is not a problem peculiar to panpsychism. The scientist has not yet been able to bridge the gap, and perhaps the problem for the philosopher must await the time when the scientist is better able to distinguish between the two. Until then, solution must be regarded as beyond the reach of an empirical philosopher. As Tennant remarks in another connection, "Some ultimates unanalyzable and inexplicable there must be."

(5) The conception of the absolute self as all-including is contradictory

i. All-inclusion and monadicity are mutually exclusive and logically contradictory terms

If the absolute is a self it could not include all, even if that all is regarded as consciousness. If it were possible to unite the consciousness of Tom, Dick and Harry, we should then, nevertheless, have to do with three separate unities, each private and peculiar to himself, even though transcended in social intercourse. Professor Calkins attributes this individuality to the fact that each is constituted by an "utterly unique purpose of the absolute."

To conceive of them now as 'included' in a one, "an Individual", is to be logically contradictory. A monad which 'includes' individuals is a contradiction in terms. Whenever a one makes itself many, yet remains numerically

one, the new individuals maintain separate and organically unrelated existence. This occurs when the paramecium reproduces by division. The process is one of life, growth, and consequently time. The absolute is static and non-temporal. He is comparable rather to a mathematical integer, which, when divided, is no longer a whole number. If viewed in relation to the integer, it is now only a fractional part. To be regarded as a new individual involves consideration out of relation to the whole number. A plurality of individuals in individuality is an error. They may be a whole of experiences, but cannot be a whole experience. The analogy of the finite self is misleading. In her address as president of the American Philosophical Society, Professor Calkins says "he the personalistic absolutist) must mean by self a being essentially similar, in its nature, to himself."[50] In the case of the finite self, we are dealing with its various aspects, perceptions, emotions, volitions, etc. only analytically separable, hence regarded as the concrete unity they are. In the case of the all-including self we have to do with individual selves, which have existence-for-self, yet they are conceived to be 'included.' The finite self, to be sure, is a unitas multiplex, and to that extent, as Professor Calkins indicates, a complex being. But there is a vast difference between a complex being, you, I, or any self,

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[50] Phil. Review, 28, (1919) 115-146.

and a complex of selves in the sense of a plurality. The various aspects of the finite self, being temporal, can at best be conceived as in entire agreement with the absolute (non-temporal). Then the temporal could be thought as being "at one" with the non-temporal, which involves a figurative use of "one". But it could not mean one-ness in the sense of identity with him. The truth cannot be both monadism and 'all-inclusion.' The two conceptions are mutually exclusive.

ii. The concept of monadism and that of 'identical partialness' of absolute self are mutually contradictory

There is a logical contradiction involving another aspect of the problem first noted. The conception of a monad is that of a strict (numerical) unity. The finite self is such a concrete whole of consciousness, the unity of experience. As such it is a true monad. Our warrant for this is properly asserted to be direct experience. The absolute is said to be likewise a monad, "an Individual." But is it? We shall see. The direct experience of the absolute on which the view is claimed is that of limitation, or "being thwarted." This experience is then interpreted, with Fichte, as the existence of other self, other included self, "quantitatively" a part of the absolute.

The criticism is here alleged that the utmost that can be claimed for the experience of "being thwarted" is

what Fichte claimed for it, the existence of not-self, or under a panpsychist view, of other self. On epistemological grounds, the not-self is allowed to be only indirect knowledge. That this other self is a part of an including self is, on the basis of the theory itself, not direct experience, but clearly only inference.[51] Returning now to the original problem, if the absolute self can be so differentiated that its separate parts become separate individuals, each constituted by an "utterly unique purpose of the absolute", then together they are inescapably a plurality. The totality fails to constitute "an Individual", a true monadic unity. Individuality or monadicity and to be "identically the same as part of him" (the absolute) are clearly a logical contradiction. It is equivalent to asserting that a concrete whole is only a part, or vice versa, that a part is a concrete whole.

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[51] Cf. 91. Calkins, Art. (1919) in Phil. Review, 28, 115-146. Note that in her presidential address, cited above, the experience of being limited (by not-self) is held to be a direct experience, "as Fichte long ago suggested." Our criticism is based on exposition of The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, (rev. 1925) because its view is internally consistent with her absolutist metaphysics, in which experience of other selves, being of other parts of the absolute, is only inferred.

(6) Absolutism and personality are inharmonious and incompatible

i. Evident in the view of an 'including' self as eternal

The absolute self is said to be "no ultimately changing being." He may "share our awareness of change while himself unchanging." The self is capable of having remarkable experiences, but none so miraculous and impossible as this. The conception is inherently contradictory. If eternal as characterizing the absolute be regarded as non-temporal, then development is impossible. Being already complete, even immortality would avail nothing for progress.

But if the absolute 'includes' finite selves for whom time is a reality, and it is implied, that his existence, though prior, is involved in theirs, then experience or awareness of their change must at least be equally real. In this case he inevitably comes within the limits of finite change and development, or else change is for him but an illusion. To say that the absolute transcends change is only to admit, by use of another word, the fact that time being real, "marches on," and development is the order of the finite world. Even so astute a philosopher as Hegel, as Professor Calkins points out, leaves

us with "apparent difficulty" in the reality of temporal development and the alleged eternity of the absolute. Eternalism and temporality are mutually exclusive predicates.

ii. Absolutism and personality are incompatible

A second instance when the concept of absolutism joined to that of personality proves inharmonious and incompatible is in the failure to define or imply 'personality' as of a higher metaphysical status than 'self.' Attention has been directed to the serious omission in lack of definition of personality, or even presentation of data whereby a higher status for 'personality' than 'self' could be implied, and that the only possible conclusion is that any self is a person.

This view, however, not only depreciates personality, but fails to account for facts that are the inalienable possession of a normal self, its rational yet incomplete nature, and its essentially social nature. In the failure to apply seriously the Hegelian argument for limitation of the finite self to its temporal aspect, the absolutist fails to recognize the incompleteness of the immediate experience of a finite self. "The present moment of any mind seems to be a poverty-stricken experience."[52] That moment may refer to experience of its residual past

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[52] Brightman, POI, 20.

brought forward by memory, for time is an unfailing bookkeeper; but that moment has also the consciousness of incompleteness and insufficiency which holds promise and potentiality for the future, a restlessness and urge which psychologists and theologians have not failed to recognize. Thought is found to have certain immanent principles which drive the self on to fulfillment. Its desires transcend the fleeting moment. There are discoveries to be made, new experiences to be gained, coherence between old and new to be attained in the light of experience as a whole.

One of these discoveries is the existence of other selves, a hypothesis which is found to be amply justified. In the resulting social life, the 'poverty-stricken' and incomplete self becomes enriched, enhanced by social acquisitions. He comes to adopt a new standpoint. As Tennant aptly expresses it, "baptized into the over-individual, he becomes a new creature to whom all things are new." Growth in value-consciousness now proceeds from a new level of self-hood. In self-achievement progress is infinite, duty confronts with an endless task. For both he can well use an immortality. To fail to recognize this new creation is to fail to appreciate fully the rational nature of the self, the function of ideals and the significance of society for the growth of personality. A person is a

growing being, an absolute exists only in static perfection. The two conceptions are incompatible.

(7) Argument characterizing the absolute as perfect, complete and non-temporal does not involve a mental being

i. The absolute being is perfect and complete

By definition the absolute is perfect. Ontologically and ethically, the absolute, being out of relation except that of 'including' is not limited by the finite selves. His existence is prior to theirs, and is in no way conditioned by them. Ethically, too, the absolute is perfect. His will is the all-embracing purpose that is free from desire and struggle. His goodness, not a consequence of the human volitions included in him, is the result of his own eternally good purpose. This perfection therefore makes for completeness.

ii. An absolutely perfect and complete being can have no purpose

An absolute being has already realized his purposes. It is said, of course, that his activity consists in 'positing' or manifesting his will in bringing finite selves into existence. But this purposeful activity is inconsistent with a self-existent complete being. Completeness implies lack of striving, which is determined by satiety. He therefore has no ends to be realized, no

values to be achieved. In keeping with Royce, the absolute is maintained to be purposive, but it has not been shown how a being already complete can experience further self-realization.

iii. Development and time are cancelled or become illusory

For a being already complete, to speak of his "sharing" the experience of change is to represent an illusion. His perfection is not the result of initial fragmentariness and inadequacy. Struggle and attainment have no meaning for him. His goodness, like his existence is an eternal experience. For such a static being, the time-process has no meaning. Yesterday, today and forever are equally illusions, and non-temporality in this sense is well asserted, even though it too is meaningless, for we know of no non-temporal experience.

iv. The argument does not involve mentalism

In spite of what has been said by our philosopher in arguing his consciousness, such a being cannot be a self, for all experience is process. The very essence of consciousness is change, and in an absolute where there is no development from moment to moment, process is precluded, hence consciousness. Indeed to carry absolutism to its implied limit, it becomes a metaphysics that equals Spinoza's mechanistic view of Substance, and nature may be

conceived as rigorous a mechanistic system as the naturalist conceives it. To term this being self is to apply a predicate that is a misnomer.

(8) Argument for metaphysics of the finite self may be taken independent of the conception of the absolute

i. The finite self is empirically a true monad

Taken in independence of the absolute, the finite self in unequivocally a conscious being. Although conceived to be 'included' in the absolute, each finite self has a determinate metaphysical status of its own. It is a "relatively persisting, yet changing, unique, complex related being." Further, the classification of selves following the thought of Leibniz, is based on degree of conscious attention and activity, both essential traits of consciousness. The uniqueness of the self refers to the individuality, according to which it is qualitatively and numerically a monad. Its complex, yet related being implies an organic view of the self. It is a person.

ii. An argument for separate,but related, existence is inferred from illustration

Since the ultimate metaphysical status of the finite self must be inferred in the light of its dependence on or independence of the absolute self, this investigator has fully explored possibilities of the argument for regarding the finite self in independence of the absolutist

system as a whole. The following consideration would argue for an independent existence of finite selves. In order to illustrate the relation of the absolute to finite selves, the figure of "sharing yet transcending" an experience is advanced by Professor Calkins. The absolute "shares," yet "transcends," finite experience of change, evil, and error. If sharing be interpreted as in perception, it is an experience in which separate and distinct individuals may, in relation to each other, share a symphony. Nevertheless, each preserves his own distinct individuality separate from the others, and is free to come or go at will. So conversely, finite selves may be regarded as sharing experiences of the absolute in independence of him, but related to him, while he transcends their experience.

iii. A direct argument for separate existence

Of greater weight is the evidence that finite selves are conceived as "possessing a measure of freedom," especially to the extent that each can obey the inner call to duty. Each can temporarily be in opposition to the will of the absolute. They are also free "with respect one to another." Since Professor Calkins holds that complete freedom is not an experience of the finite self, the measure of freedom which they possess may be held to imply separate existence, although for at least the ultim-

ate origin of that existence they depend on the absolute.

(9) Possibilities of deducing a metaphysics of the self from the absolutism of Calkins

i. Inference will be based on parallel views of finite and absolute self

The system of personalistic absolutism is advanced as a metaphysical doctrine of self. Since our investigation has not been restricted to any particular level of self, the metaphysics involved in Professor Calkins's argument will be separately based on parallel views of the finite and absolute self. Critical evaluation has regarded these views as widely discrepant. The finite self is a monad in the sense of consciousness and individuality. On the other hand, the absolute self we hold to be neither a true individual nor mental in nature, but lacking in the basic essential characteristics of mind, temporality, process and purpose. Our procedure is believed warranted on the basis of the degree of freedom indicated in critical comment.

ii. Relation of the problem to Hegel's thought

In an effort to locate the source of the contradictions criticized, this investigator concludes that the particular use of the Hegelian dialectic of limitation, in which it is joined to his conception that ultimate reality is an Individual, proves a source of difficulty. Hegel did apply

the dialectic of limitation to limited reality (which Professor Calkins implies to be finite selves), to show that limited reality cannot be ultimate, since "the true is the whole." Another interpretation of Hegel's logical organicism applies it more coherently. Experience finds consciousness to be a self-identical unity in multiplicity, and the pluralistic personalist refers to Hegel's logical organicism this organic whole of its related parts. On the contrary, it is only because of an unempirical point of view and forced interpretation that we can conceive of a system of organically related selves as "an Individual." The self is an experienced unity, the complex of selves a logical unity. We can, of course, have principles common to all selves, or what Ward refers to less adequately as "consciousness in general," when through social intercourse selves transcend the narrow confines of individuality and attain a common viewpoint. But this unity is empirically founded on social intercourse, and must be thought.

(10) Personalistic absolutism in relation to theism

i. Professor Calkins does not identify her conception of the absolute with God

It is noted that Professor Calkins has refused to identify her conception of the absolute with God. She rightly believes that the absolute is strictly a philosophical conception, while the God of theism is an object

of religious devotion and worship. Conversely, the object of religious worship need not be thought as absolute. Although many theists so regard him, there is a growing tendency in literature and philosophy to conceive of him as limited. Strict conformity of exposition to this viewpoint would preclude any attempt to relate the absolute of her philosophical thought to God.

ii. A personalistic appraisal in the light of theism

However, internal consistency with our treatment of the theism of Ward and Tennant in relation to metaphysics of the self requires that we similarly include the metaphysical thought of the third member of our triad in respect of its relation to theism. We note, briefly, certain similarities between Professor Calkins's intended conception of the absolute and the God of theism, and also the points at which our critical comment has held the argument for her conception to have failed. It is quite clear that Professor Calkins has intended to think of the absolute as a person. She conceives it on the analogy of the finite self, as a concrete unity of thought feeling and volition. This is the theist's basic thought of God. But we have held that process, time, and purpose are inseparable aspects of personality. The absolute is conceived as non-temporal or eternal, hence lacking in process and time. Such a being, we have held, is not a per-

son.

The absolute, as intended by Professor Calkins, is a purposive being, whose primary purpose is asserted to be realized in constituting unique finite selves. This activity would be the absolutist's counterpart of the theist's doctrine of creation. It would then bespeak a being of intelligence, capable of experiencing value. But again, purpose cannot be thought apart from process and time. Finally, a similar observation is made of the ethical aspect of goodness, intended in Professor Calkins's conception of the absolute, but not attained in argument. A static and eternally complete individual cannot be a good person in the sense that the theist uses that term. We conclude that the absolute of Professor Calkins's metaphysics is not analogous to the theist's conception of God, and for this reason concur in her refusal to identify them.

5. The metaphysics of the self involved in Calkins's personalistic absolutism

(1) Inferences of the argument for the finite self

i. The argument for the finite self involves mentalism

In Professor Calkins's metaphysics, the finite self is conceived as separate from, yet related to the absolute. Her acceptance of Hegel's objective idealism and advocacy of panpsychism based on the thought of Leibniz, regard

consciousness as the foundation-fact of reality. A mentalistic metaphysics of the self is therefore unequivocally involved.

ii. Monadism is involved

The unique purpose by which the finite self is constituted, its exclusive psychological particularity, and its personal ethical task and destiny are the arguments in Professor Calkins's view of the finite self which involve monadism.

iii. The finite self involved is an organic whole

Hegel's logical organicism is fully accepted by Professor Calkins and applied to the finite self. It is a concrete whole, a systematic unity of complex aspects, hence a person. The view is organic.

iv. Professor Calkins attains an activistic metaphysics in the conception of the finite self

Attention and activity are the two characteristics by which the higher levels of finite self are differentiated from inorganic selves. The human self is conceived as ethically free, and Professor Calkins's argument for the finite self involves an activistic metaphysics.

v. The argument involves only limited freedom of the finite self

Professor Calkins's argument involves only limited freedom of the finite self. It is free with respect to other selves, and can endlessly fulfill its duty. It may

even be in temporary rebellion to the will of the absolute, but measured by the complete purpose and will of the absolute, its rebellion can only be temporary. Because contrary choice is thus limited, only limited freedom is involved.

vi. Immortality of the finite self is involved

The non-atomistic and personal conception of the self, the phenomenal view of the body as primarily a visible sign of self, and the endlessness of duty implied by the moral consciousness are argued by Professor Calkins, and involve immortality of the finite self.

(2) Inferences from the argument for the absolute self are ambiguous

i. The qualitative metaphysics of the absolute self involved is ambiguous

The qualitative metaphysics involved in Professor Calkins's conception of the absolute self is ambiguous. While the absolute is conceived on the empirical analogy of the finite self, it is also regarded as non-temporal, eternal, and complete. Our position is that process and and time are inseparable essentials of mind, hence the conception of the absolute does not involve mentalism.

ii. The conception of the absolute self as a monad is ambiguous

The absolute has been argued by Professor Calkins to be an "Individual" as psychology conceives that term. But he is also conceived as an 'all-including' self, maintained to include all other individual selves as parts of himself. This argument has been regarded as contradictory, because a monad cannot be constituted by a plurality of individuals. As to monadism, the metaphysics of the self in the conception of the absolute is ambiguous.

iii. An organic view of absolute self cannot be inferred

Professor Calkins argues,on the basis of a theory of relations as 'included' and 'including,' that the finite selves constitute a systematic unity. The conception has been found contradictory because the organically related system of selves may be a whole of experiences but not a whole experience, and is therefore not a monadic individual. An organic view of absolute self is not involved.

iv. Activism, though asserted of the absolute self, is not attained

The activity of Professor Calkins's conception of the absolute self is argued to consist in expressing his will in constituting finite selves. She fails to show in argument how a being, devoid of the inseparable essentials of

mind, time, process, and purpose can be active. Activism is therefore not involved in her metaphysics of absolute self.

v. Freedom is not involved in the argument for absolute self

The self-expression of the absolute in constituting unique individuals is intended to imply his freedom. But freedom thus to choose is a metaphysical trait of mind. The absolute, being non-temporal, has been shown to lack process and time, without which mind cannot be conceived. Lack of purpose also follows eternal completeness, and a static being cannot be a free self. The conception of the absolute does not involve metaphysical freedom.

vi. Immortality is not involved in argument for the absolute

Eternal, which Professor Calkins defines as non-temporal, is more adequately defined as meaning "at all times." We have held that it takes real temporal process to make the eternal, in the sense of immortality, meaningful. For an absolute being without time and process, immortality would be meaningless, and is not involved in the argument.

CHAPTER VIII

A COHERENT CONCEPTION OF THE SELF FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PERSONALISM

1. Conclusions of the investigation

(1) Ward's epistemology, rational empiricism, involves the monadic unity and identity of the self. Experience is conceived as a unity of cognition, feeling and interest. The privacy of the monad, conceived in the contrast of self with other selves, is transcended in intersubjective intercourse.

(2) Ward's rational empiricism, in conceiving knowledge as the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience, because it abstracts and hypostatizes transcendental aspects that can only be understood by their membership in the concrete self, involves an incomplete organic view of the self.

(3) Ward's rational empiricism involves a mentalistic metaphysics. Knowledge, whether apprehended in sense experience as presentation or developed in intersubjective intercourse as thought, is the experience of selves, and is mental.

(4) In Ward's rational empiricism, an activistic metaphysics of the self is involved in his view of attention, conation, and teleological response to its environment. Teleological response implying choice also involves metaphysical freedom.

(5) Ward's rational empiricism conceives knowledge as a development in a world of process, which implies space and time. The view of the self as a unity transcends space, and time is transcended in the conception of the retentiveness of the objective continuum.

(6) A view of the self as a monad is involved in Tennant's phenomenalism (genetico-analytical epistemology) which conceives of consciousness as a duality in unity in which the pure ego (subject) and empirical ego (object) are a numerically identical self.

(7) In Tennant's phenomenalism, the breakdown of consciousness into pure and empirical ego involves an incomplete organic unity of the self.

(8) Tennant's phenomenalism conceives the pure ego as conscious experience, but the qualitative metaphysics of ultimate Reality and the sensa caused by it and the pure ego jointly are held to be unknowable. The qualitative metaphysics of the self involved is therefore ambiguous.

(9) The pure and empirical ego in Tennant's phenomenalism are conceived as active in both empirical and transcendental aspects. In the empirical, the self chooses the qualities that are combined in the act of reification. The view involves an activism and metaphysical freedom.

(10) Tennant's phenomenalism involves time and space in their being derived as intuitions of the pure ego, a synopsis of sensuous elements. They are also both transcended, space in the metaphysical conception of the pure ego as soul to give unity and continuity to the mental life, and time in the experiences of memory and anticipation.

(11) In her refutation of historical forms of abstraction of ideas from the self, the self involved in Professor Calkins's idealistic epistemological monism is an organic unity and a monad.

(12) Professor Calkins's interpretations and critical estimates of modern philosophers, from which her epistemological presuppositions are derived, involve mentalism; the self is conscious experience. This is especially clear in her denial of Cartesian dualism and endorsement of the idealism of Berkeley, Leibniz, and Hegel.

(13) Professor Calkins regards Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as of paramount epistemological importance. The view involves process, time and the transcendence of time.

(14) The Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self conceives consciousness as the fundamental fact in a conception of the self. Both the pure ego and its presentations are mental. For this interpretation, both in the theory of attention and the related theory of psychoplasm, presentations have been regarded as appearances of the environment to a self.

(15) From the standpoint of discussion, that of private individual experience, from the wholeness of the objective continuum together with refutation of series theories of the self thereby precluding atomism, a monadic view of the self is involved in the Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self.

(16) In the treatment of some empirical aspects of the self as organically related to it, the Tennant-Wardian psychology recognizes the importance of a view of the self as an organic unity. But because other aspects are treated as ultimately separable, a complete organic unity has not been attained.

(17) The various empirical and transcendental aspects of the self in the Tennant-Wardian view are conceived as active in functioning. Voluntary and involuntary activity are discriminated, and the view as a whole involves activism.

(18) All empirical aspects of the self in the Tennant-Wardian conception involve choice. Further, personality is conceived as creating an ideal of self, and by the choice of ideals from its environment, directs its development by means of self-imposed ideals. Metaphysical freedom is involved.

(19) In the Tennant-Wardian psychology, all present experiences of the self, its memories of the past and anticipations of the future, and the conception of the plasticity of the continuum involve time and the transcendence of time.

(20) Personality, in the Tennant-Wardian psychology finds meaning and purpose in life, and directs its progress in the light of ideals. This, if taken with its mentalistic metaphysics and the transcendence of time involve the possibility of immortality.

(21) All literary forms of the psychological thought of Professor Calkins, constructive discussion as well as refutation of psychological theories that imply behavioristic metaphysics, involve mentalism.

(22) The concrete unity implied in Professor Calkins's psychological conception of the related self and her view of the uniqueness and privacy of individual experience involve a monadic view of the self.

(23) In Professor Calkins's self-psychology, all empirical and transcendental aspects of the self are related to it. Together with her repudiation of the abstraction implied in structural and functional standpoints in psychology and her recognition of the views of biological personalists and Gestaltists as allied to self-psychology in their organic conception of the self, a view of the self as an organic unity is involved.

(24) In the highly significant conception of Professor Calkins's self-psychology, the related self, it is presupposed and implied that the self is the relater of its various empirical aspects, which are all treated as active. Activism is involved.

(25) Professor Calkins's self-psychology argues the possibility of deliberative choice in preference to easy inclination and habit. Metaphysical freedom is involved.

(26) In Professor Calkins's most recent view of the First Book, failure of argument to imply a method of conceiving the immediate experience of self, on reaching the temporal consciousness results in a psychological monism, in which temporal aspects of the self are confused with

the events to which they refer. An inadequate metaphysics of time is accordingly involved.

(27) When Ward holds theism to be a demand of reason in its theoretical and practical aspects, the ultimate reality of the finite self and a mentalistic view are involved. His complete pan-psychism and view of society as an organic unity, consciousness in general, implement a mentalistic metaphysics of the self.

(28) Negatively, in the argument refuting naturalism's theory of mind as epiphenomenon and psycho-physical parallelism, and positively, in argument for the teleological unity of nature as an inference from the self, an organic conception of the self as a concrete unity of experience is involved.

(29) In Theistic Monadism, Ward argues that the notion of causal efficiency is derived from experience of the active self, and teaches that creation is mediated by finite selves in an epigenetic process. These arguments involve activism.

(30) Ward's argument for theism as the practical demand for the perfect good of the world, towards which the historical world continually strives without realization, involves space and time; the transcendence of space and time; and given the nature of God as love, which he also maintains, immortality of the finite self.

(31) Tennant's Cosmic Teleology involves an ambiguous position as to qualitative metaphysics of the self. A mentalistic metaphysics is involved in arguments which conceive of the ultimate Reality of the world as best interpreted in terms of intelligence, purpose and value, and of God similarly on the analogy of intelligent, purposeful and ethical personality. But since substance-cause (thing in itself) is as proximate as ultimate reality can be determined, neither spiritualism nor dualism can be proved to the exclusion of the other, and agnosticism is implied.

(32) That the world is not a chaos of disparates, but a cosmos of thoroughgoing adaptedness, a coherent whole intelligible by teleological inference of selves, presupposes the world as an organic whole, and accordingly a view of the self as a monad and an organic unity.

(33) From arguments which base both his conception of the metaphysical ultimate, substance-cause, and the fundamental relation of God to the world, creation, on analogy with the activity of the finite self, Tennant's Cosmic Teleology involves an activistic metaphysics of the self.

(34) Tennant's insistence on the "delegated autonomy" of the ontal creatures, substance-causes, and that the immanence of God must not be thought in any way that would

violate their autonomy, that although God is their ground, they are none the less planted out, separate and distinct from him, together with Tennant's repudiation of mechanistic naturalism involve the freedom of the finite self.

(35) In Tennant's Cosmic Teleology, his view of the organic and inorganic levels of the world's existence as historical, and his conception of divine ~~fore~~-knowledge involve time. Fore-knowledge involves the transcendence of time, at least by the divine Self.

(36) Consummation of the divine purpose of creating beings with moral aspirations, given the divine nature of righteousness and love as Tennant conceives them, involves immortality.

(37) In Professor Calkins's personalistic absolutism, the finite self, conceived as separate from, though related to the absolute, is a unity of complex aspects. It is a person related to its objects, and confronts a unique duty and destiny. A view of the self as a monad and an organic unity is involved.

(38) The panpsychistic view of organic and inorganic nature in personalistic absolutism, the refutation of extramental metaphysics and the implied relation of Professor Calkins's own metaphysical thought to Hegel's objective idealism and that of Royce involve a mentalistic metaphysics of the self.

(39) Professor Calkins takes activity and attention as the criteria for differentiating the higher levels of self-hood in the panpsychistic order, and conceives the finite self in her personalistic absolutism as free to perform its obligation. This view involves an activistic metaphysics.

(40) The ability of the finite self in Professor Calkins's personalistic absolutism endlessly to perform its duty and to employ its will even to the extent of rebellion against the absolute self, involves real, though not absolute freedom. It is real because the self exercises its choice and is free from external constraint. It is not absolute because its rebellion in the long run can only be futile.

(41) Professor Calkins's personalistic absolutism combines a view of the finite person as a non-atomic self with a conception of the body as only a symbol of self, and of the moral consciousness as requiring and capable of fulfilling infinite duty. Immortality is involved in the view.

(42) In Professor Calkins's argument for the absolute self, basically due to an inadequate view of time, the qualitative metaphysics of the self involved is ambiguous. The absolute is conceived as empirically analogous to the

finite self, yet as non-temporal, ontologically and ethically complete. Hence it lacks process, time and consequently purpose. Because of this ambiguity, a negative conclusion is reached as to its activism and freedom.

(43) In conceiving the absolute self on the empirical analogy of the finite self and also as all-inclusive of finite selves, who are monads, the view presents logical contradiction, because the numerical singularity of a monad and a plurality of included monads are logically incompatible. The view involves an ambiguous view of the self as an organic unity and a monad.

(44) Eternal, defined as non-temporal, is an attribute of the absolute self as viewed by Professor Calkins. But non-temporality excludes time which is necessary, if eternity and immortality are to be meaningful. An inadequate view of immortality of the absolute self is involved.

2. Critical development of conclusions

The conclusions of the investigation will be developed in the course of elaborating a coherent (systematically consistent) metaphysics of the self from the standpoint of personalism, based on a criticism of the views considered. By personalism is meant the metaphysical view that the ultimate reality of the universe is personal, and that theism is true.

(1) Experience of the self

i. Consciousness is the foundation-fact

(i) All our philosophers have maintained that the self is 'given' in consciousness, and the view is critically accepted. The Tennant-Wardian conception identifies the self with subject or pure ego, but this has been criticized as unwarranted and leading to confusion, as it does when Tennant later interprets the pure ego as metaphysical soul implying an ambiguous qualitative metaphysics. Most contemporary philosophers who are aware of this fact employ the more accurate term, self, as Professor Calkins does. The right usage of "soul" is in historical reference only. However, to expunge it from popular religious vocabulary would engender misunderstanding and confusion. Here, in order to avoid dualistic meaning, the term "spirit" which has the merit of religious familiarity and philosophical accuracy could well be substituted. The philosopher, however, must adhere to the logically correct term for both psychology and metaphysics, self.

(ii) Methods of conceiving the self as 'given' in consciousness vary and the views of the three philosophers are only accepted with modification. The Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self maintains that consciousness "always involves a subject." The term subject is an epistemological term, properly used as correlative with

object, only as a temporarily abstract aspect of the whole self with reference to its knowing function. So too, the "pure ego" implies the contrast with "empirical ego," an unwarranted hypostatization of rational function and sense experience of the one whole self. Professor Calkins rightly holds that the self is immediately given, that is not requiring proof. But her epistemological monism fails to discriminate from the datum, which is a sensory complex, the transcendent self of experience. With these modifications we conclude that consciousness is always self-experience.

ii. Ultimate nature of consciousness metaphysically true but inadequate Cartesian insight

Modern philosophy owes to Descartes the distinction of the ultimate nature of consciousness. However metaphysically imperfect his conception, his dualism of disparate substances and imperfect view of consciousness, which we repudiate, was a necessary stage, but only a stage, in the development of modern thought. To have argued the existence of the self from its conscious activity, cogito, ergo sum, "I", the thinker and doubter, "am", was to assert an indubitable truth that has never been successfully refuted, and also to establish without comprehending it, a criterion for the nature of ultimate reality. In view of the contemporary materialism of behaviorism and

neo-realism, it is refreshing to recall the distinction which Descartes made between res cogitans and res extensa, thought and extension.[1] There is real merit in the estimate of the significance of Descartes by Falckenberg.

> This clear and simple distinction which sets bounds to every confusion of spiritual and material existence was an act of emancipation; it worked on the sultry intellectual atmosphere of the time with the purifying and illuminating power of a lightning flash.[2]

iii. Self-experience and the datum self

(i) The term self-experience is used in preference to self-consciousness. The term self-consciousness is used by Ward and Tennant to involve the genetic process of attaining self-knowledge. The conception is intended to mean that self-consciousness involves a self. It has been criticized, and instead it is maintained that all consciousness is experience of self. Self is 'given' in the datum. Introspection reveals the experience of self as always related to its environment. In other words, consciousness does not occur in a vacuum, but is always of something or somebody.

(ii) In point of temporal occurence, this consciousness is the datum, prior to observation and analysis. It is not entirely the "blooming, buzzing confusion" that William James conceived the infant to have, but a relatively undiscriminated sensory complex, from which the active self soon discriminates the sound of the fire-gong passing the

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[1] Descartes, Meditations, in Rand, MCP, 127.
[2] Falckenberg~~, HMP, 96.~~

street, the tick of the clock, the chest of drawers and the waste-basket in the room, etc. Simultaneously, these meanings are recognized as those of the self to which they are related. But the experience of self and its environment of fire-gong, clock, chest of drawers, and waste-basket are never, as Professor Calkins maintains in her epistemological monism, identified with the self that experiences them, but transcends it. Says Pratt, in the opening paragraph of his chapter on epistemological dualism, "some sort of dualistic view of mind and its objects has been common since the dawn of human thinking."[3] Stating the distinction otherwise, it is recalled that since Fichte, some philosophers in conceiving the dualism, have referred to what we have termed the datum self as involving self and not-self. For the personalist the significant facts are that the metaphysical nature of the object is mental because it is in the mind, that the object is related to the self as a whole, and also transcends the self, as that which is intended or referred to.

(2) The self and its environment

i. The datum and the whole self

One of the fundamental facts of consciousness is that it occurs in time. Professor Calkins rightly states that

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[3] Drake et al (ed) ECR, 85.

the psychologically basic fact of consciousness of time is the experience of the self as changing. "One part of mind sinks into the past and a new part grows into the future."[4] But as a good bookkeeper carries forward his balances from day to day, so in an indefinitely regressive series of memory linkages, the self, transcending its present experience, connects it with experiences of the past. Conversely, in the purposing of future ends which are anticipated, the self projects itself into the future and effects transcendence of time in the opposite direction. Past and future with principles involved are epitomized in the specious present, aptly referred to figuratively by Tennant as a "saddle-back not a knife-edge." They constitute the whole self, infinitely more complex and richer than the "poverty stricken" self of a given moment.[5] The momentary self is but a problem, to which the whole self gives meaning.

We must now pause to weigh the truths that have emerged, and to indicate first certain basic immanent principles of mind implied in the argument. The most fundamental of these principles, because experience is impossible apart from it, is "time." Along with it must also be mentioned

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[4] Brightman, POI, 19.

[5] Brightman, POI, 20ff; Tennant, PT, I, 83. The figure used by Tennant is used earlier by Josiah Royce and William James.

the inherent capacity of the self, in memory and anticipation to "transcend" time in a single act. Another fundamental principle of the self is its "rational"function. Indeed, Ward and Tennant regard the rational (interpretative) function of the self as of primary significance for knowledge. In place of the scholastic notion followed by some modern philosophers, that reason is a special divinely imparted faculty, a lumen naturale, we can fully agree with Tennant's account of the empirical genesis of reason, since on the personalistic basis, even if only the capacity is innate, the divine immanence is none the less a fact for its being an evolutionary product. At least it is maintained that the rational nature of the self is evidenced in its outreach to grasp the diversities of its environment in terms of its own unity and identity, and so to understand them. A third fundamental principle of the self is its "purpose." As again Ward and Tennant insistently emphasize, the self is never merely rational (cognitive) but also conative. The element of desire and striving after some end, either simple or complex, is always present. This normative character of the self added to its rational nature is at the basis of all ideals and values, from creaturely comforts to the summum bonum of religion, the experience of God.

We can now estimate the importance of the concept of the whole self. The first and most important for a coherent conception of the self is that it is the unity of self-experience, and this unity further implies self-identity. My consciousness of today is linked by memory to the childhood self of many years ago, and is evidenced by the fact that involuntarily there breaks into present experience without assignable reason therefor, some secular or religious song that can be definitely dated as belonging to experience of childhood days, and I recognize myself as identical with the childhood self of then.

> The unity and uniting memory of the mind are possible because the mind grasps its experiences of time in an act, that, so to speak, rises above time and looks down on it.[6]

The second important implication of the concept of the whole self is the "category of self-transcendence," by means of which the self interprets its environment and attains knowledge. Professor Calkins has introduced us to that specter of the philosophical imagination, solipsism, namely, that to maintain the mental view of the known is thereby to affirm the non-existence of the environment of nature and other persons. This view to which she wrongly subscribes, is contrary both to sound common sense and to a coherent philosophy of experience. The per-

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[6] Brightman, POI, 21.

sonalist holds that the facts of memory and self-transcendence, in which the self interprets its present experience by reference to its past, merely environment of consciousness until in memory it becomes present datum, are a coherent verification of the hypothesis of an environment, and sufficient refutation of solipsism. The self, because of its rational and self-transcending nature interprets its datum in the light of its whole experience, and finds its hypothesis of existence of an environment amply justified. The environment of nature and persons is known by virtue of its category of self-transcendence, and Perry's philosophical taunt of an ego-centric predicament, in which the self is shut up within the circle of its own ideas, utterly fails as a serious criticism of personalistic idealism.[7] In its act of transcendence, the self discriminates its environment, and appealing to reason, verifies its hypothesis as coherent with experience.

ii. The self and its physical environment

The reality of knowledge of the physical environment established, we can now proceed to discriminate the various parts of that environment. We have seen how parts of it, because below the threshold of consciousness, and sometimes referred to as subconscious, may through memory

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[7] Perry, PPT, 129f.

become part of the datum, and that we interpret present experience in the light of that environment. It remains now to investigate the physical parts of that environment. (i) Closest of all, and sometimes because of its proximity identified with the self is the body. That it is environment is evident in the fact that no part of it appears in consciousness to be immediately experienced, but like nature of which it is a part, is something referred to, a verified hypothesis to account for our conscious experience of it. It is the closest environment of self, yet we have no immediate experience of it. (ii) The historical phase of the mind-body problem has been stated.[8] We have also noted Ward's solution of it. Mind and body are both monads. The former 'dominant,' the latter 'ministering,' implies their interaction. Tennant's position is not unambiguous, but implies dualism. From his failure to follow up the psychophysical account of neural stimulation by offering an argument implying a theory of sensa compatible with the dualism which his position involves, it can only be concluded that while admitting the view of spiritualism to be coherent, he has reached no satisfactory solution of the problem. Professor Calkins's view, similar to Ward's, in that mind is dominant, body 'subordinate' monad, implies interaction.

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[8] Cf. 214.

However, Tennant's view that the self is "clothed with our (its) habitation which is from earth," and also that the body conditions knowledge, accords with the personalistic view that the body is the closest environment of self, and that there is mutual interaction between self and its body. We continue the personalistic statement of the relation between mind and body, and it is maintained that the self is constantly affected by this closest part of its physical environment, in particular the brain and central nervous system, and that in turn, the self responds to its physical environment. It becomes a real cause, and introduces changes in the environment that are often regarded as miraculous. The New Testament miracles of healing most coherently regarded as the effect of a benign, sympathetic, and helpful personality upon distressed pathological personalities, are hardly more miraculous than the twentieth century miracle, the creation of our contemporary civilization by persons organized into a society. The survival in contemporary society of vestigial remnants of its "nasty and brutish" past both emphasize the contrast with that past and constitute a challenge to contemporary persons to shift emphasis from creativity in the 'realm of nature'

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9. Miraculous is here used in the sense of transcending scientific formulation of phenomenally observed antecedent and consequent, but not contrary to nature, metaphysically conceived.

to creativity in the realm of mind. In any instance, whether the influence experienced be referred to one's own body or the bodies of other selves, as in the case of healing, or to remoter parts of nature as in the transformation of physical nature into contemporary civilization, the point insisted on is that selves respond to their environment and cause changes in it.

To carry this fact of interaction between mind and body a step further, one may speak of the mind-body relation as a paradox. It is the closest environment of self, yet no part of it is immediately experienced. So far as we know, it is essential to the existence of the finite self. Using Ward's concept, it is the servant of the self, through which the self finds its power of expression. From the humble yet much desired, importance of recognition by other persons to the most significant social relationships and values at the basis of family life and organized society, the body serves as the medium of self-expression and self-realization. The flirtatious eye-wink of the incipient lover, the glamorized bodily appearance, that attracts movie fans, and becomes instrumental to aesthetic and economic value, the spiritual meaning of the body of an apotheosized Roman or Japanese emperor, deified not for moral excellence, but as symbol of unity

of the state, or the body-posture of the religious worshipper, - all speak eloquently of the importance of the body as a medium of expression for the self. Further, the body is frequently conceived as a medium of divine communication. Not only the rumble of the earth-quake and sight of cloud and fire among the ancient Hebrews, but to many a modern God becomes real, when through eye and ear, physical nature, with its thousand voices, proclaim his invisible presence.

Paradoxically, the body, being that part of nature closest to the self, still contains surviving elements of the struggle for existence, and so harbors "loathsome fellow-lodgers," who often render the joint tenancy intolerable for the primary self and the major source of his physical evil. Parasites and sappers from within, they finally destroy the bodily habitation itself. But the paradox, in recognizing the very intimate relation of body and mind, merely emphasizes the fact of their mutual interaction.

(iv) A statement of the personalistic view of nature can now be made. Nature is conceived as the divine experience, the ceaseless activity of God in the universe, the product of his thought and of the "Living Will which not only worketh hitherto, but worketh ever-

more."[10] From the standpoint of the personalist, the laws of nature are descriptions of the phenomenally observed regularities of antecedent and consequent.

> Considered in itself, nature is simply a form of working for the expression and realization of a thought or plan. Its continuity is intellectual, and all its laws and phenomena, its constants and variables, are to be understood from the side of this plan.[11]

iii. The self and its environment of other selves

(i) Perhaps the most significant part of the environment of the self, because of the meaning of that environment for the development of its rational and ideal nature is the environment of other selves. Their bodies and communication of speech and gesture are the only signs which we have of their existence and presence. (ii) Knowledge of the existence of other selves unlike our own self-experience is an inference. There is probably some degree of truth in the Tennant-Wardian view of knowledge of other selves by ejective analogy. The personalist holds that knowledge of other selves is in part by ejective analogy being presupposed and implied by the presence of their bodies in the environment, in the social instincts of one's own physical organism, in the rational nature of the

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[10] Bowne, MET, 16.
[11] Bowne, MET, 385.

self and the social nature of knowledge. This hypothesis we find amply justified in experience, and solipsism is no problem. (iii) At this point we also call attention to the divergence of the personalistic view from the epistemological basis of knowledge of other selves held by Professor Calkins and presented in exposition of her epistemological monism. According to that view mediate knowledge of other selves is based upon knowledge of their common inclusion as different parts of the absolute.[12]

iv. 'Self' and 'person'

Before this conception of the self from the personalistic standpoint is further developed, the term 'person' must be defined and its relation to 'self' stated. A person is to begin with a conscious being, implying self-experience. A person, in a word, is a self. Professor Calkins has been criticized for failure to carry this definition further. It is only a starting point. The following definition has the merit of being brief, yet complete. "A person is a self that is potentially self-conscious, rational and ideal."[13] This would exclude from personality the inanimate 'bare' monads and inorganic selves of the pan psychist. In particular, reference is made to Professor Calkins's admittedly unverified hypothe-

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[12] Cf. 91.

[13] Brightman, POR, 350.

sis of pan-psychism and her view of inorganic selves as uncommunicative. It is only when we think of them in terms of the inferred sense images of the scientist that we can regard them as doing and suffering.

In maintaining the existence of the rational and ideal innate potentialities of the self, the personalist implies his position on the controversy between Locke and Leibniz as to the nature of the mind. It is no passive _tabula rasa_ on which the environment makes impressions resulting in experience, as Locke assumed. Rather, the innate potentialites of the self and its active response to environment make experience possible. Further, the view implies the nature of the categories of thought. They do not come into existence independently of the synthetic processes of experience, but are "principles necessary to the universe of discourse" because they are developed in the organization of experience.

Part of the environment of self is social. The fully rational self attains its development only in active commerce with other selves. Ward interprets the social nature of personality in terms of the Kantian _Bewusstsein überhaupt_, meaning that the nature of personality is vastly enriched through interaction with the organically related community of selves. Tennant defines personality

as "self-consciousness plus anything that may be superadded through the mediation of social life." The social nature of personality is fully recognized by Professor Calkins who also holds that the finite self is socially conscious. The epistemological basis of social knowledge is referred to common membership in the absolute.[14] We conclude, then, in agreement with our philosophers, that response of the self to its social environment by developing the innate potentialities of the self, is largely the source of its rationality, ideals and values, and venture the suggestion that it is also the basis of our conception of God as other person.

(3) The self is a monad

i. In its individuality

We turn to what the personalist regards as an essential characteristic of the self, it is a monad in the Leibnizian sense. We have already discussed its conscious experience. Now we note further that the self is an individual in the numerical sense and also in the sense of its peculiarity and privacy. Says Leibniz:

> Each monad must differ from every other, for there are never two beings in nature perfectly alike, and in which it is impossible to find an internal difference, or one founded on some intrinsic denomination.[15]

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[14] Cf. 91.

[15] Leibniz, The Monadology in Rand, MCP, 200.

However pervasive empathy may be, or however sympathetically one may try to think or feel with another, the boundary lines of distinction between selves are never erased. The self is a haeceitas, definitely a this, not the other.[16] Only each self can know its own experience. So too, each self has its distinctive point of view, that however similar, is never quite the same as another's. Our view of individuality corresponds to Professor Calkins's trait of uniqueness.

ii. In its unity

Further, the self is a monad in the sense of unity. Consciousness is experienced as a complex, and this has been shown in the concept of the datum and the whole self, but it is also a unity. To use Stern's term, it is a unitas multiplex.[17] It is the unity of self-experience.

(4) Unity and organicism

The view of the self as a unity leads to the conception of organic wholeness as Hegel conceived it. Organicism is maintained as opposed specifically to two other conceptions noted in the course of this investigation. One is the atomic view of consciousness as discrete impressions, held by Hume, and in modern times, by Mach and Pearson, to

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[16] The term, although not the application, is from Duns Scotus.

[17] Stern, GP, 36.

the error of whose phenomenalism Professor Calkins also calls attention. Hume overlooked the conscious self, because in the abstraction of its ideas from the self, he failed to see that each idea is to be regarded as a part of the whole self, and as "owned" by a concrete self. The organic view of self precludes equally the hypostatized abstraction of a subject and object, as in the Tennant-Wardian conception. These terms are rightly used only in connection with the knowing functions of the self, when the subject is temporarily distinguished from the datum, and correlated with its object, also an abstraction. The Tennant-Wardian view has accordingly been criticized for conceiving these hypostatized abstractions as epistemologically ultimate. On the contrary, the personalistic conception is that the self is a concrete whole of these aspects that are only analytically distinguishable, but not ultimately separable.

> Every phase of the self is so interconnected with every other in the self as a whole that no single experience can be understood until it is interpreted in the light of its membership in the whole self.[18]

This view of the self, which precludes such philosophical vagaries as that of a Schopenhauer, who held that a metaphysics can be developed on the basis of (idea and)

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[18] Brightman, in Barrett, CIA, 72.

will as supreme, maintains equally that the complete abstraction for analytic psychological study of the functions of consciousness, thought, feeling, and will by the psychologist can result in only an unscientific view of each. Rather, as Hocking expresses it:

> Emotion is simply thought becoming concrete, showing its meaning in the body... Will is the continuous consent to (or dissent from) the embodying process, saying to thought, "Be thou actual."[19]

It should be added to complete the conception of the self as an organic whole which Hocking fails to do, that conversely all thought is permeated with the kindling fires of emotion and the driving activity of will.

(5) The personalist maintains an activistic metaphysics of the self

To complete a coherent metaphysics of the self, its activity must be made explicit. Activity is used in the sense of "occasional" rather than ultimate causal efficiency.[20] Since the activity of the finite self is "never pure, wholly self-determining, or self-creating action," the personalist, here differing from Ward, regards ultimate causal activity as having its source in the Cosmic Self.[21]

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[19] Hocking, SBF, 83.

[20] According to J. E. Newhall in Ferm (ed) EOR. the theory of occasionalism, earlier held by Geulincx and Malebranche was adapted by Bowne to personalism. It is further noted that Berkeley, to whose thought Bowne acknowledges indebtedness, also held an occasionalist theory.

[21] Brightman, in Barrett, CIA, 194. Knudson, POP, 232.

The question emerges in this context, even prior to a more extended discussion of freedom in a later paragraph, "What under the occasionalistic view of causality is the status of human freedom?" The important distinction must first be noted between volition as conative action, which may be merely an involuntary movement, and volition as the purpose of a self. A further distinction must be made between volition in the latter sense and the activity of a body which the personalist regards as a concomitant divine and human experience. Because self, human and divine, may be coherently regarded as metaphysically harmonious, interaction is logically facilitated. By its volition, the human self elicits divine causal efficiency which is available in the body. The choices of a self are an expression of its own purpose, hence freedom is unimpaired. Activity is real, because while the act is executed by the human self, the ultimate causal efficiency is referred to the Cosmic Self. The personalist thus regards the concomitant relation as a cooperative divine and human experience.

The contemporary physicist has abandoned the notion of inert matter in favor of the dynamic conception of ceaseless energy. The personalist refers the activity of the universe to the ceaseless activity of God in the universe. It is in the experience of ourselves as conative,

desiring goals and then striving after their realization, of purposing ends and then moving to their achievement, that we conceive at all of motion and activity. As Ward pointed out in his refutation of naturalism,we then transfer our own experience of causal power into objects in the attempt to render the world intelligible. In distinction from Ward, since finite activity always involves other than self, the personalist holds that the activity which finite selves experience is the phenomenal "occasion" of the divine activity. Further, that the source of ultimately real causal efficiency, often wrongly attributed to electrons and protons, is also to be attributed to the activities of the Cosmic Self, God.

(6) Freedom of the finite self

i. Activity as ultimate cause and freedom of the finite self

The conception of activity as the ceaseless activity of God in the universe leads naturally to an investigation of the problem of finite freedom. It is important that freedom first be defined. It is the power of ultimate choice. At once the question confronts us, does activity as the personalist conceives it, as ultimately divine causal agency, in any way violate the autonomy of the finite self? Is freedom metaphysically real? The personalist distinguishes between freedom in the empirical and

freedom in the metaphysical sense. By empirical freedom is meant the fact that we have an immediate feeling of freedom. We experience ourselves as free to choose, and having chosen, that we might have chosen otherwise. Almost stoically, one may experience a "bloody but unbowed" head. Further, there is the experience of obligation and remorse or blame when obligation is unfilfilled. The feeling of obligation implies empirical freedom. Metaphysical freedom involves a "spontaneous and self-determining act."

ii. The personalist regards metaphysical freedom as reconcilable with the principle of mechanism

While the personalist asserts empirical freedom as an indubitable fact, he also goes further, and repudiates deterministic theories that would make mechanism "the sole and complete explanation of all events," --that of the naturalist who holds that a given event experienced by the self is wholly determined externally and mechanically by an antecedent cause, and that of the physiological psychologist, who regards the self as completely determined by physiological mechanisms. The personalist believes that scientists have amply demonstrated the validity of the principle of determination of consequent by antecedent. It is because we are able, on the basis of this principle, to depend on the regularities of external nature and our

own bodies, that we can predict the regularities conducive to bodily health and personal efficiency.

The personalist agrees with the naturalist that there are no uncaused events, but contrary to him, insists that in metaphysical freedom, the real decisive factor is not external to the self, but immanent to his consciousness. Nevertheless, the personalist recognizes the fact that he must, whether desirable or not, accept the universe as it is constituted, and this implies limitation both of the self and its environment, within which choice must be made. The course of action may some time have to be charted with inadequate knowledge, in the presence of a devastating hurricane, bereavement of loved ones, loss of property, personal suffering, or even all of these combined. The range of choice then becomes narrow and precarious, but none the less remains. Freedom, because of these considerations, has been regarded as existing in degrees.

Or again, it is recognized that selves experience process and development, and that freedom is largely an attainment. The free self, who refuses to conform to derogatory social patterns that involve moral risk, as contrasted with the self who lives on the principle of unrestrained impulse, has often gradually earned his freedom through the long sustained practice of making deliberate decisions in the light of a fixed ideal of personality:

A given choice may then be interpreted as conditioned by the cumulative moral strength gained in the experience of earlier choices. This is nevertheless true freedom, because it is freedom from coercion external to the self.

(7) Personalism and the belief in the immortality of finite persons

i. Meaning of immortality and its rise in experience

By immortality is meant the survival of persons after death. Empirically the belief in immortality, like the belief in God, is normally a product of the religious consciousness. In almost every religion whose history has been studied, this belief has been a central article of faith, in the religious practices of the North American Indian and of the South Pacific islanders, discovered by the modern anthropologists no less than the cult of the dead, which formed the central feature of the religion of ancient Egypt. Even early (Hinayana) Buddhism, which lacked both the belief in a personal God and the belief in immortality was in time succeeded by the developed (Mahayana) form, in which belief in immortality and in a personal God are cardinal articles of faith. Although historically, the two beliefs are usually concomitant, it is to be noted that the relation is not one of necessary dependence, but rather that both spring out of the common soil of experience.

In his discussion of the psychological origins of the belief in immortality, Pratt makes a fourfold division, based either on "primitive credulity, habit and authority; on reason; on some form of feeling; or on will." He also believes there is evidence to show that the belief in immortality arises less from authority than does the belief in God. As evidence, he cites the well-known fact that while a child must be taught to believe in God, as he must also be explicitly taught the belief in a future life, belief in the continuity of life is more natural and is taken for granted, while "it is the fact of death that has to be taught."[22] The empirical facts of the rise of the belief in immortality are established in connection with weak arguments that have been alleged against it as due to "easy belief" and wishful thinking. The belief is rooted universally in the soil of human experience.

ii. The crucial argument against immortality

(i) The belief in immortality encounters a crux in the more seriously advanced argument of the physiological psychologist that consciousness is dependent for its functions on the body, specifically on the brain and nervous system, of which it is the product. It might be argued however, as implied in the citation of Professor

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[22] Pratt, RC, 224f.

Calkins from J. M. E. McTaggart, atheist believer in immortality, that because the self in a spatial cosmic order is dependent on its body for stimulation, it does not logically follow that it must of necessity exercise its functions only in connection with a body.[23] The self is not spatial and has functions as its own unity and obligation, in which it transcends space. While this argument does not finally dispense with the counter argument against immortality, it shows at least that dependence on an object whose primary characteristic is said to be spatial has not been completely shown, and this fact tends to diminish the cruciality of the argument from physiological psychology. (ii) More decisive is the refutation by the personalist of the materialistic and positivistic postulate which the argument of the physiological psychologist presupposes. The personalist contends that the dogma that consciousness is a product of bodily physical process rests not on scientific observation, but on the speculative metaphysics of the materialist, who regards physical objects as causal substances, matter in motion, euphemized as physiological process. But the theory of the materialist fails to account for the rationality, order, and law-abiding uniformities of phenomena, which are cogently explicable only by reference to a common intelligent causal agency.

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[23] Cf. 304

Further, that consciousness could be caused by the unconscious, intelligence and purpose by the inanimate is a highly improbable hypothesis, which is not worthy of being seriously entertained. (iii) Personalism has advanced its hypothesis of the interaction of mind and body, in which the body is regarded as ultimately the product of the divine will in action. On this hypothesis, in which interaction is not between disparate substances, but between finite mind and Cosmic mind, a more coherent and far more explicable account is given of the phenomena of mind-body interaction. Further, in consciousness itself is found a clue to the nature of ultimate reality. Taken in their connectedness, the personalist believes his position to draw the sting from the argument for physiological psychology against immortality, because materialism on which the argument rests, is unproved assumption, and the universe is more coherently believed to be of the nature of mind.[24]

iii. Arguments for the belief in immortality

(i) The personalist calls attention to the traditional arguments for the immortality of the soul as spiritual substance, hence immaterial, indivisible, and not subject to dissolution. He finds the conception of a

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[24] Lamont, IOI, 109-110. Brightman, POR, 395ff.

substantial soul to present a contradiction which, however, intended to express an empirical truth, the self-identical unity and continuity of conscious life. These are the characteristics which the personalist attributes to the self. Furthermore, the personalist has shown that the self is a real causal agent, "that it fills out the notion of true being more completely than any other form of finite existence." He therefore contends that argument from the mentalistic nature of the self is strongly presumptive of its continued existence after death.[25]

(ii) The personalist also advances an argument from the belief in the extension of purpose. The purposive nature of the self has been shown in its capacity for development on the basis of ideals. As a test of the validity of a belief, Bowne proposes its rootage in "the great catholic interests and tendencies of the race," the primacy of the practical reason.[26] The catholicity of the belief in immortality has been shown in the introductory paragraph of this section.[27] Man accepts the belief as true because it satisfies natural yearning for life and the desire for the realization of noble purposes and aspirations. The creative literary genius, in far advanced age

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25. Knudson, POP, 327.
26. Bowne, TH, 126.
27. Cf. 374.

feels that he has not said the thousandth part of what is in him, and that his life's work is so far from being completed, that continuity of purpose requires its extension beyond the arbitrary time-limit interposed by the interruption of death. The constant striving and progressive, yet incomplete realization of values imply, as Ward shows, continued development in self-realization. The death of many of mankind's most creative workers at an early age, and an ingrained belief in the equity at the heart of the universe greatly strengthen the argument for the extension of purpose beyond death.

(iii) But the goodness of God is the most conclusive argument for immortality. While argument for the existence of God is not in the direct range of this investigation, in studies of the metaphysics of the self, the theistic arguments of Ward and Tennant in 'Theistic Monadism' and'Cosmic Teleology' have been presented, and attention is called to their high merit.

The personalist then maintains that theism is true, that "God is Supreme Person," "the source both of existence and value," that finite experience of value points to and reveals a realm of ends in which values are objective, and that values are an expression of the divine purpose. The personalist also holds that "God is the goodness in the

universe," and that "his will for goodness and love is unlimited."[28] And although the personalistic finitist regards as limited God's power to conquer finally in this life all the problems of natural and moral evil, yet he maintains there is "no definite reason for regarding the finiteness of God as a barrier to universal immortality."[29] The personalist therefore concludes that the infinitely good God "is committed to the eternal conservation of values," and that personality at its best is of infinite worth and the supreme value. Hence God is also the conserver of persons, and the belief in immortality though in the nature of the case, impossible of complete empirical verification, and incapable of absolute coercive proof, is nevertheless coherent and that sufficient reason has been shown in justification of the belief.

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[28] Brightman, ITP, 329ff; POR, 337.
[29] Brightman, POR, 407.

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THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF
INVOLVED IN THE THOUGHT OF
JAMES WARD, FREDERICK R. TENNANT,
AND MARY W. CALKINS

Abstract of a Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

The problem investigated in this dissertation is the metaphysics of the self involved in the thought of James Ward, British philosopher; his disciple, Frederick Robertson Tennant, British theologian; and Mary Whiton Calkins, American psychologist and philosopher.

Investigation of Ward's epistemology finds it to be a rational empiricism. His view of experience at its start is a concrete unity of a priori subjective elements --intuitions of space and time, feeling, conation, and attention and the objective elements of experience. Both in individual experience and in social intercourse, knowledge is a teleological development, because the experient's end of conservation of self is his paramount interest. Experience is taken to be always a unity of the duality of subject and object.

The Tennant-Wardian psychology of the self has been treated as one view. Tennant uses this psychology, originally Ward's, in the elaboration of his genetico-analytical theory of knowledge, phenomenalism. The development of self-knowledge, according to these thinkers, is a genetic process whereby "the pure ego" (subject) is known in the "empirical ego" (object). This view of the self has been rejected as unempirical, because it contains, in

the contrast analogically derived from the self and its environment, the germ of ultimate distinction, which develops in argument when knowledge of the "me" and the "I" is separated by temporal discontinuity.

Ward argues theism from the standpoint of a pluralistic monadism. The entire historical world is conceived pan-psychistically as a "realm of ends," from "bare" monads at the lowest limit of inorganic existence, conceived on as ascending order bridged by the lex continui, to "dominant" monads or souls, at the highest limit. Ward is unable to find within this pluralistic order of selves either an adequate ontological principle to account for their cosmological unity, or a spiritual principle adequate to the conservation of the experienced values of the world. He therefore invokes the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason, and postulates a purposeful being, a supreme Person, as primus inter pares of the pluralistic order. God is conceived as a Designer and creator, but limited by reason of his membership in the world of spontaneous monads.

With a view to use in his theistic argument, Tennant interprets the pure ego of the Tennant-Wardian psychology as soul substance. A historical survey of this idea finds it to be a metaphysical contradiction, which Tennant's

view of the soul as substratum "bond" for the empirical states of consciousness does not escape. It has been rejected as ambiguous. The soul may be interpreted as mental in conformity with Tennant's empirical view of the pure ego, or it may be inferred to be a qualitatively ambiguous metaphysical entity, from the figure of a "bond" that is used to characterize it.

The fundamental characterization of Tennant's epistemology, based on the Tennant-Wardian psychology, is its emphasis on the _ordo cognoscendi_ of the knowledge process. This leads to a sharp discrimination between the _a priori_ elements of the self, on the one hand, and the sense experience of external reality, on the other. Tennant regards knowledge as teleologically developed, the joint product of the self and external reality, conceived as substance-cause, an unknown thing in itself. He insists on distinguishing, though holding their inseparability in perception, the respective factors in the duality from which knowledge is thought to arise. Hence, Continental Rationalists and subjective idealists are refuted for their failure to recognize the sensory elements of experience. External reality must first be "there" to be experienced. The _qualia_ of sense data have forms and relations that are unalterable by the self. Conversely, instrumental and scientific realists are refuted for their failure to recognize the

activities of the self in the knowledge process; for knowledge is dependent on the self. Non-veridical phenomena are conclusive refutation of the epistemological realist. Tennant believes that because the dualist is unable to prove that external reality is not appearance of spirit, dualism can neither be proved nor disproved to the exclusion of spiritualism. Conversely, because sense data of qualitatively undetermined reality are presented to selves and are unalterable fact, spiritualism cannot be proved nor disproved to the exclusion of dualism.

Tennant's empirical argument for theism is based on teleological interpretation of the world. It is an order in which thought is adapted to thing, inorganic existence to organic life, and the mind to beauty. Evolutionary process seems to be guided, and to find its meaning in being instrumental to morality. This thorough-going adaptedness reasonably suggests that a purposeful Designer has created the world as a theatre for the moral development of persons. As knowledge of the soul and the world are both gained by teleological inference, so knowledge of the existence of God is thought to be a reasonably justified teleological inference. Both are noumenal rather than phenomenal knowledge.

A post-theistic survey of metaphysical theories in the light of theistic requirements for conceiving the rela-

tion of God to the world offers Tennant no further light on the qualitative metaphysics involved. The transcendent and immanent relations of God to the world can be coherently thought on the basis of either spiritualism or dualism, and no crucial argument leads Tennant to favor either view. He embraces metaphysical agnosticism.

His agnosticism has been rejected as inharmonious with the more fundamental phases of theistic argument. Theism is argued on the basis of intelligence of the human self, which furnishes analogy for the conception of God. Our knowledge though often incomplete, is nevertheless possible, because reality is not some back-lying, abstract, pure being. If our hypothesis is coherent with our already established total system of beliefs concerning reality, it must be assumed to be true, until persistent tests for coherence prove the contrary. Further, a metaphysical theory based on substance, an unempirical abstraction must be inadequate. Cause is the only empirical datum.

Professor Calkins's epistemological presuppositions are derived from her critical estimates of modern philosophers, and from her personalistic absolutism. She repudiates the agnosticism of Hume and Kant, refutes the theory of extra-mental reality of Cartesian dualism, and maintains with Berkeley, Leibniz, and Hegel that reality is of the nature of self. She refutes Hume's "bundle" theory of

the self and Kantian agnosticism, but finds Kant's crowning epistemological importance in his doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception and his corroborative teaching, implied in the nature of obligation, that the real self is knowable. Direct and immediate knowledge of self is held to involve also knowledge of absolute self, experienced as not-self, by which self is limited. Professor Calkins is an idealistic epistemological monist, because the knowing self is identical with that known part of the Absolute which it constitutes.

The standpoint of the self-psychology of Professor Calkins is first clarified by contrast with the contemporary standpoints of structural and functional psychology, which she rejects as being abstract and partial, hence un-scientific. Kinship with biological personalists and Gestalt psychologists is recognized, because they view the self as a non-atomic unity. The primary clue to understanding self-psychology is the conception of the related self, which is a concrete unity, a person. Self-psychology is not to be confused with soul psychology. The soul is a philosophical term uncritically applied to human and sub-human individuals in the history of thought, to characterize the biological principle of life, or metaphysical and ethical traits of the individual. The self is an existence sui generis, which is characterized by complex unity,

change yet identical existence, numerical individuality, and it is related to all its aspects and to its objects.

The personalistic absolutism of Professor Calkins, in agreement with implied acceptance of Hegel's objective idealism and that of her teacher, Josiah Royce, regards reality as an Individual. She offers an argument from the theory of relations as "including" and "included" to show that the Absolute is an Individual, which includes all finite selves. Following Ward, the universe is conceived pan-psychistically, and the levels of finite selves are thought as differentiated in an ascending order, on the basis of their attention and activity, from inorganic nature to inter-communicating selves. They are classified according to their ability to communicate intelligibly. The finite self is conceived as conscious experience, a complex unity of related aspects. Each is free to perform its obligation endlessly, and may even choose to rebel against the Absolute. They are thus regarded as separate from, yet related to the Absolute.

The Absolute is conceived on the empirical analogy of the finite self, but is thought as eternal, defined as non-temporal, and as ontologically and ethically complete. Its activity consists in fulfilling its purpose of constituting finite selves. The conception of the Absolute is rejected as ambiguous, primarily because of its non-

temporality. It is thought on the empirical analogy of the finite self, but it is not a self, because process and timeare essentials of mind. The Absolute, being ontologically and ethically complete, is static, and lacks purpose and choice, hence can neither beactive nor free. It is not a monad, because numerical individuality and all-inclusion of monads are incompatible. It is not immortal, for time is required if immortality is to have meaning.

This investigation has led to the following conclusions:

1. The qualitative metaphysics of the self of the three philosophers studied, when coherently thought, is mentalistic.

2. In an adequately empirical view, the self is a monad in numerical individuality, peculiarity, and organic unity.

3. Activism, and metaphysical freedom of the finite self, either partial or complete, are involved in the thought of each individual philosopher.

4. In the thought of all the philosophers, time and the transcendence of time are essential elements in an adequate metaphysics of the self.

5. An empirical account of time, in which the self is thought to be immediately given and the finite demensions of

time as simultaneously experienced in the specious present, must include a theory of self-transcendence, or result in an inadequate view of memory and anticipation, and epistemological monism.

6. Agnosticism as to qualitative metaphysics of the self is incompatible with an argument for theism based on cosmic teleology.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

STANLEY EVERTON GRANNUM

I was born in Barbados, British West Indies, October 17, 1891, the son of William Henry and Sarah Jane Grannum. My elementary and college preparatory education was received at my native home. Because the expenses at Codrington College (affiliated with Cambridge University, England), the only local college, were beyond our means, at the age of nineteen I came to the United States of America for educational opportunity. I am now a citizen of the United States by naturalization.

I matriculated at Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, and studied there during the freshman year. My edcation was continued at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, from which I graduated in 1920, Phi Beta Kappa, having majored in Philosophy and Psychology. I studied Theology at Boston University School of Theology, and was graduated in 1923 cum laude.

I am a minister of the Methodist Church ,and have served pastorates in Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio. I have also been president of Samuel Huston College, Austin, Texas, 1932-43. I am now a Professor of Systematic Theology in Gammon Theological Seminary, Atlanta, Georgia.

In 1920, following graduation from college I married Gertrude Harper, of Huston, Texas, a graduate of Wiley College. She died in 1929. My second marriage was to Breta Adelaide Walker of Cincinnati, Ohio, a graduate of the University of Cincinnati, A.B., B.Ed., and a teacher in the Cincinnati Public Schools.

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